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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
Introduction
This overview comments upon eleven administrative law
cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during its 1976-1977 term.
Several of these cases represent new departures by the court.
In Rutherford v. United States,I the Tenth Circuit set clear
standards for the FDA and the district courts in determining
whether a drug (here, Laetrile) is exempted from the "new drug"
certification procedures of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.' In
the areas of exhaustion of administrative remedies and res judicata, the court used relatively recent United States Supreme
Court decisions to clarify Tenth Circuit policies.'
In Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. v. Butz,' a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit held that feedlots are not "livestock
dealers" and thus are not subject to the registration and bonding
provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.1 In EEOC
v. Continental Oil Co.,' the Tenth Circuit decided that if an
individual has brought suit under Title VII for employment discrimination, the EEOC is limited to participating in the litigation
by intervening in the private suit. In a Federal Tort Claims Act
case, the Tenth Circuit, for the first time, held it proper to consider the effect of inflation upon future earnings!
These decisions indicate a somewhat more progressive court
than in the past. Compared to its prior three terms, 8 the Tenth
542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 9-29 infra.
See text accompanying notes 43-59 infra.
557 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 60-68 infra.
548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977).
' See text accompanying notes 116-125 infra.
9 See Overview (Third Annual Tenth Circuit Survey), Administrative Law, 54 DEN.
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Circuit has become far more willing to formulate new policy in
the field of administrative law.
I.

A.

JURISDICTION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AND SCOPE OF

REVIEW
Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976)

In Rutherford v. United States' the Tenth Circuit reviewed
a district court order enjoining the FDA from preventing appellee
Rutherford from obtaining a supply of the controversial cancer
drug Laetrile for his own use. The court upheld the preliminary
injunction on the ground that the issue of whether Laetrile is a
"new drug," so as to bring it within the certification procedures
of section 505(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act10 (the Act),
is a mixed question of law and fact which should be fully tried.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court."
The FDA contended that its administrative determination
that Laetrile was a "new drug" barred the drug's introduction
into interstate commerce without an approved new drug application (NDA) having been filed pursuant to the Act. l2 Rutherford
asserted that even if Laetrile is a drug, it is not a new drug and
hence is exempt from the NDA provisions of the Act."3
The Tenth Circuit commenced its analysis of the question of
whether Laetrile is a new drug by examining section 201(p) of the
Act," deciding that "[ilhe effect of [the statutory definition of
L.J. 7 (1977); Overview (Second Annual Tenth Circuit Survey), Administrative Law, 53
DEN. L.J. 29 (1976); Overview (First Annual Tenth Circuit Survey), Administrative Law
and Procedure, 52 DEN. L.J. 39 (1975).
542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
tO 21 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq. (1970).
542 F.2d at 1140, 1144.
" 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970) provides: "No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is effective with respect to such drug." The
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is required by this section to review the
application within a specified period on the criteria of safety and effectiveness as demonstrated by "adequate and well-controlled investigations." Such an application is reviewable directly in the court of appeals. 542 F.2d at 1140.
IId.

, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1970) provides:
The term "new drug" means(1) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or
containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such
drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific train-
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the term 'new drug'] is that there is a two-fold grandfather clause
exemption which is capable of removing Laetrile from the new
drug category even if it is not recognized by the experts as being
safe and effective .

. . ."

The first grandfather exemption, the

court said, derives from transitional provisions attached to the
1962 amendment to the Act, whereas the second grandfather exemption arises from provisions attached to the 1938 Act when it
superseded the original Food and Drug Act of 1906.16
Considering the first exemption, the court noted that prior
to the 1962 amendment the only prerequisite for a drug to avoid
classification as a new drug was recognition by qualified experts
that it was safe, but that the 1962 amendment added the requirement of "effectiveness."' 7 However, the effect of the amendment's
transitional provisions, 1" according to the court, was that if Laetrile was marketed before October 10, 1962 for "exactly the same
uses for which it is presently being sold and was generally recognized by qualified experts as safe for those uses, it is exempt...
from the test of general recognition by experts as being both safe
and effective for its claimed uses."'" The court then directed that
the questions of whether Laetrile was marketed as a cancer drug
ing and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, except that such a drug not so recognized shall
not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any time prior to enactment of this
chapter it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as
amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same representations
concerning the conditions of its use; or
(2) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or
containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such
drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness
for use under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not,
otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or for
a material time under such conditions.
IS 542 F.2d at 1141.
IId.
'7
"

Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 781 (1962)).
Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107(c)(4), 76 Stat. 781 (1962), reprinted at 21 U.S.C. § 321

note.
" 542 F.2d at 1141 (citing Tyler Pharmacal Distributors, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of HEW, 408 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir. 1969). The Tenth Circuit also cited its own decision in
United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
899 (1966) where it had previously construed the 1938 Act's definition of a "new drug,"
the 1962 amendment to the Act, and the so-called "grandfather clause." The Tyler opinion
relied heavily on Allan.
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on October 9, 1962 and whether it was then generally recognized
as safe be considered by the FDA on remand by the district
court.
The Tenth Circuit next considered the second grandfather
exemption"t and concluded that "a drug may escape the 'new
drug' machinery if it was marketed or officially recognized as a
drug at any time before June 25, 1938, but after June 30, 1906."l
The court accordingly framed the issue for future proceedings as
whether or not Laetrile was "recognized or used as a cancer drug
under the same conditions of present use during the period when
the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was in effect, June 30, 1906 to June
25, 1938."23 If so, the court said, Laetrile would be exempt from
the "new drug" procedures of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.2
The Tenth Circuit considered the question, as to whether
Laetrile was exempted from the new drug procedures by virtue
of either of the foregoing grandfather clauses, to be "substantial,
difficult and doubtful," thus supporting the grant of a preliminary injunction. 5
The court went on to examine the adequacy of the record to
support the FDA's initial determination that Laetrile is a new
drug. It appeared "doubtful" to the court that the FDA had in
fact developed an adequate record for court review, for to support
its determination the FDA would have to present "substantial
evidence . . . that Laetrile is not generally recognized among
qualified experts as 'safe and effective,' and that Laetrile is not
grandfathered by either of the exemptions discussed above.""
Therefore, conforming to the procedure established by the Su542 F.2d at 1141, 1143.
This exemption derives from the transitional provisions of the 1938 Act which
provide that a drug not recognized by qualified experts as "safe and effective"
shall not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any time prior to the enactment of this chapter (the 1938 Act) it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act
of June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the
same representations concerning the conditions of its use.
542 F.2d at 1141-1142 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1970)). The court noted that all
substances which were recognized or used as drugs at the time of passage of the 1906 Act
were subject to its wide coverage. 542 F.2d at 1141-42.
n 542 F.2d at 1142.
2 Id.
4 Id.
" Id. at 1142-43.
" Id. at 1143.
"
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preme Court in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,2 the
Tenth Circuit ordered the district court to remand the case to the
FDA for proceedings adequate to develop a record supportive of
the agency's determination, wherein Laetrile proponents would
have an opportunity to express their views. 2
The Tenth Circuit, applying Bentex, has thus left to the
FDA's sole determination the question of whether a drug such as
Laetrile is a "new drug" and hence subject to the certification
provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. However,
the Tenth Circuit has also forcefully reminded the FDA that it
cannot answer this question by administrative fiat,2 and the
court has also established clear standards for use by the FDA and
the courts in determining whether a drug is exempted from the
"new drug" procedures of the Act by one or both of its grandfather provisions.
B.

Public Service Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977)

In Public Service Co. v. FPC and its companion case, City
of Gallup v. FPC,30 the Tenth Circuit reviewed two Federal Power
Commission orders concerning a rate increase sought by Public
Service Company of New Mexico (Public Service) for electricity
sold to the City of Gallup.
In the first case, Public Service contended that the Commission erred in holding that its contract with Gallup barred Public
Service's unilateral rate increase filing.3 ' The Tenth Circuit noted
412 U.S. 645 (1973). In Bentex the Supreme Court stated: "We conclude that the
District Court's referral of the 'new drug' and the 'grandfather' issues to FDA was appropriate, as these are the kinds of issues peculiarly suited to initial determination by the
FDA." Id. at 653.
* 542 F.2d at 1143.
* The court stated that "the FDA's record is grossly inadequate and consists merely
of a conclusory affidavit of an official of the FDA which in effect declares that [Laetrile]
is a new drug because the FDA says it is .
Id. at 1140.
557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Public Service sells electric power to Gallup under a contract requiring payment
at a monthly rate, with provisions for fuel cost and tax adjustments. Articles II and XII
of the contract included other provisions which were central to this controversy. Article II
contained a paragraph entitled "Change in Rate" which included an option for Gallup to
terminate the agreement within 90 days after being given notice of a rate increase "should
the rates charged herein to the Consumer by the Company be increased for any reason
whatsoever other than fuel cost or tax adjustments.
...
Article XII stated that the
contract, including the tariff made a part thereof, was subject to "such changes or modifi-
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that its primary guidelines were furnished by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in a trilogy of electric utility cases 3
which were summarized in Richmond Power & Light v. FPC3 as
follows: "The rule of Sierra, Mobile and Memphis is refreshingly
simple: The contract between the parties governs the legality of
the filing. Rate filings consistent with contractual obligations are
valid; rate filings inconsistent with contractual obligations are
invalid. ' 34 The court examined and rejected each of Public Service's arguments in support of its claim of a right under the contract to make unilateral rate filings. The court in effect concluded
that the rate filings were inconsistent with Public Service's contractual obligations, stating that had the parties intended Public
Service to have the important right to file unilateral rate increases, the right would have been clearly provided for in the
contract rather than being left to implication.3 5
In the Gallup case, the City challenged an FPC order instituting proceedings to determine a just and reasonable rate for
Public Service pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act.3"
The challenged portion of the Commission's order stated that the
proceeding "would not entail meeting the heavy burden of proof
associated with the Mobile-Sierra decisions." 7 On appeal, the
cations as shall be ordered from time to time by any legally constituted regulatory body
having jurisdiction to require such changes or modifications." Id. at 228.
" United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103
(1958); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
481 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
, Id. at 493.
' 557 F.2d at 232. There was no language in the contract from which the court could
reasonably imply a unilateral right to increase rates. The contract provisions at issue in
this case are easily distinguishable from those considered in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958), which the Supreme Court found
to permit a unilateral rate increase by the power company. The agreements provided that
"[aill
gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller's Rate Schedule
. . .or any effective supersedingrate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission." Id. at 105 (emphasis by the Court). The Court held that rather than seeking
unilaterally to abrogate its contractual undertaking, the seller in Memphis sought "simply
to assert, in accordance with the procedures specified by the Act, rights expressly reserved
to it by contract." Id. at 112. The Court therefore concluded that the seller could, consistent with its contractual undertaking, unilaterally increase its rate by filing a new tariff
with the Commission.
38 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1970).
11 557 F.2d at 229 n.3. The Tenth Circuit elucidated the burden of proof issue as
follows:
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Commission asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over Gallup's petition for review because Gallup was not presently
"aggrieved" within the meaning of section 313(b) of the Federal
Power Act,35 there having been no change in the rates which Gallup was required to pay.39 The Commission contended that the
earliest possible point at which Gallup would have standing was
at the conclusion of the Commission's section 206 proceeding and
that therefore Gallup's petition was premature.40 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the Commission's orders with respect to Gallup
were preliminary and procedural and that Gallup could not suffer
any real injury unless the rates were modified by the Commisson
in the section 206 proceeding.4 The court accordingly dismissed
Gallup's petition without prejudice, rejecting Gallup's further
claim that the ongoing section 206 proceeding could be a
"nullity" if the wrong burden of proof were used.42
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: McGrath v.
Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976)
In McGrath v. Weinberger,43 the Tenth Circuit, citing two
exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine, accepted jurisdiction over a due process constitutional
challenge of certain Social Security Administration procedures."
In Sierra, the Court held that although a contract for a fixed term at a fixed
rate was involved so that a unilateral filing could not effect a change in rate,
under the Federal Power Act the Commission could have a hearing to determine "whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as
where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue
its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly
discriminatory."
Id. (citing 350 U.S. at 355).
P 16 U.S.C. § 825e(b) (1970), which provides in part: "Any party to a proceeding
under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding
may obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals.
" 557 F.2d at 232.

Id.
" Id. at 233.
12 Id. (citing Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 370 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1967)).
,3541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977).
" The court upheld the constitutionality of procedures authorizing the appointment,
without prior notice or opportunity to contest by the recipient, of a representative payee
to manage the monetary benefits of the recipient determined incapable of so doing. 541
F.2d at 254 (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, 1381 (1970)).
The court noted the Social Security Administration subsequently modified its procedures: "A ten-day advance notice of a proposed payee action is now sent to all legally
competent beneficiaries and court appointed guardians." 541 F.2d at 251 n.3.
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Acting upon information provided by state mental hospital personnel, a local Social Security office determined McGrath incapable of managing his benefits and appointed a representative
payee. The procedures provided for a post-deprivation hearing
but not a pre-deprivation hearing. McGrath sought judicial review without exhausting his administrative remedies and the
government interposed a jurisdictional challenge. 5 The Tenth
Circuit held that jurisdiction existed, noting two exceptions to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. 6
The first exception addressed the distinction between the
power of an administrative agency to determine the constitutional applicability of legislation and its lack of power to determine the constitutionality of legislation.4 7 The second exception
involved the presence of constitutional questions, coupled both
with a demonstration of the inadequacy of prescribed administrative remedies and with either a threat or impending irreparable
injury flowing from the delay incident to pursuing prescribed
administrative procedures. 4
The Tenth Circuit cited Mathews v. Eldridge" as controlling. 0 It stated the decision's essence as being that statutorily
created finality requirements should not be construed to cause
crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable
injuries to be suffered. 5' The significance of McGrath lies in the
" 541 F.2d at 251, 253-54.
" Id. at 251-53. See Ryan v. Shea, 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
, 541 F.2d at 251 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, § 20.04 (1958)). See also K.
DAVIS, ADhNISTArIvE LAW ov THE SEVENrES, §§ 20.01, 20.04 (1976 & Supp. 1977 §§ 20.00
to 20.00-3), where Professor Davis indicates that the exhaustion doctrine recently has been
subjected to radical alteration by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
,3Id. at 251-52 (citing Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964) and City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958)).
,' 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge asserted that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment required the Social Security Administration to provide him with notice and
an opportunity for a hearing prior to terminating his disability benefits. Professor Kenneth
Davis is quite upset with the import of Eldridge. See note 47 supra.
10The Tenth Circuit relied upon Eldridge in disposing of the constitutional challenge.
541 F.2d at 253-54. Eldridge provided a test mandating consideration of three interests:
(1) The private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of the interest through the procedures utilized, and the probable value of any additional,
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, including the function of, and the fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by, additional or substitute
procedural requirements. Id. at 253 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
1,541 F.2d at 252.
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Tenth Circuit's refusal to permit the exhaustion-ofadministrative-remedies doctrine to function as an absolute jurisdictional bar for considering a collateral constitutional due process challenge.
D. Res Judicata-Cooperv. United States, 546 F.2d 870 (10th
Cir. 1976).
2 the Tenth Circuit, implementIn Cooper v. United States,"
v. Utah ConstructionCo.,53
States
United
in
ing a test enunciated
held that res judicata principles applied to administrative proceedings when: (1) The agency acted in a judicial capacity; (2) it
resolved a factual dispute properly before it; and (3) the parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the factual dispute at
an evidentiary hearing."
Cooper arose from the denial in 1969, based upon character
5 After
or behavior disorders, of an airman's medical certificate.1
an evidentiary hearing, a hearing examiner sustained the denial
and, in turn, the National Transportation Safety Board upheld
his action. Cooper did not seek judicial review but rather, he
applied again in 1974 for the medical certificate. The Chief Administrative Law Judge refused a hearing, noting the issues were
the same as those in the prior hearing, and denied the application. In 1975 the National Transportation Safety Board upheld
that decision, stating that res judicata barred reconsideration of
the 1972 decision. Cooper petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review,
asserting that the National Transportation Safety Board's action
in granting review precluded it from using res judicata. The court
affirmed the National Transportation Safety Board decision. 7
In recognizing the propriety of res judicata, the Tenth Circuit
utilized the Utah Construction Co. test to clarify its prior decision
in Hobby v. Hodges.5" In Hobby the court conceded the lack of a

546 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1976).
384 U.S. 394 (1966).
', Id. at 422; 546 F.2d at 871-72.
The court noted its jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976). The airman's
medical certificate is a prerequisite for obtaining or retaining either a private or commercial pilot's license. 546 F.2d at 870. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (1977).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970) permitted Cooper to seek judicial review. 546 F.2d at
871.
" 546 F.2d at 870-72.
-,215 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1954).
'
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clear rule specifying when the findings and decision of an administrative body are res judicata for subsequent proceedings. The
Tenth Circuit, in that decision, held the application of the doctrine appropriate where permitting the applicant to relitigate a
claim after his failure to seek judicial review would run counter
to the purposes and provisions of the Social Security Act. 9
The significance of Cooper lies in its enunciation of the test
specifying when res judicata principles apply in administrative
proceedings.
II.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. v. Butz, 557 F.2d 717 (10th Cir.
1977)
In 1973 the Department of Agriculture reversed its prior position that custom feedlots were not livestock dealers within the
definition of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921'0 and sought
to bring Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. under those provisions of
the Act which require all dealers and market agencies to register
with the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary) and to post
bonds."' In Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. v. Butz, 2 a case of first
impression, the Tenth Circuit, affirming a declaratory judgment
of the district court, held that the plaintiff feedlot and other
feedlots of similar character were not livestock dealers within the
definition of the Act.
The Secretary's primary contention on appeal was that Solomon was indeed a livestock dealer because it assisted its customers with the purchase of livestock which were then placed at the
Solomon Feedlot for feeding until they reached the desired weight
for slaughter, after which Solomon aided in the sale of the cattle
to packer-buyers. The Secretary asserted that Solomon was thus
engaged in the business of buying and selling livestock as the
I at 759. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
Id.
7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970). Section 201(c) of the Act provides that "[tihe term
'market agency' means any person engaged in the business of (1) buying or selling in
commerce livestock on a commission basis or (2) furnishing stockyard services .... "
Section 201(d) provides that "[tihe term 'dealer' means any person, not a market agency,
engaged in the business of buying or selling in commerce livestock, either on his own
account or as the employee or agent of the vendor or purchaser."
1 7 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204 (1970); 9 C.F.R. §§ 201.10, 201.27(c), 201.29.
,2557 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1977).

4

1978

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

employee or agent of the vendor
or purchaser and hence subject
3
to the provisions of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the purpose of the Act is to
protect producers and consumers, and that among the means
prescribed to accomplish this purpose was the posting of bonds."4
It noted that packers were subjected to the bonding requirement
by a 1976 amendment to the Act,65 primarily resulting from the
large number of packer failures which had left livestock producers
unpaid for over $43 million worth of livestock." The court declared that Congress was aware of the "enhanced role of feedlots"
and "if it had seen the need for including feedlots within the
sweep of the Act, it could have done so on the occasion of its
expanding the regulation of packinghouses." 7 Observing that
feedlot operators such as Solomon do not handle the proceeds of
cattle sales, the court concluded that Congress did not intend
them to be subjected to the requirements of the Packers and
Stockyards Act. 8
Id. at 718-19.
'

Id. at 720.
Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 3(c), 90 Stat. 1249 (1976) (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. §§ 203,

204).
, 557 F.2d at 720 (citing S. REP. No.94-932, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2267, 2270-71).
" 557 F.2d at 721.
U The court had previously noted that Solomon "handled no money and was not
engaged in any activity specified in Section 201 ....
" Id. at 720. This statement
amounted to a finding that Solomon was not the employee or agent of the vendor or
purchaser and thus fell outside the statutory definition. The court also stated that Solomon was not paid any fee in connection with the assistance afforded its customers in
buying and selling livestock. Id. at 719. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit had previously
stated in Kelley v. United States, 202 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1953), a case relied upon by the
Secretary, that the collection or receipt of a commission for the handling of any livestock
for another was "immaterial" to the determination of whether a person was acting as a
dealer within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 841. The court, however, appears to have
correctly distinguished the Kelley case from the present one inasmuch as Kelley, although
not collecting or remitting funds on behalf of buyers or sellers of livestock, was engaged
in purchasing livestock for resale as a speculation and not for purposes of improving their
value through feeding. The Kelley court noted in this connection that speculators who buy
in their own name to resell have traditionally been considered as dealers. Id. In Solomon
the court remarked that one of the Department of Agriculture's own publications had
recognized that speculators in livestock fall within the statutory definition of dealers while
those who make profit as a result of improving the animals do not. 557 F.2d at 720.
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B. Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 551 F.2d 1178
(10th Cir. 1977)
This case disposed of appeals from a judgment enjoining the
defendants, Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), from proceeding with the sale of the Daniels and Fisher
Tower in Denver, Colorado, to a local architectural firm which
planned to renovate the Tower into office space as part of the
HUD-funded Skyline Urban Renewal Project."5 The district court
found that neither the pertinent section of the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA)70 nor the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)71 applied, but rather that the
HUD-approved regulations" under NHPA activated the procedural requirements set out in NHPA.7 3 DURA and HUD appealed, and plaintiffs, the State Preservation Officer and the
State Historical Society of Colorado, cross-appealed. The plaintiffs contended that "the district court reached the right decision
for the wrong reasons" and urged the circuit court to find that the
two Acts, in addition to the HUD regulations, were applicable.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that NHPA
was inapplicable to the case. The court stated that the Tower sale
did not fall within the statute's relevant provision7" because the
Tower was not placed in the National Register of Historic Places"
11Hart v.

Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977).
70 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970).
7142 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
72 36 C.F.R. § 800.1 et seq. (1976).
551 F.2d at 1179.
7,16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970), cited at 551 F.2d 1178, 1179-80:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head
of any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license
any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the
case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district,
site, building, structure, or object that is included in the National Register.
The head of any such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation established under sections 470i to 470n of this title a
reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking. (Emphasis by the court.)
7" The Register, established by NHPA, "recognizes and preserves objects significant
in American history, architecture, archaelogy, and culture." 551 F.2d at 1179.
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until 1969, whereas the Skyline Urban Renewal Project, of which
the Tower renovation formed a part, was officially approved by
HUD in 1968 when HUD and DURA entered into a project loan
and capital contract. The court concluded that the key element
in the statute is approval, and not actual expenditure, of funds,
citing a similar interpretation in other jurisdictions. 7 Although
the last expenditure of federal funds occurred in 1970 when
DURA purchased the Tower from a private owner, the court
voted that "this is not the 'expenditure' contemplated in the
77
statute."

The Tenth Circuit, although affirming the district court's
findings as to the inapplicability of NHPA to this case, did not
arrive at the same conclusion with respect to the applicability of
NEPA. 78 The Court saw the primary issue as "whether the loan
and capital grant contract's requirement that HUD approve all
acquisitions and dispositions of property by the DURA

. .

.es-

tablishes major Federal action sufficient to mandate compliance
with the Act each time that approval is given."79 The court answered the question affirmatively, finding too restrictive the district court's holding that the loan and capital contract was the
only major federal action involved in the project. 80 The Tenth
Circuit followed the trend established by the First, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits"' by holding that DURA's proposed sale of the
",South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970); St. Joseph Historical Soc'y v. Land Clearance for Redev.
Auth., 366 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Kent County Council for Historic Preserv. v.
Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
" 551 F.2d at 1180. The district court in Kent County Council stated that the "prior

to the approval of expenditure" language in the statute (see text accompanying note 15
supra) does not mean that every time there is to be an expenditure pursuant to a prior
approval the entire approval machinery must again be set in motion and the approval
process repeated. 304 F. Supp. at 888. The court was emphatic in declaring that the words
"prior to approval of the expenditure" do not mean "prior to the expenditure," observing
that "[aipproval of expenditure requires a judgment" whereas "the actual expenditure
is a clerical, ministerial or mechanical act." Id.
,' 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
551 F.2d at 1181.
Id. at 1181-82. The court found support for its conclusion in Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d
885 (1st Cir. 1973); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); and Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n v. Romney,
343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972).
" See Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton,
471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973); and Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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Tower was sufficient federal action to require filing of an environmental impact statement, notwithstanding the fact that the loan
and capital grant contract was signed prior to the effective date
of NEPA. 2 The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed but upon a slightly different rationale than that asserted
by the lower court.
C. Vissian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 548 F.2d
325 (10th Cir. 1977)
In Vissian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,13 petitioner claimed, on appeal from a final deportation order entered
by the Board of Immigration Appeals, that he was wrongfully
precluded from applying to the Attorney General for a discretionary waiver of excludability under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." Vissian also contended that the Board
of Immigration Appeals erred in concluding that even if he had
been eligible to apply for a waiver, a favorable exercise of discretion would not have been warranted. 5
The Tenth Circuit disposed of Vissian's first contention by
reference to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Immigration &
Naturalizaton Service v. Bagamastad,6 which upheld the propriety of the Attorney General's pretermission of a ruling on eligibility to apply for discretionary relief in cases where such relief
would not be granted in any event.87 With respect to Vissian's
" 551 F.2d at 1182.

" 548 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1977).
"
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970). This section provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who
are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile.of seven consecutive years,
may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard
to the provisions of paragraphs (1)-(25), (30), and (31) of subsection (a) of
this section ....
(Subsection (a) specifies 31 classes of aliens to be excluded from admission to the United
States, including aliens convicted of marijuana and narcotics offenses. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(23) (1970)). Vissian, while on vacation from the United States in 1971, had entered a plea of guilty in a court of Australia, to a charge of importation of cannabis and
cocaine. 548 F.2d at 327.
u 548 F.2d at 327.
" 429 U.S. 24 (1976), rev'g. 531 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 25. The relief at issue in this case was that set forth in section 245(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970), which authorizes the Attorney General in his discretion to change the status of an alien who is physically present in
the United States to that of a permanent resident. Id. at 24.
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second contention, the court ruled that the Attorney General (or
his representative) "may not use this pretermission of the eligibility decision as a guise for pretermitting a hearing on the factual
grounds for exercising his discretion as well. 8' 8 The court noted
that Vissian was precluded from presenting evidence in support
of a favorable exercise of discretion and that, although Vissian's
counsel made an offer of proof consisting of eleven letters of recommendation attesting to Vissian's value to the community, this
isolated and summarily-rejected offer of proof did not satisfy the
requirements of a full and fair hearing comporting with the accepted principles of due process."9 The court cautioned that its
holding "should not be misconstrued as requiring a separate hearing on the factual basis for the exercise of section 212(c) discretion, but merely a 'hearing within the deportation hearing' already required by the Act." 0
It therefore appears that although the Attorney General (or
his representative) need not make specific findings with respect
to an applicant's eligibility for discretionary relief where such
relief would not be granted in any event, the Attorney General
must provide a full and fair hearing comporting with the accepted
principles of due process on the issue of whether discretionary
relief is warranted under the facts of each particular case." The
Tenth Circuit in Vissian has clearly announced that this issue is
separate and distinct from the eligibility issue.2
D. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Continental
Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977)
The issue presented by this case93 is the authority of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to bring a separate civil action under Title VII, section
706(f)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 predicated upon the
" 548 F.2d at 330.

aId.
" Id. The Court cited Zamura v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 534 F.2d 1055,
1060 (2d Cir. 1976) where the Second Circuit stated with respect to a discretionary stay
of deportation that, "as concerns the factfinding process upon which the discretionary
decision in part depends, . . the § 243(h) inquiry constitutes a hearing, albeit a hearing
within [the deportation] hearing."
548 F.2d at 329-30.
' Id. at 330.
EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1H1972).
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charges of two individuals, each of whom had previously filed an
action in vindication of his charge of employment discrimination.
Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII sets forth the procedure for filing
suit to redress alleged unlawful employment practices." This procedure is summarized as follows:
1. A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence
of an alleged unlawful employment practice.
2. If the Commission finds reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, and conciliation attempts prove unsuccessful, the
Commission may bring suit against the respondent within 180 days
of the filing of the charge. The charging party shall have the right
to intervene in the Commission's suit.
3. If the Commission fails to file an action within 180 days, it
shall notify the charging party.
4. Within 90 days after receipt of notice, the charing party
may bring a civil action against the respondent. Should a private
action be brought, the Commission may intervene, in the discretion
of the court, upon certification that the case is of general public
importance."

Before deciding whether the EEOC could bring suit under
section 706(f)(1) after the charging party had already exercised
his right to sue, the Tenth Circuit examined three differing views
on this point as manifested in decisions of the circuit courts interpreting section 706(f)(1). The first view appears in the cases of
EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co.,97 EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 8 and EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co." According to
these cases, if the EEOC suit is broader in scope than the previously filed private action, the EEOC suit may proceed in vindication of further similar acts or incidents of discrimination discovered in the process of investigation of the charge which gave
rise to the private action.' ® The Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed
this view, stating that it was unable to find any basis within the
statute for defining the right of the EEOC to sue in terms of the
scope of its suit.'0 '
11Id. Section 706 in general is addressed to vindication of individual instances of
employment discrimination. 548 F.2d at 887.
" EEOC v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
17 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
- 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975).
" 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975).
110This was the Tenth Circuit's summary of these cases. EEOC v. Continental Oil
Co., 548 F.2d 884, 889 (10th Cir. 1977).
1s1 Id.
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A second interpretation of section 706(f)(1) is represented by
the Third Circuit holding in EEOC v. North Hills Passavant
Hospital'"' which construed the statute to allow the EEOC to
bring suit, assuming conditions precedent are met, regardless of
the fact that the charging party has previously brought an action
on his charge. 0 3 The Third Circuit held that the EEOC's right of
action is not expressly terminated by the statute when an individual commences suit. It also found that there is no basis in the
legislative history of section 706(f)(1) to support such a view. 0'°
The opposite conclusion was reached by the Eighth Circuit
in EEOC v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,0 1 which was followed by
the Tenth Circuit, on slightly different facts, in EEOC v. Duval
Corp.06
1 The Missouri Pacific case held that when an individual
has brought suit on his charge the EEOC may not sue but rather
is limited to participation in the litigation through intervention
in the private suit. 07 The Eighth Circuit relied upon the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII 0 8 indicating a
congressional concern for duplicative remedies, as manifested by
102

544 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1976).

10 Id. at 672.

Id. at 668 and 672.
493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976). Duval presented a fact situation which was the
converse of Continental Oil. In Duval the EEOC had filed suit first, and the issue was
whether the aggrieved party could file a separate lawsuit or was limited to intervention
in the EEOC action. The Tenth Circuit held that, after issuance of right-to-sue notice by
the EEOC, the EEOC shares with the aggrieved complainant a concurrent right to sue
during the 90-day statutory period. Id. at 948. The defendant's major argument in Duval
was that to allow both the EEOC and the aggrieved party to sue during the same 90-day
period would produce a multiplicity of suits. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated:
Congress was aware of this potential problem and provided a method to
avoid duplicitous actions. To protect the interests of both the EEOC and the
aggrieved party in a particular complaint, Congress established the right of
either party to apply for intervention in a suit filed by the other party.
Multiplicity of actions is prevented during the 90-day period [during which
the EEOC and the aggrieved party share a concurrent right to sue] because
when one of the parties sues, the other is limited to possible participation
only through intervention.
Id. at 948-49. The court further stated: "If, during the 90-day period in which the aggrieved party may also file an action, the EEOC is the first to file [as was the case in
Duval], the proper procedure under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is to allow the aggrieved
party to intervene." Id. at 949.
1w 493 F.2d at 75.
t,0 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137-79.
104
05
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the inclusion of a provision for intervention by the EEOC or the
charging party into a suit previously filed by the other. 09 The
reliance of the Missouri Pacific and Duval courts on this legislative history was criticized by the North Hills court, which asserted that the history cited by these courts did not refer to the
present language of section 706(f)(1) but to bills in a quite different form which were not enacted into law."10 Perhaps as a result
of this criticism from the Third Circuit, the Tenth Circuit did not
rely on its Duval holding or on the legislative history of section
706(f)(1) in deciding the present case."' Nevertheless, it adopted
the Missouri Pacific-Duval view that the EEOC is limited to
intervention once the aggrieved complainant has already filed
suit. In so doing, the court stated that it placed "primary reliance
. . . on the construction of the language of the statute to avoid
surplusage.""' 2 It noted that "[s]ection 706(f)(1) provides that
the EEOC may be allowed to intervene in a previously filed private lawsuit at the discretion of the trial court and upon certification that the case is of general public importance.""' 3 It further
reasoned that under the holding of the North Hills case, this
1" 493 F.2d at 74-75, citing 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2148, where the
House committee reported that it
was concerned about the interrelationship between the newly created cease
and desist enforcement powers of the Commission and the existing right of
public action. It concluded that duplication of proceedings should be
avoided. The bill, therefore, contains a provision for termination of Commission jurisdiction once a private action has been filed (except for the power
of the Commission to intervene in the private actions).
110544 F.2d at 668 & n.8. In a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the North Hills court persuasively supported this
conclusion by showing that the portion of the House committee report relied upon by the
Missouri Pacific and Duval courts related to the bill as it read prior to passage of an
amendment which substituted the EEOC's grant of cease and desist authority with the
authority to institute suits in federal trial court. Id. at 668-72. The Third Circuit pointed
out that the problems which may arise from duplicative administrative [i.e., cease-anddesist proceedings] and judicial proceedings are entirely different from those which may
be created by the duplication of separate lawsuits. Id. at 670.
" The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "the most often quoted portions of legislative reports refer to the bill as originally proposed, granting cease and desist authority"
and that "[clertainly different considerations are involved indealing with conflicts between administrative and judicial proceedings, as opposed to potentially overlapping civil
litigation." 548 F.2d at 890 (footnote omitted). Refusing to admit any error in relying on
legislative history in Duval however, the Tenth Circuit concluded: "The best that can be
said of the legislative history on the point is that it is inconclusive." Id.
112Id.

M'Id. at 889.
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provision is rendered superfluous, for if the EEOC is permitted
to duplicate a previously filed individual lawsuit, it can participate in the private suit with the permission of the trial court by
way of a motion to consolidate the suits, without regard to the
certification of the case as to general public importance." The
court concluded that the "statutory provision for intervention
must be read as the exclusive procedure by which the EEOC may
participate in a previously filed private lawsuit under § 706(f)(1)
in order to give it significance." Allowing a second suit to proceed
on the charge would emasculate the provision."15
In short, the Continental Oil case represents little more than
an affirmance of the Tenth Circuit's Duval holding. The court,
however, modified its rationale in order to answer the criticism
directed at Duval by the Third Circuit in the intervening North
Hills case.
III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Future Damages: Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372
(10th Cir. 1977)
In Steckler v. United States,"' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, for the first time, that it was
proper to consider the effect of inflation upon future earnings.
The opinion resulted from a medical malpractice action brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act"7 against the Veterans Administration Hospital in Denver."' The trial court awarded damages for permanent disability, present and future pain and suffering, and present and future lost earnings."' It refused, however,
to consider the influence of inflation upon future earnings. Instead, the trial court applied a discount factor to future earnings,
thus reflecting the present value of the amount awarded.2 0 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
and directed the trier of fact to consider the effect of inflation
upon future earnings. 2 '
Id.
Id.

114

" 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
"'

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1977).

"' 549 F.2d at 1373.
"l

Id.

Im

Id. at 1375.

"

Id. at 1378. Another interesting issue concerned whether the collateral source rule
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The Tenth Circuit noted that a majority of courts have discounted future earnings to present value without considering the
effect of inflation upon future earnings. The majority's rationale,
and also that of the district court, emphasized the speculative
nature of considering anticipated inflation. 22 The Tenth Circuit
adopted the approach of the Ninth Circuit, stated in United
States v. English.2 3 This method required, first, determining future income by estimating future changes in purchasing power.
The estimate of future inflationary trends, however, must be supported by solid economic evidence. The final step of this approach discounted the estimated future income to its present

value. 121
applied to Social Security and Veterans Administration benefits. The Colorado Supreme
Court in Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 772, 774 (1971), said: "Simply
stated, it is that compensation or indemnity received by an injured party for a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will
not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer."
On the collateral source issue, the Tenth Circuit held that Veterans Administration
benefits were a noncollateral source. 549 F.2d at 1379 (citing United States v. Gray, 199
F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952)). However, the Social Security benefits attributable to employer
and employee contribution, as differentiated from government contribution, should be
regarded as a collateral source. 549 F.2d at 1379. The court stated:
There is a dearth of authority on whether Social Security disability
payments are to be regarded as income from a collateral source insofar as
they represent payments made by the injured person and his employer.
Logically they are collateral. We do know that the government has supplemented the fund from time to time where this has been necessary. The extent
to which the payments under Social Security disability can be traced to the
government is questionable. The part contributed by the worker and the
employers has the aspects of social insurance and as such is collateral to
monies contributed by the government. However, no authorities have been
presented to us on this issue and our research has failed to produce any case
dealing with the subject. It may be impossible to ascertain the part or percentage of funds attributable to the government which would be deductible
since the monies are commingled. Nevertheless, some effort to ascertain the
percentage or part contributed by the government should be made so as to
permit a determination of the contributions of the employer and employee
and their exclusion as collateral sources.
Since the cause is to be remanded, this subject ought to be considered.
The onus should be placed on the plaintiffs . ...
Id.
" 549 F.2d at 1376-77.
"' 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975). English was a wrongful death action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
124549 F.2d at 1378. For recent articles addressing this area see, e.g., Note, Inflation
and Future Loss of Earnings, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 281 (1975); Comment, Considerationof
Inflation in Calculating Lost Future Earnings-Feldmanv. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524
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The Tenth Circuit noted three other approaches. The first,
the offset method, rejected both the consideration of inflation and
the discounting of future earnings to present value. The second
approach ignored evidence of future inflationary trends because
of their speculative nature. The jury, however, would be permitted to consider any diminution or increase in "purchasing
power." Thus, inflation is considered; its effect, however, cannot
be established through expert witnesses. The third method ap21
plied an inflation factor thereby reducing the discount factor.

B. Immunity: Jackson v. Kelley, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977)
In Jackson v. Kelley, 2 1 the Tenth Circuit refused to grant
absolute immunity through judicial decision to a former United
States Air Force physician. 2

7

Although the opinion was not

brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 the Tenth Circuit
relied upon the discretionary-ministerial distinction, as applied
under the Act, to reach its decision.2 9 Jackson involved a medical
malpractice diversity action. The trial court had dismissed plaintiffs action, holding that an Air Force physician was a federal
official and thus immune from suit for actions arising within the
scope of his employment. 30 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit re3
manded the case to the district court. '

The court believed that Doe v. McMillan 31 compelled the use
F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975), 72 CORNELL L. REv. 803 (1977); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective
Damages and the Circuit Courts, 62 VA. L. REv. 105 (1977); 17 S. TEx. L.J. (1976).
"
549 F.2d at 1377-78.
'
557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977).
'
Id. at 741. The Tenth Circuit recognized the contrary holding of Martinez v.
Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1339 (1977).
"2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
"
The Tenth Circuit stated:
Generally speaking, a duty is discretionary if it involves judgment, planning,
or policy decisions. It is not discretionary if it involves enforcement or administration of a mandatory duty at the operational level, even if professional
expert evaluation is required . . . . The key is whether the duty is mandatory or whether the act complained of involved policy-making or judgment.
557 F.2d at 737-38.
* Id. at 736.
"' Id. at 741.
"= 412 U.S. 306 (1973). The Tenth Circuit stated:
Thus, the Court [in Doe] mandates the use of the discretionary function
test and a direct balancing of the policies underlying the immunity doctrine
in the context of each fact situation . . . . Mindful of these principles, the
first step here is to decide whether defendant's functions were discretionary.
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of the discretionary function test. For the first step of the test the

court determined whether the physician's functions were discretionary. For guidance, it examined the discretionary-ministerial
distinction applied under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 3 ' The key
to the distinction lies in whether the act involved a mandatory
duty or discretionary policymaking and judgment. To subject the
government to liability the act must be nondiscretionary.
In Jackson, the Tenth Circuit characterized the physician's
duty as nondiscretionary. It noted the presence of a ministerial
duty and the absence of a planning or policymaking function.
Furthermore, although the medical treatment required some
judgment and discretion, it did not necessitate governmental discretion. Immunization of official conduct required governmental
discretion. 34
For the second step the court balanced the harm to the patient with the threat to effective government. 35 The Tenth Circuit held that awarding monetary damages to an injured party
would not hinder effective government because neither politically
sensitive decisions nor discretionary governmental functions were
involved. 136
Finally, the court noted that its refusal to grant absolute
immunity was reinforced by a statute 7 enacted after this cause
of action arose. That statute affords indemnification or insurance
to military physicians assigned to foreign countries. The Tenth
Secondly, the consideration of harm to the individual citizen must be balanced with the threat to effective government in the context of this case.
557 F.2d at 737.
" 557 F.2d at 737-38.
"3 Id. at 738-39. The Tenth Circuit cited with approval Henderson v. Bluemink, 511
F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Henderson, the court stated:
[T]he significant factor is that the discretion exercised might have been
medical rather than governmental. The chief policy underlying the creation
of immunity for lower governmental officials is mainly that which stems from
the desire to discourage "the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration
of policies of government." However, that policy is not applicable to the
exercise of normal medical discretion since doctors making such judgments
would face the same liability outside of government as they would face if the
complaint below is upheld.
Id. at 402-03.
"1 557 F.2d at 737.
"3 Id. at 739-40.
M7Act of Oct. 8, 1976, § l(b), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(f) (West Supp. 1977).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Circuit reasoned that, since a finding of liability must precede the
need for indemnity or insurance, the granting of absolute immunity would render the statute superfluous. 8
C. Discretionary Function Exception: First National Bank v.
United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 122
(1977)
First National Bank v. United States'3 9 involved one of the
tragic fact situations facing the Tenth Circuit in the past term.
Four children suffered permanent mental and physical impairment resulting from organic mercury poisoning. 40 After the denial
of an administrative claim, petitioners brought suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.' 4 ' The suit alleged negligence on the
part of the Pesticides Regulation Division of the Department of
Agriculture with regard to registration for interstate sale and approval for the labeling of the fungicide causing the poisoning."'
The district court held that the government was immune from
suit under the discretionary function exception." 3 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed.'"
The court focused on the regulations and statutory requirel3

557 F.2d at 740-41.

IN 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 122 (1977).

The court stated:
[flt was determined that the Huckleby children were suffering from organic
mercury poisoning as a result of their eating the meat from the hog which
had been fed the grain treated with Panogen 15. Thus a "food-chain" poisoning was involved.
Alkyl mercury poisoning does irreversible damage to the central nervous
system. It affects sight, speech, locomotion and the ability to grasp objects
or otherwise use one's hands properly.
552 F.2d at 371 (footnotes omitted).
141 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
552 F.2d at 372.
Id. at 372. The discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency of an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
552 F.2d at 374.
'" 552 F.2d at 377.
"'
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ments of the Pesticide Regulation Division and noted that they
obligated the agency to engage in discretionary policy judgments
in evaluating the adequacy of labeling. The Tenth Circuit asserted that the pertinent statute and regulations provided only
generalized policy standards. It conceded that a scientific function was involved but since the function was not narrow in scope,
discretionary judgment predominated."' The court also decided
that the judgment whether to suspend or cancel registration fell
within the discretionary function exception, since a policy choice
was involved."'
Brian A. Magoon
Kay F. Thomas
" Id. at 375-76. The Tenth Circuit stated: "[Tihe functions on which the negligence
claims are founded are within the words and reason of the exception. Evaluation of the
labeling did involve scientific as well as public policy considerations, but it was not
confined to a narrow scientific function ....
" Id. at 376.
" The Tenth Circuit made two further holdings:
We note first that the decision-making as to possible suspension or cancellation does implicate a policy choice based on substantive standards of product
safety . . . . Whether such discretion is exercised and possibly abused, or
whether there is a failure to exercise the discretion, such acts or omissions
related to the cancellation function are within the terms of the exception
provided by § 2680(a).
We feel the claims and proof relating to alleged failure to marshall and
submit data to the Secretary or to his surrogate, the Director of PRD, fall in
the same category. These actions are an integral part of the process for any
possible cancellation or suspension of a registration.
Id. at 377 (footnote omitted).

ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW
During the past term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed two cases involving fundamental antitrust issues. Specifically, the court focused on the general bounds of the predatory
pricing concept in the Tenth Circuit' and upon the ramifications
of Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. for the territorial
marketing system used by the Adolph Coors Company.' Both of
the cases to be discussed represent the court's struggle with two
developing analytical frameworks that may have far reaching
impact for antitrust litigation in the Tenth Circuit.
PREDATORY PRICING: Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 234 (1977)
3
Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
involved a suit by a manufacturer of a rocket fuel chemical, Pacific Engineering, against its competitor, Kerr-McGee.' The trial
court found Kerr guilty of monopolizing and attempting to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,5 and of price
discrimination in violation of section 2(a) of the RobinsonPatman Act.' The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's award
to Pacific Engineering [PE] of treble damages of $4,590,594.00
and attorneys' fees of $528,000.00 on the basis that the antitrust
laws were inapplicable to the facts before the court.

I.

Pacific Engineering and Prod. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct, 234 (1977). See notes 3-26 and accompanying text infra.
2 Adolph Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc., Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 (10th Cir.,
March 16, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication). See notes 27-43 and accompanying text
infra.
551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
Kerr counterclaimed against PE for engaging in a group boycott by agreeing with
two major buyers to take "stay alive" orders. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim
and the Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal on the basis that the findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous. 551 F.2d at 799.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) states that: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire .
a felony ....

.

. to monopolize ...

shall be deemed guilty of

to sell, or
6 Id. § 13(a) (1970) states that: "It shall be unlawful for any person ...
contract to sell, goods ... at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in
"
the United States for the purposes of destroying competition ....
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Kerr and Pacific Engineering manufactured a chemical used
in rocket fuel. The major buyers of the chemical, of which there
were only three,7 were manufacturers of missiles for the federal
government. Thus, demand was fixed by the government. At one
time there were four companies manufacturing the chemical, but
due to the reduction in the space program budget, only Kerr and
PE were still engaged in production by 1966.
Citing United States v. Grinnell, the court recognized that
the traditional elements of a monopolization claim are possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from power
derived from a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.' The court also relied upon the general rule that a finding of an attempt to monopolize requires proof of both a specific
intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of successful
monopolization However, instead of applying these rules to the
facts, the court identified the crucial issue as whether or not the
defendant had engaged in predatory price cutting. 0
The court found the defendant's prices to be below its total
cost. Below-cost pricing is often one indication of predatory intent." However, the court construed the Supreme Court's statement that below-cost pricing may be considered predatory as not
constituting a definitive standard for determining the existence
of predatory pricing. According to the court, under some circum13
stances, below-cost pricing might even be considered beneficial.
The court noted that any price-cutting must to some extent be attributed to the
three major buyers' method of soliciting bids. Preliminary bids would establish a ceiling
price. Often they would tell a bidder that he should go lower if he wanted to get the bid.
Sometimes this resulted in the low bidder underbidding himself. Id. at 792.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1965). For subsequent
adoptions of the Grinnell test, see also United States v. Empire Gas Co., 537 F.2d 296,
302-07 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v.
Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1976).
' See E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
IC 551 F.2d at 796. Since the plaintiff's claim of monopolization was based primarily
on the defendant's pricing tactics, the court apparently felt the intent behind such pricing
to be determinative.
" Total cost equals fixed costs (management expenses, depreciation property taxes,
etc.) plus variable costs (labor, material, fuel, and any other cost which varies with
output). 551 F.2d at n.2.
'
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12 (1967).
'
551 F.2d at 796. It should be noted that the court gave no examples of beneficial
below cost pricing.
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The court acknowledged that there was ample evidence that
the defendant knew PE could not survive at the low price level.
The defendant had conducted extensive surveillance of the plaintiff's activities and was well informed of the plaintiff's plight,
especially with respect to its financial situation."
The evidence showed that Kerr once offered to "dump" a
nonexistent surplus of the chemical to a PE customer at extremely low prices. It also appeared that the defendant raised its
prices when the collapse of PE seemed certain, only to lower them
when PE seemed to recover. Kerr's market share had also increased steadily since 1966.1
The court ignored this evidence and instead turned its attention to the "crucial" fact that Kerr's prices were above its average
variable cost." The court cited Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. 7 for the
proposition that section 2 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit
"reasonable" price fluctuations. The court agreed with Professors
Areeda and Turner 8 that marginal costs or average variable costs
are the appropriate standards for determining the existence of a
predatory intent as opposed to a "reasonable" fluctuation."
The court preferred to ignore the traditional application of
antitrust law to such facts 0 and instead utilized what can be
called an "economic reality" approach to the issue. Both companies were operating below capacity.2' Small price cuts were appar", Id. at 792-93. The court noted that Pacific Engineering was a one-product company
and was vastly undercapitalized.
" Id. at 793-94.
Average variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output. Id. at 792
n.3. The court also pointed out that in this industry the marginal costs decrease as output
increases. Id. at 796 n.7.
17 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
" Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing and Related Practicesunder Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. Ray. 697 (1975).
"1 The court noted that "there is no indication of when downward price changes cease
to be reasonable." 551 F.2d at 797.
n See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) and United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), both supporting the position that price
leadership is to be condemned. The court also cited Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) and Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms,
Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976) for the general rule that parallel pricing may involve
many of the same vices. 551 F.2d at 796.
11 Recognizing that price leadership would invoke all the disadvantages of monopoly,
the court believed that invocation of the antitrust laws would encourage, rather than
discourage this result. 551 F.2d at 796.
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ently effective in increasing market share. PE was obviously in
an unsound condition. The court stated that it found the destruction of Pacific Engineering via price-cutting and the resulting
monopoly economically preferable to a price leadership oligopoly.
According to the court, price leadership would result in a selling
price higher than it would be in a monopoly situation.2 2 Therefore,
the court held that under the circumstances of the case, belowcost pricing was more consistent with the competitive goals of the
antitrust laws than to prevent such price-cutting to save a floundering company. In the court's estimation, such pricing was
"rational, competitive behavior" rather than predatory action.2 1
However, the court did limit its holding by stating that even
under the facts of this case prices could have been set so low as
to be considered predatory. 2' Apparently this limitation means
pricing below average variable costs or marginal costs may be
construed as predatory.
Robinson-Patman Charges- The allegations of discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act 25 were based upon the fact
that the defendant sold to a number of small-volume purchasers,
constituting a relatively small percentage of the market, at scheduled prices which were higher than the bids submitted to the
large-volume buyers. The court stated that the Robinson-Patman
Act should be interpreted no differently than the Sherman Act.
The court then dismissed the price discrimination charges on the
basis that it had already determined that the defendant was engaging in lawful competition without any predatory intent and
thus there was no injury to competition under Robinson-Patman.
The court recognized that its decision would result in the
demise of many small businesses in the face of the pressures
applied by their larger competitor. The court summarized its
policy by stating that "[bligness . . . is not a disqualification
to compete. '2 In this case the Tenth Circuit was obviously concerned with the economic realities of business. The antitrust laws
were not to be applied, however, in order to save a company which
the court viewed as doomed. It is obvious that the court considn Id.
n Id. at 797.
,A Id.
n 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
0 551 F.2d at 799.
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ered the plaintiff an unsound, ineffective competitor and a burden on society who should be purged from the marketplace by any
means, even those questionable from an antitrust viewpoint. The
opinion demonstrates a bias for those who can and do compete.
This case seems to place an additional burden on the shoulders
of the smaller competitor plaintiff: he must be able to show that
he is a sound business and thus "worthy" of the protection of the
antitrust laws.
II. RULE OF REASON: Adolph Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc.,
Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 (10th Cir., March 16, 1977) (Not for
Routine Publication)
One of the most significant antitrust cases decided by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during 1977 was Adolph Coors Co.
v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc.Y Of primary importance in this case
was the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Supreme Court decision, Continental T. V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.,2 8 viewed in
' Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 (10th Cir. March 16, 1977)(Not for Routine Publication).
Adolph Coors Company [Coors] initiated a suit in 1973 seeking to enjoin A&S Wholesalers, Inc. [A&S] from purchasing Coors beer from Colorado retailers and transporting it
to North Carolina for resale to retail outlets. On June 5, 1973, A&S filed an amended
answer and counterclaim alleging that Coors had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act (see note 6 infra) in that Coors, Coors Distributing Company, and other unknown
persons had combined and conspired to impose customer and territorial restrictions upon
independent distributors, wholesalers, and retailers in the sale of Coors beer. A&S requested damages and injunctive relief. Both parties appealed from the district court's
order dismissing Coors' complaint and A&S's counterclaim, and dissolving the preliminary injunction. Id. at 2.
" 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977). Prior to this decision vertical restrictions were governed by
the per se rule announced in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
In Continental T. V., Inc., the Supreme Court concluded that:
[Tihe appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason that governed
vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn. When competitive effects are shown
to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed
under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority
of anticompetitive practices challenged under Section 1 of the Act.
Id. at 2562.
An often cited statement of the rule of reason is that of Justice Brandeis in Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

the wake of an earlier Tenth Circuit decision Adolph Coors Co.
v. FTC.2 Also of note was the Tenth Circuit's recognition of the
applicability of federal antitrust laws to the regulation of liquor
traffic, despite the twenty-first amendment's vesting of the regulations of such traffic within the borders of the respective states
to the states.
The facts in A&S Wholesalers are of some significance because of the uniqueness of Coor's operation. Coors is the fourth
largest brewery in terms of national consumption. In order to
guarantee the integrity of its product, Coors has historically limited resale by its 167 distributors to ten and one-half of the western states. A distinctive feature of Coors is that it is the only
"shipping brewery", i.e., Coors transports its product from its
plant at Golden to the various distributors. The primary method
employed by the brewery to maintain product integrity has been
the implementation of a closely monitored program of refrigeration and rotation by the distributors. 0
In 1974, the Tenth Circuit in Adolph Coors v. FTC31 held that
the territorial restrictions on resale imposed by Coors were violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act; 32 in light of the per se rule
for vertical restrictions announced in United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co. 33 The court, in dicta, noted:
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of the intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 4831 n.15.
- 497 F.2d 1978 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). The Tenth
Circuit, bound by the Schwinn per se rule, concluded that Coors' territorial restrictions
were violative of the Sherman Act. However, there were indications that the court wished
to rule otherwise. Id. at 1187.
Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 at 6.
" 497 F.2d at 1187.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This section provides, in pertinent part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Supreme Court held that:
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with
dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or
persons to whom the product may be transferred, whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee is a per se
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 382.
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Although we are compelled to follow the Schwinn per se rule, we
believe that the per se rule should yield to situations where a
unique product requires territorialrestrictions to remain in business. . . . Perhaps the Supreme Court may see the wisdom of
grafting an exception to the per se rule when a product is unique
and where the manufacturer can justify its territorial restraints
under the rule of reason. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963) (emphasis added).'

This language demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit sought to
protect Coors' interest in its "unique" product, but was precluded
from doing so because of the continued vitality of the Schwinn
per se rule for vertical restrictions.
The ruling for which the Tenth Circuit had been waiting
came on June 23, 1977, when the Supreme Court decided
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 5 Justice Powell
adopted the rule of reason test for vertical restrictions35 and ex37
pressly overruled the Schwinn per se rule.
It was in the aftermath of GTE Sylvania that the Tenth
Circuit was called upon to decide Adolph Coors Co. v. A &S Wholesalers, Inc. 31 In this case, A&S contended that Coors'
efforts at firm and resolute enforcement of territorial restrictions
on resale of its products constituted a per se violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. The court noted that, with the overruling
of the Schwinn per se doctrine, the vertical restrictions and controls imposed by Coors would have to be tested under "the rule
of reason, that is, whether they are required in order to protect
497 F.2d at 1187.
97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
, See note 2 supra.
1 For a full description of the Schwinn per se rule, see note 7 supra. Regarding
Continental T. V., Inc., Mr. Handler notes that:

[T]he Court could have confined its ruling to the narrow facts of record, as
Justice White proposed in his concurrence, instead, it adopted a rationale
applicable to all vertical restraints without limitation. The Court did not
hesitate to overrule Schwinn, a mischievous precedent which rested on a
nonexistent principle of ancient property law, which was historically incorrect, indefensible as a matter of logic, and unjustifiable as a matter of economics.
(Citations omitted).
See, M. Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term - 1977, RECORD OF THE AssOCIATnON OF THE BAR OF THE CrTY OF NEW YORK
530, 532 (Nov. 1977).
Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 at 13.
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and insure the 'quality and integrity' of its beer product." 39
Recognizing the need for a full evidentiary hearing at the trial
level to examine the impact of the rule of reason on Coors' vertical restrictions, the case was remanded to the trial court. In light
of the statements in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, it is likely that
this time Coors' interests in its "unique" product will be afforded
some degree of protection.
The Tenth Circuit did, however, dispose of Coors' contention
that the twenty-first amendment vested the regulation of liquor
traffic within the borders of the respective states to the states,
and "this, by necessary implication, denies application of federal
antitrust laws which would defeat state policy governing the
traffic of alcoholic beverages." 0 The Colorado statutes do seem
to sanction vertical restrictions which have the effect of eliminating interterritorial competition between Coors' wholesalers."
However, there are no statutes sanctioning the type of vertical
customer or territorial restrictions imposed by Coors. The Colorado state courts have not yet been forced to address the interplay
between the Colorado statutes and Coors' twenty-first amendment contentions. In view of the lack of controlling state decisions
or precedents, the Tenth Circuit afforded the federal district
judge's views great weight. 2 The appellate court thus concluded
that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that "the state's
power to regulate liquor traffic under the twenty-first amendment
provides the plaintiff with no defense to the antitrust claim here
asserted."
In summary, the court's adoption of the "rule of reason" test,
as used in deciding GTE Sylvania, marked the demise in the
Tenth Circuit of the Schwinn per se rule for vertical restrictions.
Vertical restrictions will now be tested under the rule of reason
standard. 3 Under this new standard, the Tenth Circuit may have
greater leeway in fashioning legal protection for manufacturers
like Coors. In view of the court's statements in Adolph Coors Co.
v. FTC, it appears likely that the court not only may, but will,
" Id. at 18.

COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 12-47-108(2), 124(4).
See Volis v. Puritan Life Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1977); Joyce v. Davis,
539 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1976); Warde v. Davis, 494 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1974).
4 Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 at 18.
' See note 2 supra.
"
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do so. Therefore, as a result of the combination of GTE Sylvania
and Adolph Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc., it may become
extremely difficult for both retailers and distributors to prove
antitrust violations for vertical restrictions in the Tenth Circuit.
Neil E. Lipson
Kathleen S. Mahood

COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
This section comments briefly on Tenth Circuit cases applying the law of banks and banking, creditor-debtor relations, and
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). Extended comment of
the court's analysis in each case is not provided in this section,
since the primary objective of the overview is to acquaint the
reader with only the essential facts and holdings of the more
significant cases of this year in the Tenth Circuit. However, several opinions in the UCC section reflect comparatively greater
significance in terms of new legal theories and receive more consideration.

I.

BANKS AND BANKING

Harr v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board' [HarrI] and Harr
v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association2 [Harr II
were companion cases dealing with the remedies available to petitioners who sought to challenge a conversion plan whereby Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, a federally chartered mutual
savings and loan association, would become a federally chartered
stock association.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan was created as a federally
chartered mutual savings and loan association under the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933.1 Prudential drafted a plan whereby it
would convert from a mutual savings and loan association to a
federally chartered stock association as provided by section 402(j)
of the National Housing Act.' The approved plan provided for the
issuance, without charge, of stock to persons who were depositors
as of July 13, 1972. The conversion plan became operative April
15, 1976. 5
In HarrI, the petitioners sought judicial review of the order
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank approving the conversion
plan pursuant to section 408a(k) of the Housing Act.' The Bank
1 557

F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1977).

2 557 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1977).

Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976).
National Housing Act of 1934, § 402U), 12 U.S.C. § 1725(0) (1976).
557 F.2d at 749.
According to the court, Order No. 75-1164 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
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Board asserted that the petitioners should not be allowed to proceed because they had not exhausted their administrative remedies by filing timely objections with the Bank Board. The court
recognized that administrative remedies must be exhausted in
virtually all instances where judicial review is sought, but that,
in this case, the exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
required because the notices affirmatively stated that there
would be an unconditional right to court review.' Therefore, the
petitioners were allowed to proceed with the petition for review.8
The petitioners alleged that the conversion plan was unfair
because of the lapse of time between the record date of July 13,
1972, and the effective date of conversion of April 15, 1976; that
the conversion by issuance of "free" stock was improper; that the
proxy solicitation material was misleading and false; and that
there was no authority to convert deposits in a mutual association
into stock In response to these allegations, the court referred to
the 1974 amendments to the National Housing Act and the Securities Exchange Act embodied in Public Law 93-495.10 The

court recognized that the time lapse created problems, but noted
Congress had mandated the record date and, therefore, the lapse
did not invalidate the conversion." The issuance of "free" stock
was permitted under the grandfather provisions of the final
amendments to section 402 of the National Housing Act. The
Bank Board was authorized to supervise and approve the conversion process under section 402 of the Housing Act. 3 Public Law
93-495 amended section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act directing the Bank Board to supervise and administer proxy solicitaapproved the plan. Id. at 748. Petitioner sought review pursuant to the National Housing
Act of 1934, § 408(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(k) (1976): "Any party aggrieved by an order of
the Corporation under this section may obtain a review of such order by filing in the court
of appeals of the United States ....
"
I "This is not an instance of silence as to possible remedy, but an affirmative misleading statement, the statement being that court review would be available." 557 F.2d at 749.
1 For a discussion of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, see Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Bank of
Commerce v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975); Bank
of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
' 557 F.2d at 749.
0 Pub. L. No. 93-495 §§ 105(b), 105(d), 88 Stat. 1504 (1974) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1725(j) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1976)).
1 557 F.2d at 750.
12 12 U.S.C. § 1725(j) (1976).
13

Id.
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tions.1' After examining the record, the court held that the proxy
solicitation material was neither false nor misleading. Finally, the
conversion was authorized by law upon a proper vote of a majority
of shareholders. 5 The petition for review was, therefore, dismissed. 11

In Harr II, plaintiffs challenged the conversion plan in a
collateral attack under rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act. 7 Plaintiffs alleged (1) That the conversion plan was part of
a conspiracy by the directors to benefit themselves and the officers; (2) that the plan
was unfair and deceptive; and (3) that rule
8
10b-5 was violated.1
The Tenth Circuit again referred to the changes made in 1974
to the National Housing Act and the Securities Exchange Act and
affirmed the trial court's holding that section 402(j)(4) of the
Housing Act, 9 as it refers to section 408(k) of the same Act,2
creates an exclusive remedy to review a determination by the
bank board." The court cited Fort Worth National Corp. v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.2" which considered the remedy available under section 408(k):
When Congress has prescribed a particular method of review, that
procedure is exclusive. .

.

. By specifying that appeals under sec-

" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1970), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1503 (1974). The Bank Board is authorized to issue
rules as to conversions. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725(j), 1730a(l) (1976).
" 557 F.2d at 751. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725(j), 1730a(l) (1976).
557 F.2d at 751.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(A) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(B) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a

material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not

misleading, or
(C) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates...
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the. . . sale of any
security.
II 557 F.2d at 751, 753.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1725()(4) (1976). This section provides in part that: "Any aggrieved
person may obtain a review of a final action of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board...

which approves . . . a plan of conversion . . . only by complying with the provisions of

subsection (k) of section 1730a of this title ....
2 National Housing Act § 408(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(k) (1976). This section provides
that the petition for review to the Court of Appeals "shall be exclusive, to affirm, modify,
terminate, or set aside, in whole or in part the order of the corporation."
11557 F.2d at 753.
469 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1972).
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tion 1730a(k) were to be filed in the Court of Appeals, Congress
expected to prevent conflicting rulings and duplicative proceedings
that inevitably would result from permitting collateral attack of
Corporation orders in the various district courts .... 2

The cause of action must, in the first instance, be a challenge to
the approval by the Bank Board of the plan of conversion and of
the proxy materials. A Rule 10b-5 claim would be at best a secondary action based on the consequences or impact of the plan
on the plaintiffs. The appeal was dismissed."
II.

CREDITOR-DEBTOR RELATIONS
Motor Co.2 5 involved a suit brought

Begay v. Ziems
under the
Truth in Lending Act"' and regulation Z2 to recover damages for
alleged failure of the seller to disclose accurately and meaningfully the amount of any default, delinquency, or similar charges
payable in the event of late payments by the buyer. The primary
question concerned whether the acceleration provisions in the
sales contract constituted charges required to be disclosed in the
manner specified by the Act and the regulation." The contract
provision permitted the seller upon default of an installment to
declare all amounts due or to become due, immediately payable
and allowed the seller-creditor to retain unearned finance charges
following acceleration. 2
The Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure for default,
delinquency, or other similar charges payable because of late payments on a sales contract. 0 Regulation Z similarly provides for
disclosure of terms addressing the amount and method of computing charges for late payments. 31 In light of these requirements,

the defendant, Ziem Motor Co., argued that the default or accel557 F.2d at 754 (citing 469 F.2d at 52).
557 F.2d at 753.
550 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1977).
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (1976).
21 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.15 (1977).
n 550 F.2d at 1245.
"

Id. at 1247.
' The Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure for "default, delinquency, or similar

charges payable in the event of late payments." 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (1976).
" Regulation Z provides disclosure of terms covering "[tihe amount, or method of
computing the amount, of any default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the
event of late payments." 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977).
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eration provisions of the contract were not charges required by the
Act and the regulation to be disclosed. 2
The court briefly reviewed conflicting case authority from
other circuits and accepted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in
Martin v. Commercial Securities Co.3 3 The court in Martin held
that an acceleration clause was not subject to the disclosure requirements because there is no reference to them in the Act, the
regulations, or the official interpretations of the Federal Reserve
34
Board.
The dissent in Begay pointed to the fact that since the acceleration provision included amounts due or to become due, the
seller-creditor had reserved, and could assert, the right to accelerate the entire debt, including the unearned finance charges. The
creditor could then collect all such unearned finance charges.3
The dissent continued by noting that this clause was not only the
assertion of a remedy by way of acceleration but also obligated
the debtor to pay additional, specific pecuniary sums. Therefore,
the dissent would require disclosure under the Act and regulation
Z.

A.

36

III. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Consolidated Film Industries v. United States

In ConsolidatedFilm Industries v. United States, 37 Consolidated Film Industries [hereinafter Consolidated] sought an injunction enjoining the United States from enforcing a tax levy
served on Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., the assignor of certain
contract rights to Consolidated.3 8 The main issue facing the court
was whether the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) required
the filing of a financing statement in order to perfect a security
interest in the assignment of contract rights.3 If filing was not
550 F.2d at 1247.
539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976).
, Id. at 529.
550 F.2d at 1249 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
3S Id.

37547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977).

" Consolidated was the assignee of certain contract rights granted by Inflight and,
as such, the court held it to be the proper party in interest for bringing the action. Id. at
534.
3 The Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides in part: "A financing statement
must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following . . .(e) an assignment
of accounts or contract rights which does not alone or in conjunction with other assign-
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required, the perfected security interest of Consolidated would
assume priority over, and preclude enforcement of, the tax levy.10
Consolidated contended that the assignment was a security
interest covered by a provision of the Utah UCC which exempted
from filing for perfection contract rights which are not a
significant part of the outstanding contract rights of the assignor." The trial court agreed with Consolidated and granted the
injunction against the United States. However, the Tenth Circuit
reversed on the ground that the assignment was a significant part
of the assignor's outstanding contract rights and therefore not
exempt. 2 The court stated that the burden of proof for establishing significance was upon the party claiming the exemption. In
this case, Consolidated had failed to meet its burden. 3
B.

Cargill, Inc. v. Van Stafford

In Cargill, Inc. v. Van Stafford," the court dealt with two
separate transactions for the sale of wheat by defendant Stafford
to plaintiff Cargill. The issue in the first transaction involved
whether Cargill's claim of an enforceable contract for the sale of
wheat was barred by the Statute of Frauds provision of the
UCC.45 The issue in the second transaction hinged upon determining the proper date for assessing damages for breach of a sales
contract under the UCC.11
On July 23, 1973, Cargill's agent telephoned Stafford concerning the purchase of wheat. Stafford replied that he had wheat
available. He concluded the conversation by instructing the agent
ments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts or
contract rights of the assignor." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-302(1)(e) (1968).
* 547 F.2d at 533.
41 Id.
42

Id. at 535.

Id. at 536-37. The court noted that the assignment constituted most of the outstanding accounts or rights of the assignor and that the assignee failed to present evidence
to the contrary.
" 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
" The parties agreed that Colorado law applied in this case. Section 4-2-201(2) of the
Colorado Uniform Commercial Code provides in part: A writing is sufficient "[bletween
merchants, if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents .... " COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-201(2) (1973).
" See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 4-2-712 to 713 (1973). Section 4-2-712 relates to damages
when the buyer procures substitute goods, i.e. "cover." Section 4-2-713 addresses the
measure of damages when "cover" is not used as a remedy.
"
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to forward a confirmation and, if it appeared proper, he would
sign and return it. The agent of Cargill prepared the confirmation
but addressed it improperly, delaying its arrival until August 17,
1973. Stafford refused to sign the confirmation, citing several
objections to its terms. Cargill brought suit for breach of contract.47
The trial court held that recovery for breach of contract was
foreclosed because of the Statute of Frauds provisions of the UCC
governing sales between merchants." The written confirmation
was not sufficient because it was not received within a reasonable
time following the contract. Thus the contract was unenforceable.49
The second transaction arose out of a telephone conversation
on July 31, 1973, in which a contract for the sale of wheat was
negotiated. A confirmation of the second sale was correctly addressed and mailed to Stafford in a reasonable time but contained several additional terms not negotiated by the parties. On
August 17, Stafford objected to the additional provisions and
declared the contract void. Cargill then brought suit for breach
of contract.50
The court held that the objection to the additional terms was
not made within the ten-day period provided by statute5' and
thus the confirmation was sufficient as written. The court decided, however, that the additional terms constituted a material
alteration of the contract and thus did not become a part of it.5"
Having found a valid, enforceable contract the court then
approached the more interesting question of damages for its
breach. Since the buyer did not employ the remedy of cover,53 the
buyer's damages were to be assessed in accordance with section
, 553 F.2d at 1223-24.
COLO.REv. STAT. § 4-2-201(2) (1973).
" 553 F.2d at 1225.
Id. at 1222, 1225.
"
Between merchants, an objection to a writing in confirmation of a contract must
be in writing and "given within ten days after it is received." COLO. Ry. STAT. § 4-2-201(2)
(1973).
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-207(2)(b) (1973) states that, between merchants, the additional terms become part of the contract unless they materially alter the contract.
0 "Cover" is a remedy by which a buyer may purchase substitute goods and recover
the difference in price between the original contract price and the price of the substituted
goods. COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2-712 (1973).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.. 55

4-2-713 of the Colorado UCC. 54 The section provides that the
measure of damages is the difference between the market price
at the time the buyer learns of the breach and the contract price.55
The trial court awarded damages based on the market price as
of September 6, the date on which Stafford unequivocally stated
he would not perform. The Tenth Circuit, in interpreting section
4-2-713, ruled that the time at which the buyer learns of the
breach is the time for performance. In this case this would have
been September 30.5
The court then discussed the remedy of cover. Apparently
influenced by the comment to section 4-2-71311 dealing with damages for nondelivery or repudiation, the court stated that a buyer
should cover unless there is a valid reason for refusal. 8 This opinion placed the Tenth Circuit in a unique position in interpreting
the UCC. Cover apparently is not a mandatory remedy for recovery of damages. Until this decision, a buyer had the right to
choose between remedies without penalty in choosing one over
another. 9
C.

Barbour v. United States
In Barbourv. United States,'"the Tenth Circuit held that a
secured creditor's failure to sell repossessed goods in a commercially reasonable manner does not preclude recovery of a defi4 Section 4-2-713 provides in part: "[Tihe measure of damages for nondelivery or
repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price ....
" CoLo. REv. STAT. § 4-2-713
(1973).
"Id.
S 553 F.2d at 1226. This interpretation has gained some support in other jurisdictions
and by legal scholars. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 197-202
(1972).
57 COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2-713, Official Comment 1 (1973).
The court stated:
At the end of a reasonable period he [the buyer] should cover if substitute goods are readily available. If substitution is readily available and buyer
does not cover within a reasonable time, damages should be based on the
price at the end of that reasonable time rather than on the price when
performance is due. If a valid reason exists for failure or refusal to cover,
damages may be calculated from the time when performance is due.
553 F.2d at 1227.
1, The author has not been able to locate any other court or legal scholar taking the
same position as the court in this case.
- 562 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977).
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ciency judgment by the creditor.' The case involved a situation
where the Small Business Administration (SBA) lawfully repossessed secured equipment but then proceeded to sell it in what
failed to qualify as a commercially reasonable manner. The price
obtained at the sale was considerably less than the balance on the
underlying note and the SBA sued to recover the deficiency. Barbour, the debtor, counterclaimed based upon the SBA's failure to
comply with section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) as adopted in Kansas.62
The courts have offered three different interpretations of the
effect of noncompliance with section 9-504(3) and its consequent
interaction with section 9-507(1),11 which provides the debtor
with a remedy upon a creditor's failure to comply with section 9504(3). The first interpretation holds that "compliance with section [9-504(3)] . . .is a condition precedent to a secured credi, Id. at 21.
§ 84-9-504(3) (Supp. 1977) reads as follows:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but
every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place
and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no
other notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to
any other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of
his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The
secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject
of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.

' KAN. STAT.

9

KAN. STAT.

§ 84-9-507(1) (1965) reads as follows:

If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this part dispositon may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor
or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been
made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with
the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has
a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price
differential plus ten percent of the cash price.
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tor's right to recovery of any deficiency between the sale price of
collateral and the amount of the unpaid balance." 4 Assuming a
situation where a creditor fails to satisfy the commercial reasonableness test of section 9-504(3), obtains a reasonable price, and
yet a sizeable deficiency remains, this rule would bar a deficiency
judgment."5
The second interpretation does not automatically preclude
the creditor from obtaining a deficiency judgment but rather
"indulge[s] the presumption . . .that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor
the burden of proving the amount that should reasonably have
been obtained through a sale conducted according to law.""8 This
line of authority thus allows the creditor a deficiency judgment
under section 9-504(3) but also permits the debtor an offset to the
extent of the difference between the sale price and what that price
should have been had the sale been conducted properly. Further,
the burden is upon the creditor to prove a value less than the
outstanding debt and the amount bid or received at the sale is
not considered evidence of its true value.6 7
" Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1977). See Skeels
v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other
grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Washington v. First Nat'l Bank, 332 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373 (1975); Braswell v.
American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); FDIC v. Farrar, 231
N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1975); Beneficial Finance Co. v. Reed, 212 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1973);
Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. Halling, 205 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1973); Camden Nat'l
Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M.
474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc.
2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971); Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo.
1972).
U For a criticism of this rule, see, e.g., Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest
Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).
U Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 150, 398 S.W.2d 538, 542
(1966). See Leasing Assocs., Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971);
Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v.
Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Community Management Ass'n of Colo.
Springs, Inc. v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973); Wirth v. Heavey, 508
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1974); Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d
341 (1973); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (Ocean
County Dist. Ct. 1971); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super.
328, 258 A.2d 162 (Bergen County Ct. 1969); Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Talcott,
Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 454 S.W.2d 130 (1969).
87 See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 668-69 453 S.W.2d 37,
39-40 (1970).
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The third line of cases most closely follows the provisions of
the UCC. They permit the secured creditor to recover a deficiency
judgment subject to an offset for damages to which the debtor is
entitled under section 9-507(1). Thus the creditor has the burden of proving his claim for a deficiency judgment without the
indulgence of any presumptions while the debtor has the burden
of proving his damages resulting from creditor's commercially
unreasonable sale.
The Tenth Circuit, interpreting Kansas law, adopted the
third interpretation," noting that section 9-507(1) provides a specific remedy for noncompliance with section 9-504(3) and therefore "a complete bar was not intended." 70 Further, the UCC prohibits "penal damages."'"
Constance C. Cox
Peter M. Johnson
Michael M. Page
See, e.g., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974);
Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (1972); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin.
& Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Wollgast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 (1974); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6
Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
" 562 F.2d at 21.
70 Id.

71Id,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
The term of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals covered by
this survey was not a particularly fruitful one for breaking new
ground in the area of constitutional law. Few cases of major importance were presented to the court for its consideration. The
more interesting cases presented for review were in the general
areas of employment, prison inmates' rights, guest statutes, social security, and color of state law. This overview will highlight
some of the more significant aspects of these cases.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT: EMPLOYMENT
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided four cases of
alleged employment discrimination wherein the plaintiffsemployees claimed that constitutionally protected conduct
prompted their termination or job denial. The Court of Appeals
disagreed, and decided all of the cases in favor of the defendantsemployers.
The disposition of three of the employment cases turned
upon the resolution of two key issues: 1) Whether the conduct in
question was protected under the first amendment and, if so, 2)
whether the protected conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's
termination or job denial. In Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,I the Supreme Court premised the
success of the plaintiff's first amendment claim on the affirmative resolution of both issues.2 In addressing the first issue, the
Court reaffirmed the balancing test prescribed in Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, in
which the teacher's interest in commenting on matters of public
concern was weighed against the school's interest in promoting
429 U.S. 274 (1977). In this case, a school principal circulated to the teachers a
memo relating to teacher dress and appearance. One of the school's untenured teachers
conveyed the substance of the memo to a radio station which announced the adoption of
the dress code as a news item. The teacher was subsequently dismissed. These facts gave
rise to the two questions: What constitutes protected conduct and what role does the
protected conduct play in the subsequent termination?
2 Id. at 284, 287.
3 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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the efficient delivery of public services.4 With regard to the second issue, the Mt. Healthy court determined that the causal requirement is satisfied when the plaintiff shows that the protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination, i.e., that termination would not have occurred absent the
protected conduct.5 The Tenth Circuit plaintiffs' failure to establish definitive first amendment violations is attributable to their
failure to meet these Mt. Healthy standards.
In Schmidt v. Fremont County School District No. 25,1 a
Wyoming school principal alleged that his public disapproval of
school programs and policies triggered his termination. The
school district justified the termination by reference to the principal's failure to improve the school's serious absenteeism problem
and other instances of unsatisfactory work performance. By
applying the Pickeringbalancing test, the court found the principal's expressions of disapproval to be undeserving of first amendment protection.7 The court also found ample factual support for
the termination apart from the allegedly protected expression,'
thereby dismissing the principal's first amendment claim.
Similar issues arose in Franklin v. Atkins.' Franklin was refused a teaching position at the University of Colorado on the
basis of a report prepared by his former employer. Franklin alleged that the Colorado regents' reliance on this report was unjustified since the report referred to constitutionally protected conduct. 10 In affirming the decision for the regents, the court stressed
I "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Id. at 568 (emphasis added). For further interpretation and discussion of what constitutes a matter of "public concern," see Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d
928 (7th Cir. 1972) and Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Bertot
v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
5 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
6 558 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977).
IId. at 985. The statements concerned the internal operation of the school system
and were not matters of general public concern, as stipulated in Pickering. See generally
cases cited note 4, supra.
9 558 F.2d 982, 985 (10th Cir. 1977).
No. 76-1256 (10th Cir., June 20, 1977).
1oThe report discussed Franklin's participation in several incidents amounting to
"improper conduct" and served to support a recommendation for Franklin's termination
as a teacher at Stanford University.
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that Franklin had failed to satisfy the Mt. Healthy standards;
i.e., Franklin demonstrated neither that the conduct described in
the report was constitutionally protected nor that the regents'
consideration of the conduct was the motivating factor in their
decision to turn down his application for employment."
In Butler v. Hamilton," two staff counselors in the Black
Education Program at the University of Colorado were fired after
holding a press conference designed to pressure the university
into investigating the alleged misuse of program funds. The newly
hired program director staunchly opposed the press conference,
and the counselors contended that their exercise of their first
amendment freedoms prompted their dismissals. The program
director alleged that the counselors had consistently failed to
comply with certain directives concerning the discharge of their
employment duties and that the counselors' insistence on holding
the press conference merely represented a culmination of their
insubordinate conduct. In determining that the counselors' poor
work performance and antipathetic attitudes were the chief factors motivating the terminations, the court noted that the exercise of a constitutionally protected right does not absolve the
employee of responsibility for prior transgressions committed
during the course of employment.' 3
The court's strict application in these cases of the Pickering
balancing test and the Mt. Healthy standards reveals the court's
underlying interest in preventing employees from claiming the
exercise of first amendment rights as a blanket defense against
termination or job denial. The Pickering test may be used to
exclude from first amendment protection an employee's commentary relating to the internal affairs of the employing organization
and the Mt. Healthy causal requirement insures that exercise of
first amendment rights does not excuse substandard work performance. '1 The latter requirement is especially pertinent in cases
"

No. 76-1256 at 7.

12542 F.2d 835 (10th Cir, 1976).
*' Id. at 839.
" "A discharge for exercise of first amendment rights is impermissible ....
The
exercise of a first amendment right, however, does not insulate a public employee from
being discharged for occurrences prior to the exercise of the right. Furthermore, the exercise of a constitutional right does not provide a grace period for a public employee immunizing him from discharge immediately following such exercise, as long as the exercise of
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such as Schmidt and Butler where several disparate factors culminated in the plaintiff's termination.
In United States v. City of Albuquerque,'5 the court considered the dismissal of a Seventh Day Adventist for his refusal to
work on Saturday.' 6 The 1964 Civil Rights Act protects employees
from discriminatory dismissal on religious grounds 7 and requires
the employer to "reasonably accommodate" an employee's religious practice unless such accommodation would pose an "undue
hardship" on his business. 8 The trial court found that the employer had a liberal policy governing time off and that the plaintiff had taken little initiative in attempting to trade shifts with
other workers so as to avoid Saturday work. The appellate court,
in affirming that the employer had acted reasonably, stressed
that "reasonably accommodate" and "undue hardship" are relative terms whose meanings must be interpreted within the framework of particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
case,' 9 and that such determinations are essentially findings of
fact.20 Since from the record none of these findings were clearly
erroneous, the appellate court was obliged to uphold the trial
court's decision .21
II.

DUE PROCESS: EMPLOYMENT

In Staton v. Mayers,22 the plaintiff claimed that his right to
due process was violated by the inadequacy of the notice of his
hearing and by the bias of the hearing tribunal in his dismissal
as superintendent of a school district in Oklahoma on grounds of
willful neglect of duty and incompetence. The threshold question
before the court was whether Staton's dismissal burdened a liberty or property interest so that his right to due process was in
issue. The court held that Staton was protected by due process
the right did not motivate the dismissal." Butler v. Hamilton, 542 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir.
1976).
'5 545 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1976).
The plaintiff was a fireman whose schedule frequently included Saturday work.
, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
" 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1976). See Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529
F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976).
545 F.2d 110, 115.
22 The court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and on Williams v. Southern Union Gas
Co. in support of its reluctance to overturn the trial court's findings.
- 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977).
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because he had a legitimate claim of entitlement to his job derived from his contract with the school district which was in effect
at the time of his dismissal, 3 and because he was deprived of
liberty and property by the stigma of being branded incompetent
and guilty of willful neglect of duty. 4
Staton claimed that the notice of his hearing was inadequate
because it did not specify the act or deficiencies considered by the
board to amount to willful neglect of duty or incompetence; nor
did it specify any of the adverse witnesses. The Tenth Circuit
held that the undetailed charges were insufficient to constitute
meaningful notice," but that, since Staton failed to make a
of insufficiency did not demtimely objection, his belated claim
2
onstrate a denial of due process.

Staton further claimed that the three members of the school
board who voted for his dismissal had made public statements
against him, showing a biased tribunal. After a lengthy analysis
of the background and system of school administration involved,
the Tenth Circuit held that the tribunal did not meet due process
demands for a fair hearing with the appearance of fairness.Y At
the time Staton was dismissed there were no procedures available
for providing an alternate tribunal, but subsequent to his dismissal, the Oklahoma legislature provided for appeal remedies
including a full hearing and review on the facts by a special
commission and further appeal to the State Board of Education.
In setting aside Staton's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit noted that
if the board should renew its decision to dismiss Staton, he could
then use the new appeal remedies to challenge the fairness of the
tribunal .28
" Id. at 911. For this decision, the court cited Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972), wherein the Supreme Court stated: "To have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have . . . a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."
" 552 F.2d at 911. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of governmental action, procedural due process insures that person fair
procedures. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Powers v.
Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 539 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 552 F.2d at 912. The minimum requirements of procedural due process are notice
and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before deprivation
of the liberty or property interests of the plaintiff. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
579, 581 (1975) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 576 n.15 (1972)).
" 552 F.2d at 912.
" Id. at 914.
" Id. at 915.
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In Schultz v. Parsons,9 the Tenth Circuit held that a valid
expectation of continued employment does not arise until a
teacher has tenure and, therefore, the plaintiff's right to due process was not violated when the school district informed him that
his teaching contract would not be renewed without giving him
an opportunity for a hearing.30
Schultz filed a civil rights action against the Denver Public
School System alleging that his public criticism of the school
system's curriculum was the basis upon which the defendants
changed his positive evaluation to a negative "do not rehire"
evaluation which resulted in the nonrenewal of his contract.
Schultz contended that this change in his evaluation was retaliatory and violative of his first amendment rights of freedom of
expression and speech as well as violative of his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law.
The trial court held Schultz's due process claims to be without merit and dismissed the cause of action."' On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that Schultz did
not have a property right in his employment since he did not have
tenure,32 and, therefore, his contract nonrenewal need not be pre33
ceded by a hearing since it was not predicated on his character.
a No. 76-1389 (10th Cir. July 18, 1977).
" Id. at 6.
n Id. at 4.
" Id. at 6. Since there is no federal constitutional right to public employment, the

issue of whether a teacher has a property right within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment must be determined by the law of the state where the teacher is employed.
Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 369 F. Supp. 648, 649 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d
38 (10th Cir. 1976). According to the court, a nontenured teacher does not have a property
right in his employment unless a legitimate objective expectancy of continued employment is reasonable, based upon implied agreements or statutory or administrative procedures governing nonrenewal of contracts. Weathers v. West Yuma Cty. School Dist. R-J1, 530 F.2d 1335, 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1976).
' While recognizing that any reason assigned for dismissal of a teacher is likely to
negatively reflect on his character, the court, in Schultz, held that only a dismissal "which
assumes a constitutional magnitude is one which carries a stigma that seriously damages
the individual's ability to obtain other employment opportunities." No. 76-1389 at 7.
Using this test for determining whether a hearing was required prior to nonrenewal of
Schultz's contract, the court determined that no such stigma attached in Schultz's case
and that the issue was settled by Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) wherein
the Supreme Court stated that due process would accord an opportunity to refute charges
where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake. Id. at 573, quoted
at No. 76-1389 at 7.
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In regard to Schultz's first amendment claim, the Tenth Circuit held that because he did not have tenure, he had the burden
of proving he was not rehired for constitutionally impermissible
reasons, and that he had failed to meet this burden. 3
III.

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS: MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE

In Ousdahl v. Sanders,35 plaintiffs employment as a Lawrence, Kansas fireman was terminated pursuant to a city ordinance requiring the policemen and firemen of the city to maintain
their residence within Lawrence city limits. Those who failed to
do so would be discharged.
Ousdahl challenged the ordinance as being unconstitutional
on three grounds: 1) "[I]t denies him the right to live where he
chooses, presumably limiting his right to travel and associate,
and yet maintain his employment;" 31 2) it denies him equal protection; and 3) it denies him due process. The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas held that the ordinance
was constitutional. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Citing McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service
Commission,3" the court stated that no constitutional right exists
to allow one to continue living outside a city while maintaining
employment with the city. Ousdahl could live outside the city
limits-he was simply precluded from working for the Lawrence
police or fire department if he chose to do so.
Having concluded that no fundamental constitutional right
was involved,38 the court turned to an examination of the
"rational relationship" test to determine whether Ousdahl's
equal protection rights had been violated. The ordinance itself
stated two city interests which the ordinance was supposed to
further: improved community relations between the policemen
and firemen and the citizens of Lawrence, and greater protection
for the public in case of emergency. The court held that the ordiu No. 76-1389 at 4-5.
N

No. 76-2111 (10th Cir. July 13, 1977).
No. 76-2111 at 3.

424 U.S. 645 (1976).
Therefore, the "compelling governmental interest" test did not have to be satisfied.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
" E.g. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
U
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nance's residency requirement bore a rational connection to these
legitimate city interests, and thus, the equal protection test was
satisfied.
The court held that Ousdahl had failed to establish a cognizable liberty or property interest in his employment. The city commission could fire him at will, and Ousdahl's claim amounted to
nothing more than a "unilateral expectancy of continued employment."4 0 Thus, under the principles of Board of Regents v. Roth,"
and Perry v. Sindermann,2 no pre-termination right to notice and
hearing existed.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT: PRISON INMATES
In Green v. Director, Colorado State Department of
43 a prisoner,
Corrections,
incarcerated in the Missouri State Penitentiary serving a Missouri sentence, requested that he be transferred to the Colorado State Penitentiary, presumably to be near
his relatives and to prepare himself for post-release residency in
Colorado. The Colorado authorities refused to accept the transfer.
Green claimed in his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that his
transfer was denied due to his exercise of his rights of free speech,
of freedom of religion," and of freedom to petition the government
for redress of grievances.45 His action was dismissed by the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed.
The court held that "[n]on-transfer of a prisoner under a
discretionary provision of the Interstate Correction Compact does
not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the appellant.""
Green could continue to exercise at the Missouri State Penitentiary all the rights which one possesses by virtue of the Constitution. There is no additional constitutional right to have granted
"

No. 76-2111 at 5.
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972). "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at 569.
42 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
, No. 76-2014 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 1977).
" Green was "assertedly also a minister of the Human Awareness Universal Life
Church, basic tenets of which include, in his view, that prisoners are special Christians
and support for a policy of conjugal visits for prisoners." No. 76-2014 at 2.
" Green was cited as "a notorious and prolific jailhouse lawyer." Id.
a Id. at 3.

1978

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

a requested transfer to the penal institution of another state. The
dismissal of the action was thus proper. The court distinguished
those cases wherein prison authorities affirmatively take actions
which raise questions of constitutional magnitude, for example,
the imposition of solitary confinement, 7 or the unrequested
transfer to another state.48
The Tenth Circuit saw the case of Kennedy v. Meachem49 as
raising some fundamental constitutional questions. Weldon M.
Kennedy, Richard B. Reeder, and Robert R. Collingwood were
inmates of the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The three were followers of Satanism. They brought this civil rights action, alleging
that the defendant prison authorities had violated the plaintiffs'
first amendment rights by restricting the practice of their religion.5 ° The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dismissed the complaint." Plaintiffs appealed." The Tenth
Circuit vacated the judgment of dismissal and remanded the
cause for further proceedings."
At issue was whether the dismissal was proper. The defendants argued in favor of its propriety, claiming that the complaint
failed to establish that Satanism is a religion and thus no first
amendment protection was due, and that, in any case, there were
reasonable restrictions on the practice of Satanism only, with no
restriction on the plaintiffs' belief in it.
The court first pointed out that the lower court had not held
that Satanism was not a religion. Rather, it had concluded from
its analysis of the complaint that there were reasonable restrictions on the practice of Satanism, "apparently either accepting
'1 E.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Buddhist prisoner alleged that he was put
in solitary confinement as a penalty for sharing his religious materials with other inmates).
" E.g., Fajariak v. McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974) (Black Muslim and Christian Scientist prisoners alleged that their transfers resulted from their religious activities).
" 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976).
The allegations included denial of plaintiffs' right to have certain ritual items in
their cells; prohibition of plaintiffs' posting of religious information; refusal of plaintiffs'
request to have a religious study group; discrimination against Satanist inmates in assignment of employment; and general harassment of plaintiffs. Id. at 1059.
" 382 F. Supp. 996 (D. Wyo. 1974).
" The district court had granted defendants' motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
but had ordered dismissal of the case after denying defendant's motions for appointment
of counsel and disqualification of the presiding district judge. Defendants appealed all
three rulings. 540 F.2d at 1059.
" Id. at 1062.
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the allegations that for constitutional purposes a religion was
involved, or reasoning that even assuming that a religion was
involved the restrictions were permissible."
The Tenth Circuit admonished that the dismissal of the case,
without a responsive pleading or an evidentiary hearing, precluded any attempts by the parties to prove that Satanism is or
55
is not a religion within the meaning of the first amendment.
The court acknowledged that the practice of one's religion is
subject to certain restrictions," and that the fact that these plaintiffs were prison inmates bore consideration, in that "[wihile in
custody inmates have only such rights in practice of their religion
as can be exercised without impairing requirements of prison discipline."57 But the court pointed out that the dismissal precluded
any arguments that the restrictions imposed by the defendants
were or were not "taken as necessary security or control measures
in the prison."5 8
The Tenth Circuit, in remanding the case, instructed the
lower court on the balancing test it would be required to apply if
it found on remand that a religion was involved and that restrictions on the exercise of such religion were being imposed. The
district court would have to "determine whether any incidental
burden on fundamental First Amendment rights is justified by a
compelling state interest in the regulation of prison affairs, within
5'9
the State's constitutional power.
The court in Kennedy was properly responsive to the claims
of the inmates. There is no inconsistency in its treatment of
Green's case, the realization being clearly expressed in Green that
" Id. at 1060.
5 The court pointed out that the plaintiffs might be able to prove that Satanism is
entitled to first amendment protection, citing Remmers v. Brewer, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974), (upheld a finding that the Church of the New
Song was a religion within the meaning of the first amendment) and United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), (discussed the "I Am" movement in terms of the first amendment).
" See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
540 F.2d at 1061. See Long v. Harris, 332 F. Supp. 262, 270 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd,
473 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1973).
540 F.2d at 1061.
, Id. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456
F.2d 917, 919 (10th Cir. 1972); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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prisoners as well as other persons possess constitutional rights,
and whether such rights exist depends on the factual setting of
the case."
V. EQUAL PROTECTION: GUEST STATUTE
In Neu v. Grant,"' a gratuitous passenger in an automobile
which was involved in an accident was injured and brought suit
for damages against the operator of the vehicle in which she was
traveling. The jury verdict and judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming denied her recovery.
Neu appealed.
Neu attacked the instruction given by the lower court to the
jury that she was a guest in the automobile in which she was
traveling, and therefore, under the Wyoming guest statute,"2 she
had the burden of proving that the operator of said vehicle was
grossly negligent. Neu challenged the constitutionality of the
statute, mainly on the ground that it denied her equal protection, 3 guaranteed by the Federal Constitution 4 and the Wyoming
Constitution. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and
judgment.6 6
The main obstacle to a successful argument by Neu was the
decision in Silver v. Silver, 7 wherein the United States Supreme
Court upheld, against an equal protection challenge, the Connecticut guest statute which required a showing by the guest that
the operator of the automobile intentionally caused the accident
No. 76-2014 (10th Cir., Apr. 26, 1977).
548 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1977).
2 WYO.. STAT. § 31-5-1116 (1977).
Neu's case was also based on due process grounds in that the statute "deprives
[her] of any opportunity to recover damages for her personal injuries from those responsible for their infliction, which does not lend any reasonable furtherance of any object
548 F.2d at 283. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV;
protective of the public welfare .
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Neu also claimed that "by effectively denying [her] recovery of money damages, she
548 F.2d at 283. See Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 8;
is barred from the 'courthouse door'.
WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
The above claims were not specifically discussed by the Tenth Circuit.
"

"4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 34; Wyo. CONST. art.

I, § 27.
" Also dealt with in this decision was whether Neu had adequately preserved for
appellate consideration her objections to the statute. The court's analysis of this issue is
not within the scope of this note.
- 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
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or operated the automobile with reckless disregard for the rights
of other persons. The court in Silver focused on the argument that
the statute created an unconstitutional distinction between gratuitous passengers in automobiles and those in other kinds of
vehicles, rather than an attack based on the distinction between
gratuitous passengers and those who pay. The conclusion was
that, "It is enough that the present statute strikes at the evil
where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most frequently occurs." 69
Neu argued that Silver should be cast aside.70 There was
indeed substantial authority for her plea.7 On the other hand,
there was a good deal of case law on the other side,72 and the court
in Neu pointed out that the United States Supreme Court had
summarily dismissed an appeal involving an equal protection
attack on the constitutionality of the Utah guest statute as not
presenting a substantial federal question,7 3 such decision constituting an adjudication on the merits, binding on state and lower
federal courts."

The court proceeded to discuss the United States Supreme
Court's reaffirmance of Silver in Sidle v. Majors,75 although the
0 This was not made clear in the Neu opinion. See 548 F.2d at 284; Brown v. Merlo,
8 Cal. 3d 855, 863-64 n.4, 506 P.2d 212, 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 393-94 n.4 (1973).
0 280 U.S. at 123-24.
Neu's opening brief on appeal stated, inter alia, that:
Factors, such as the great lengths of time that have passed since that decision and the very limited extent of the Supreme Court's analysis, made for
disposal of the case, which is a relic that cannot stand in the way of contemporary understanding of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
as provided in such cases as . . . [citations omitted]. Indeed Silver, as the
only real obstacle to invalidation, is a weak basis on which to found equal
protection.
548 F.2d at 284.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973);
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751,
518 P.2d 362 (1974); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial Dist., 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975);
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W. 2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195,
331 N.E. 2d 723 (1975).
n,See, e.g., Richardson v. Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d 536 (1974); Justice v.
Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W. 2d 687 (Iowa 1974);
Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W. 2d 86 (S.D. 1975).
Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810, dismissing appeal from 520 P.2d 883 (Utah),
rehearingdenied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974).
1,See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
75429 U.S. 945 (1976), denying cert. to 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.). The Seventh Circuit
was convinced that the Indiana guest statute was unconstitutional but, based on Cannon
7
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dissenters expressed regret that "a statute [the Indiana guest
statute] whose constitutionality is patently open to serious debate""6 had to be upheld, and would have granted the petition for
certiorari "so that [they might] give plenary consideration to the
constitutional issue that hasstirred such conflict among state and
lower federal courts.'""
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit felt compelled to follow
Silver, and "[tihus, Neu's federal constitutional challenges
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [were] foreclosed. 78 The Neu opinion once again points out
some of the strong arguments which can be made against Silver,
and at least hints that we have not heard the last of the conflict
surrounding the constitutionality of guest statutes.
VI. DUE PROCESS: SOCIAL SECURITY
In McGrath v. Weinberger,7 the Tenth Circuit held that due
process does not require that prior notice and an opportunity for
a hearing be afforded Social Security beneficiaries who are determined to be incapable of managing their benefits.
McGrath's sister was appointed to serve as representative
payee for his Social Security benefits after he was released from
a mental hospital and a determination made by the Social Security Administration that he was incapable of managing his benefits. In a class action suit, McGrath claimed that certain Social
Security provisions" were unconstitutional because they violated
the due process clause by allowing the appointment of a representative payee without affording the beneficiary prior notice and
an opportunity to contest the determination that the beneficiary
is incapable of managing his own benefits.
The trial court applied a balancing-of-interests standard of
review and concluded that prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard were not required by the due process clause because the
and Hicks, felt required to affirm the district court which had applied the statute to grant
summary judgment to the driver of an automobile. 536 F.2d at 1159-60.
" 429 U.S. at 950 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 548 F.2d at 285.
71541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976).
" The provisions challenged were 42 U.S.C. § 405()
(1976) and 20 C.F.R. 404.1601,
(1970) both of which govern the authority and procedures of the Social Security Administration to make a beneficiary's payments to a representative payee.
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denial of McGrath's right to manage his own benefits was not
such a grievous loss that it outweighed the governmental interest
involved.8 1 McGrath appealed, contending that the trial court
erred in using the balancing-of-interests standard of review.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding and
2 a
stated that the issue was settled by Mathews v. Eldridge,"
recent United States Supreme Court decision, where the
balancing-of-interests test was recognized as the appropriate
standard of review for due process claims."
In weighing the competing interests of the parties, the Tenth
Circuit found the government's interest substantial since oral
hearings in capability-determination matters would involve considerable time and expense. The court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the governmental interest outweighed McGrath's
loss of the right to manage his own benefits. Underlying the
court's application of the balancing-of-interests test were the
facts that there are procedures available for reviewing such a
determination and that the Social Security Administration modi541 F.2d at 253.
424 U.S. 319 (1976). In light of Eldridge, the Tenth Circuit in McGrath stated that
it would be unwarranted for it to hold that due process requires prior notice and an
opportunity for a hearing where there has been no termination of benefits. 541 F.2d at 253.
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's distinction in Eldridge between substance and process. The Supreme Court held that Eldridge's substantive claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right must fail since he could obtain full
relief at a post-deprivation hearing. In regard to the procedural issue of jurisdiction,
however, the Supreme Court recognized that the termination of Eldridge's benefits did
satisfy the requirements of finality sufficiently to constitute a final decision reviewable
by the Court. Id. at 331 n.il.
9 The Supreme Court stated in Eldridge that due process generally requires the
consideration of three factors:
[Fjirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
It is well recognized that the balancing-of-interests test is the appropriate standard
of review in procedural due process claims. See generally Comment, IrrebuttablePresumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur,62 GEo. L.J.
1173, 1176 (1974). Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) are examples of the Supreme Court's application of procedural due process
balancing by which the Court weighs governmental interests such as administrative efficiency and economy against the importance of the interest asserted by the individual.
At
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fied its procedures subsequent to the filing of this suit to require
a ten-day notice of a proposed payee action.
VII.

COLOR OF STATE LAW

The issue of acting under color of state law came before the
Tenth Circuit twice during 1977. In Taylor v. Nichols8 ' the court
of appeals upheld the district court's ruling that the defendants
in the section 1983 action were all either immune from civil suit
or had not been acting under color of state law. Taylor involved
a civil rights action, brought by police officer Brian Taylor, which
grew out of the apprehension and detention of Michael Allen.
When Allen refused to get in the police car, Officer Taylor put
Allen in by force. A subsequent police internal affairs investigation exonerated Officer Taylor, but Michael Allen's mother filed
criminal assault and battery charges against the officer. Allen's
attorney, Latimer, was later appointed special prosecutor after
the county attorney refused to file criminal charges against Officer Taylor. Latimer prosecuted the assault and battery charges
against Officer Taylor under his special appointment by the
county attorney and three county commissioners. Officer Taylor
was acquitted of the criminal charges and subsequently brought
the instant section 198386 civil rights action against everyone involved in his assault trial. The district court granted a summary
judgment for all the defendants.
The court of appeals considered whether the district court
erred in dismissing the claims against all the defendants. One by
one the defendants were held to have been either immune or
acting under color of state law, the vital ingredient necessary to
support a section 1983 civil rights action. Michael Allen and his
father were held not to have acted under color of state law because their acts of filing a claim and testifying at the trial did not
constitute state action.8 7 Latimer, the special prosecutor, was
held to be immune from a civil suit for damages under section
1983. The court, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,u declined to draw
a distinction between a special prosecutor and an official prosecu- 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977).
BId.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
' Filing a claim and testifying at trial are private acts. Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875
(7th Cir. 1975).
- 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

tor, stating that Latimer was entitled to the same protection as
the permanent prosecutor. 8 The judge in the assault case was
"unquestionably entitled to absolute immunity.""0 The county
commissioners' involvement entitled them to qualified immunity
absent a showing by plaintiff that they had acted in a manner
which disqualified them from claiming immunity."
In upholding the district court's ruling for the defendants,
the court of appeals additionally declared that plaintiff Taylor's
other allegations under sections 1985 and 1986 must fail because
he "failed to make even a minimal showing that he was denied
equal protection or equal privileges and immunities guaranteed
by federal law ....
""
The Tenth Circuit decided in Mondragon v. Tenoriol3 that
there had been no state involvement in the leasing of the common
lands of a New Mexico land grant to bring the leasing under color
of state law. The action, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,11 urged
that appellants, inhabitants of Anton Chico land grant, were discriminated against in the leasing of common lands in a community land grant originally made in 1822. The defendants were
members of the Board of Trustees of Anton Chico Land Grant
who were authorized under New Mexico statutes" to issue leases
of the common lands. The grant of powers to the trustees included
the power to control and manage the land grant.
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the trustees were acting under color of state law in leasing the common
lands in an allegedly discriminatory manner. The district court
concluded that there was no such color of state law and the court
of appeals affirmed. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the state statute was the limit of the state involvement in the grant and that
its scope was narrow. No governmental functions were contemplated by the statute nor was there any ongoing relationship 7
0

558 F.2d at 566.

oId.
558 F.2d at 567.
558 F.2d at 568.
554 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-1 (1953).
" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-1 (1953).
* See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2
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which would bring the actions of the trustees under color of state
law. The Tenth Circuit further concluded there was no legislative
ratification of the acts of the trustees and that there was "shown
no state action and no state involvement in a private entity""
which would bring it under color of state law.
VIII. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
In Los Alamos School Board v. Wugalter" the Los Alamos,
New Mexico, School Board challenged the constitutionality of
subsection 19(G) of the New Mexico Public School Finance ActN
on the ground that it conflicted with the federal Atomic Energy
Community Act (AECA) of 1955.101 Defendants were the New

Mexico state education officials who administer funds to the state
school districts. Because Los Alamos received education funds
under the AECA, it received state education funds expressly
under subsection 19(G) of the School Finance Act.'0° The School
Finance Act provided that Los Alamos would come under the
general school funding formula only if received no AECA funds
in a given year. This provision resulted in less state education
funding for Los Alamos and thus "Los Alamos [was] singled out
for special treatment merely because it [received] AECA
funds."'' 3 Los Alamos did not contend that New Mexico had denied it equal protection by virtue of the special statutory treatment but instead contended that subsection 18(G) was unconstitutional under the supremacy clause'1 because it conflicted with
the federal Atomic Energy Community Act.105
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the intent of
Congress was to prohibit New Mexico from funding Los Alamos
schools in a different manner solely because they received federal
funds under AECA. Indicating that supremacy challenges must
be decided on a case-by-case basis,'"0 the court of appeals went
"

554 F.2d 423, 426 (10th Cir. 1977).

" 557 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1977).
' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-6-19(F) (1953). The challenged subsection is now codified

as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-6-19(G) (Supp. 1975) and is referred to as subsection 19(G) in
text.
10142 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2394 (1970).
,02
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-6-19(G) (Supp. 1975).
'° 557 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1977).
' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
IU 42 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2394 (1970).
'o 557 F.2d at 712.
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through a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction
of the two statutes and then reaching and determining the constitutional question of whether they are in conflict. Because the New
Mexico statute had not been construed authoritatively, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the district court's description of the Public
School Finance Act as an "equalization formula designed to eliminate adverse education effects caused by disparities in financial
resources available to individual school districts."' 07 The AECA
authorized funds for assistance in operating atomic energy communities with the purpose of providing for the "maintenance of
conditions which will not impede the recruitment and retention
of personnel essential to the atomic energy program."'' 8 There
was no showing that New Mexico's school district funding level
impeded the recruitment or retention of essential personnel in the
community of Los Alamos. In justifying its reversal of the district
court, the court of appeals noted first that "school finance laws
should be entitled to respect"'09 and second that they had been
directed to no evidence of any congressional "intent to limit the
manner in which states give education aid to atomic energy communities . . . ."10 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that since
subsection 19(G) did not frustrate the effectiveness of the AECA,
subsection 19(G) did not offend the supremacy clause and was
therefore constitutional.
James E. Bosik
MargaretN. Dillon
Bette A. Lingis
Karen A. Perez
557 F.2d at 713.
42 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1970).
"' 557 F.2d at 715 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
11 557 F.2d at 715.

A REMEDY FOR A RIGHT-Unified School District

No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977)
INTRODUCTION

Judicial expansion of both the procedural and substantive
due process protection afforded teachers' in the nineteen seventies has been paralleled by a growing recognition that these protections are pre-empted by the protection the eleventh amendment offers local school districts. While in earlier decisions, the
eleventh amendment' was consistently used to avoid the imposition of damages against a school district, in Unified School District No. 480 v. Epperson3 the Tenth Circuit, for the first time,
concluded that local school districts are not immune from responding in damages if a teacher's employment contract is terminated in violation of that teacher's fourteenth amendment right
to a hearing.' Thus, by its finding in Epperson that School District No. 480 was not an alter-ego of the state and, hence, not
immune under the eleventh amendment,' the Tenth Circuit offered a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights, and provided a framework for the future analysis of the eleventh amendment's applicability to school districts.
I. THE DECISION
Oleta Peters and Lila Epperson had been teaching in Seward
County, Kansas, for eleven and seventeen years, respectively,
when they were notified in February of 1972 that their teaching
contracts would not be renewed for the upcoming school year.
See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
2 See Comment, The Dwindling Rights of Teachers and the Closing of the Courthouse
Door, 44 FoaRDiw L. REv. 511, 544 (1975). The eleventh amendment provides: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
in equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
For a recent discussion by the Supreme Court of the policy behind eleventh amendment
immunity, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 256. Under KAN, STAT. § 72-5411 (1972), both teachers had one-year teaching
contracts which were automatically renewed for the following school year unless notice of
termination is given to the teacher by March 15. The appellate opinion indicates that
other teachers, as well as the plaintiffs, had their employment terminated. Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

According to the school district, the contracts were not renewed
because of budgetary cuts necessitated by a declining student
population coupled with a concomitant reduction in state funds
available for local education.7 The plaintiffs, however, had a different viewpoint regarding the reason behind the termination of
their contracts: Peters was president and Epperson was
president-elect of the local branch of the National Education
Association (NEA) which had recently engaged in negotiations
with District 480's school board.' The two plaintiffs believed that
their termination was retaliatory and in violation of their first
amendment rights.9 They retained counsel and requested a hearing by the school board. Their request was denied because, in the
board's opinion, a hearing was not required when a teacher is
fired solely for budgetary reasons. 0
Plaintiffs each instituted proceedings against the District's
480 school board members, in both their individual and official
capacities, in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas." Their complaint alleged that (1) Each educator had
been denied both procedural and substantive due process under
the fourteenth amendment because she was not given a hearing
prior to the decision not to renew her contract; and (2) each had
been penalized by the school district for exercising her first12
amendment right to free speech by virtue of her NEA activities.
The parties stipulated that the first amendment claim would be
tried to a jury first, and that, subsequently, the other issues would
be tried to the court alone on the basis of the record made in the
3
trial of the first amendment claim.

551 F.2d at 256.
Id. The court explained that the negotiations between the National Education
Association and the school board had been "rather heated." Id. No explanation is given,
however, regarding the content of the negotiation sessions.

Id.
Id. The events of the case, the court notes, transpired prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Kansas law now requires that
school districts give all teachers with two years consecutive employment notice and a
hearing prior to termination. KAN. STAT. §§ 72-5436-5446 (Supp. 1976).
1 Id. The school board had previously brought a declaratory judgment action in a
Kansas state court to determine if the board had to afford the two teachers a hearing under
the terms of the teachers' contracts and state law. The plaintiffs in Epperson had the
"

declaratory judgment action removed to the district court and the actions were consolidated at trial. Id. Jurisdiction in Epperson was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (Supp.
IV, 1977), and 1343 (1976).
2 551 F.2d at 256.
" Id. at 256-57.
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The jury found for the school board on the first amendment
issue, i.e., that the plaintiffs were discharged only for budgetary
reasons. At the second preceeding, the trial court found that the
plaintiffs "had a sufficient property interest to entitle them to a
hearing before any final determination was made not to renew
their teaching contracts."" Judgment was entered, however, in
favor of the members of the school board in their individual capacities on the basis of a qualified privilege.'" The trial court also
entered judgment in favor of the school board members in their
official capacities by reasoning that the eleventh amendment
barred the entry of a monetary judgment against the school district and because reinstatement was "inappropriate," since the
jury concluded that the termination of the teachers stemmed
from budgetary considerations."6
Plaintiffs based their appeal to the Tenth Circuit solely on
the remedial question. Both teachers argued that the trial court
erred in holding that the eleventh amendment barred the entry
of a monetary judgment and that reinstatement was inappropriate."
If.

TENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH TO REMEDIAL ISSUES

The Tenth Circuit on appeal held that, despite the eleventh
amendment, the plaintiffs were entitled to monetary damages for
the wrongful denial of their procedural due process rights but
were not entitled to reinstatement.' The court's treatment of the
effect of the eleventh amendment on the defendants' liability for
monetary damages represents a significant departure from earlier
decisions which consistently protected school boards from responding in damages in spite of their disregard of employees'
constitutional perogatives." The case further provides a frame,IId.

at 257.
Citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522
F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975). The Wood court explained that school board members are
immune from damages for actions which are violative of constitutional rights if the member is acting "in good faith in the course of exercising his discretion within the scope of
his official duties." 420 U.S. at 319. See also Comment, Teacher's Speech and First
Amendment Rights - Bertot v. School District No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, Tenth Circuit
Survey, 53 DEN. L. J. 95, 100 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Teacher's Rights].
" 551 F.2d at 257. The trial took place three years after the teachers' contracts were
terminated. Id.
1IId.
, Id. at 257-60.
"Id. at 258. The court found that reinstatement was "inappropriate" because the
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work for analyzing the remedies available to educators discharged
in violation of their constitutional rights.
A. Previous Tenth Circuit Decisions Regarding the Eleventh
Amendment and School Board Immunity
The eleventh amendment2° generally has been construed as
protecting a nonconsenting state from suits brought in her own
courts by a citizen of a foreign state,"' and from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens and citizens of another state.2
The amendment's protection extends to members of a state board
or an agency acting in their official capacities.23 Political subdivisions of the state, in general, enjoy the same immunity as the
state itself if the ultimate award is derived from state revenues.2
Until Epperson, the major Tenth Circuit decision permitting
school boards to escape liability for monetary damages on the
basis of eleventh amendment considerations was Harrisv. Tooele
County School District.2 51 Harris, a diversity action against a
school board for personal injuries, was dismissed on eleventh
amendment grounds.26 To determine the applicability to the
school board of the state's eleventh amendment immunity, the
Tenth Circuit isolated the following factors: State supreme court
decisions had held that school districts are instrumentalities of
the state;27 educational costs were divided between the state and
jury found the two contracts were not renewed because of budgetary considerations. The
court said:
To grant Peters and Epperson all that they now seek, namely reinstatement,
lost pay, and consequential damages, would afford them all the relief they
could have obtained had they prevailed in the First Amendment claim,
which they did not, and would in practical effect render the three-week trial
a nullity. Such would be utterly unrealistic.
Id. at 257. See Hostrep v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.
1975); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973); Horton v. Orange County Bd.
of Educ., 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972); in all of these cases, reinstatement of the teacher
was denied on facts similar to those in Epperson.
See note 2 supra.
" Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-63 (1974).
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1945).
' Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974). Other criteria in addition to the
payment of the judgment have been used by lower federal courts. See text accompanying
note 41 infra.
- 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 219.
v Id. at 220 citing Campbell v. Board of Educ., 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 (1964);
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school districts;18 and Tooele County property taxes, supplemented by state funds, would be used to pay the judgment.' The
court said that because there was a "possibility" that the judgment would be paid out of state funds, the eleventh amendment
30
barred any recovery by plaintiff.
In Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1,31 another action against the
local school district for violation of a teacher's first amendment
and procedural due process rights,32 the Tenth Circuit remanded
the damage issue to the trial court. On rehearing of the school
district's eleventh amendment defense, the trial court was instructed by the appellate court to look at Wyoming law regarding
school boards, "local circumstances," and federal law in making
its determination regarding the school board's liability for mone33
tary damages.
Two analagous cases involving state boards of regents also
indicate various factors used by the Tenth Circuit's eleventh
amendment analysis vis a vis protection for educational administrations. State control was the focus of the Tenth Circuit's analysis of whether a state board of regents was immune from liability
as an arm of the state in Brennan v. University of Kansas.3 In
Brennan the court concluded that the state's eleventh amendment protection extended to the board of regents because the
local courts had treated the board as an extension of the state,3
and because the state had centralized control over the regents'
activities. 3 Financial questions, i.e., who was to pay the judgment, were not considered by the court.
Hamilton Manufacturing Co. v. The Trustees of the State
Colleges in Colorado37 involved a suit against the trustees for
Brigham v. Board of Educ., 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950); Woodcock v. Board of
Educ., 55 Utah 458, 187 P. 181 (1920).
0 471 F.2d at 220.
n Id.
3oId.

31 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1185. See Teacher's Rights, supra note 15, at 102-05.
522 F.2d at 1185. No explanation was given by the court of the phrase "local
circumstances." Id.
451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1290, citing Murray v. State Bd. of Regents, 194 Kan. 686, 401 P.2d 898 (1965)
and Board of Regents v. Hamilton, 28 Kan. 376 (1882).
" 451 F.2d at 1290.
- 356 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1966).
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nonpayment for goods delivered to a state college." The court
held that the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment because
the State of Colorado was the real party in interest." The court
isolated the following factors in reaching its decision: whether the
state would pay the judgment; extent of state control over the
trustees; nature of the trustees' functions; whether the trustees
were a corporate body; whether the trustees could sue or be sued
in their own names; whether the trustees have the power to contract, and whether the trustees serve at the pleasure of the state
legislature. 0
Thus, in determining whether a school board is protected by
the eleventh amendment, the Tenth Circuit has not fastened
upon any one set of criteria for determining whether or not a
school board, and analogously, a board of regents, is the state's
alter ego. In Harris,the court emphasized the possibility that the
judgment might be paid from state coffers; in Brennan, control,
not finances, was the key factor; in Bertot, the court alluded
vaguely to local circumstances and laws; and in Hamilton, the
court identified a cluster of criteria." While the question of state
control and the ability of the local board to pay the judgment are
always prime factors in the court's analysis, other factors have
been used by the court, seemingly at random. Moreover, of the
two main factors, i.e., control and ability to pay the judgment,
one may be given greater weight than the other, again seemingly
at random. Brennan, for example, focused on control, but in
Hamilton, control was only one of many criteria reviewed by the
court.
In Harris,the case which most clearly articulated the court's
position on the financial question, the court used a standard
uId. at 600.
" Id. at 601.
40Id.

Other jurisdictions have isolated various factors in determining whether or not a
school board is the state's alter ego. For example, in Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School
Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit said that the important considerations in the decision are: whether the local district could pay the judgment; whether the
entity performs "essential government functions"; the district's ability to sue or be sued;
its power to own property in its own name; and the school district's corporate status. Id.
at 966. See Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975); George R.
Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1974); Morris v. Board
of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188 (D. Del. 1975); Smith v. Concordia Parish School Bd., 387 F.
Supp. 887 (W. D. La. 1975).
"1
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which is strongly supportive of the school board's eleventh
amendment defense: Even if there is only a possibility that the
state will have to pay part of the judgment, that judgment will
be barred. 2 The dissenting opinion in Harris pointed out that
state funds do not actually have to be used to pay the judgment;
local funds could pay for the judgment since the school district
can levy a tax on local residents to meet the costs of the judgment.4 3 But it is the possibility, not the actuality, which controls.
B. Epperson and the Eleventh Amendment Connection
As the Tenth Circuit noted," the court had the benefit of a
recent United States Supreme Court decision on school districts'
eleventh amendment immunity when deciding Epperson. Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle" dealt
squarely with the question of whether a school district is an arm
of the state and thus able to draw upon eleventh amendment
protections." The Supreme Court concluded that the school
board was not an alter ego of the state, based on three factors:
Local law treatment of school districts as distinct political entities from the state; the amount of control exerted by the state
over the school board; and the power of the school district to raise
money. 7 Taking these factors as a totality, the Supreme Court
concluded that the local school district in question was "more like
a county or city than . . . like an arm of the State.""
The Tenth Circuit drew upon the Mt. Healthy analysis in
Epperson, utilizing the three factors isolated by the Supreme
Court: Local law, control, and finances. The court found that
under Kansas statutes a school district can sue and be sued in its
own name, execute contracts, own real and personal property,
See Note, The Educational System and the Eleventh Amendment-Prohibitionof
Suits Against States: Can Teachers Protect Their Constitutional Rights? 16 WASHBURN
L. J. 102, 110 n.83 (1976).
" Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 222 (1973)(Holloway, J., dissenting). UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-27 (1977) gives a school district the power to levy
property taxes to pay a judgment.
4 551 F.2d at 259.
- 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
' Id. at 280. Mt. Healthy involved the issue of whether a teacher's first and fourteenth amendment rights had been violated by the school district's refusal to renew his
teaching contract. Id. at 276.
," Id. at 280.
9lId.
42
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and function as a corporate entity."9 School districts in Kansas
receive "substantial state aid" for local educational needs, but
also have the power to levy taxes within the school district area
to fund the local budget.50 As to control, the court found that the
Kansas State Board of Education exercised a broad supervisory
power over the local school districts which did not amount to
"control."'5 The court concluded that, like the Ohio school district in the Mt. Healthy case, School District No. 480 was more
akin to a municipality, rather than an alter ego of the state, and
thus was deprived of eleventh amendment immunity.2
The court then distinguished two of its earlier decisions
which had extended eleventh amendment protection to a school
district and to boards of regents. The court said that Brennan v.
University of Kansas," the board of regents case, was factually
quite different from Epperson. The Board had no taxing authority and the Board "really runs" the state university, thus exercising actual control, not mere supervision." The school district
case, Harrisv. Tooele County School District,55 was distinguished
on the grounds "that [in Harris] a money judgment rendered in
federal court against the school district might be paid, at least
partially, out of state funds."" The judgment against School District No. 480, on the other hand, would be raised by special levy
within the district and would not come from state funds.5
The distinction the court drew between Harrisand Epperson
is practically nonexistent. Both school districts had the power to
o 551 F.2d at 260. See KA. STAT. § 72-8201 (1972).
" 551 F.2d at 260. See KAN. STAT. §§ 72-8204(a), 8209, 7021 (1972). KA. STAT. §§
72-8801 to 8812 (Supp. 1976) regulate the amount of taxes which can be raised by a local
school district and sets up notice to citizens and election requirements in the event the
tax is opposed by ten per cent of the qualified electors.
11 551 F.2d at 260. In the case of State ex tel. Miller v. Board of Educ. of Unified
School Dist. No. 398, 212 Kan. 482, 511 P.2d 705 (1973), the Kansas Supreme Court, in
upholding a regulation issued by the State Board of Education, said, "Considering the
frame of reference in which the term [supervision] appears both in the constitution and
the statutes, we believe 'supervision' means something more than to advise but something
less than to control." Id. at 492, 511 P.2d at 713.
0 551 F.2d at 260.
3 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
',551 F.2d at 260.
" 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
" 551 F.2d at 260.
Id. See text accompanying note 50 supra. Under KA. STAT. § 72-8209 (1972) the
I7
district has the power to levy a tax solely for the purpose of paying a judgment.
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levy taxes within the local area to fund the school budget, and to
pay judgments, and both school districts received substantial
state subsidies for educational purposes.58 The Harris court
seemed to imply that if local educational funds were used to pay
the judgment then state funds would have to be increased proportionately to take up the slack.59 The Epperson court said that
since the Kansas school district had the power to levy a tax solely
for the purpose of paying the judgment, 0 without resorting to any
general educational fund, there is no direct or indirect pipeline
to the state coffers and no eleventh amendment immunity. But
since the governing statutes in each respective state are virtually
identical, this distinction drawn by the Tenth Circuit is without
merit.
III.

SCHOOL DISTRICT IMMUNITY IN FUTURE DECISIONS

The Epperson decision, following the Supreme Court's lead
in Mt. Healthy,6 isolated three factors to be used in determining
whether a local school district is an arm of the state for eleventh
amendment protection purposes: Local law, control, and finances. 2 By isolating these factors, the decision focused on the
critical elements which must be established by a plaintiff seeking
redress of his constitutional rights to avoid the defense of eleventh
amendment immunity. Other factors considered by the Tenth
Circuit and other federal courts in previous decisions 3 are now
extraneous. By narrowing down the critical elements of proof in
school district-eleventh amendment cases, counsel should be
able to assess a client's case against a school district more readily, since there are fewer factors with which to contend. This
consideration is important from a practical standpoint because if
eleventh amendment immunity is ultimately granted to the
school district, the teacher's suit to vindicate his constitutional
rights is a hero's cause, with an empty promise of monetary recovery.
The financial ability of a school district to pay a judgment
without direct or indirect state aid remains the one factor which
' Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254, 260 (1976); Harris v. Tooele
County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 220, 222 (10th Cir. 1973). (Holloway, J., dissenting).
' 471 F.2d at 220.
See note 57 supra.
' 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
6 See text accompanying notes 25-43 and note 41 supra.
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the Tenth Circuit apparently finds crucial (in an albeit hazy
manner) when extending eleventh amendment protection. If
there is a possibility that the judgment will be satisfied from the
state treasury, then the eleventh amendment is applicable."' On
the other hand, if there is no chance the money will come from
the state, then there are no eleventh amendment protections."e
The Tenth Circuit, however, may be relaxing the stringent standard set in Harris concerning the meaning of "possibility." In
Harris the local school district's power to levy taxes to pay for a
judgment was not enough to cut off the possibility of the utilization of state funds to pay the judgment; in Epperson the local
levying power, although nearly identical to that in Harris, was
enough to preclude the possible use of state funds and thus, eleventh amendment protections. 6 By distinguishing cases that are
nondistinguishable, the court may be indicating a greater willingness to find that a school district is not an alter ego of the state,
by not requiring the plaintiff to show there is no possibility of
state fund utilization. Under Harris this showing apparently
amounted to proving complete state abandonment of local education.
CONCLUSION

The Epperson decision makes practical suits against school
districts for violation of their employees' constitutional rights, by
providing for a damage award when it can be shown that a school
district is not an alter ego of the state. By isolating the criteria
to be used in determining whether a school district is an alter ego,
the court has clarified both the critical relationship that must be
established between the state and the school district and the
court's less protective inclinations toward school districts.
Moreover, by upholding a damage award against a school
district, the court has provided an incentive to prevent future
violations of teachers' constitutional rights. Without the prospect
of a damage award, a school district has little to lose by failing
to comply with due process requirements. 7 Teachers have not, by
virtue of their employment, consented to the denial of the same
" See text accompanying note 59 supra.

* See text accompanying note 60 supra.
"

See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 692 (1974)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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basic rights and remedies enjoyed by other citizens, 8 and
Epperson provides a vital remedy for a constitutional right.
Mary L. Groves
U

Comment, The Dwindling Rights of Teachers and the Closing CourthouseDoor, 44

FoRDHim L. REv. 511, 544 (1975).

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is a compilation of
the major cases decided last term in the area of criminal law and
procedure. This is only a sampling of all Tenth Circuit criminal
cases, and the treatment given to them is intended only as an
overview, not as an exhaustive analysis.
The Tenth Circuit decisions in this area were for the most
part straightforward applications of established precedent. None
of the cases presents any significant development or change, although the factual situations are sometimes thought-provoking
and rather extreme.
The section is divided into seven categories: Fourth Amendment; Fifth Amendment; Sixth Amendment; Trial Matters; Jury
Instructions; Post-trial Proceedings, and Statutory Interpretation.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Consent
In United States v. Abbott,' the Tenth Circuit ruled that a
wife's participation in a search of her husband's automobile in
conjunction with police officers did not amount to specific consent to a second search conducted by the same officers at a later
time in her absence. Additionally, the court sounded a note of
caution as to the validity of a citizen's consent to a warrantless
search which is obtained while the individual consenting is
clearly within the "shadow of authoritative control."'
Appellant John Abbott was in custody when his wife attempted to obtain the release of his automobile from police authorities.' She was informed that such a release was not possible
without presentation of the automobile's registration certificate.
A search of the passenger compartment by Mrs. Abbott with the
I 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977).

Id. at 885.
Appellant had been stopped by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol for a routine registration check. The serial number and description on the registration produced by the appellant did not correspond to the automobile he was driving. Additionally, officers discovered
a .45 caliber automatic under the seat of the automobile. Thereafter, appellant was arrested for possession of the weapon and illegal registration of the automobile. Id. at 884.
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assistance of a police officer proved unsuccessful in locating the
registration. Mrs. Abbott then suggested that the title might be
in a box locked in the trunk of the automobile. Not possessing the
trunk keys, she departed saying she would attempt to locate the
key and return.
Subsequently, police officers obtained the trunk key from
appellant's coat pocket in his jail cell, opened the trunk, found
several registration titles and a .30 caliber carbine which was the
subject of appellant's prosecution. The government justified its
warrantless search of the trunk solely upon the claim that Mrs.
Abbott had given consent to the search.4 Appellant's motion to
suppress was denied, and he was tried, convicted, and sentenced
to imprisonment.
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction with
instructions to sustain appellant's motion to suppress.' The reversal was justified on two grounds. First, the court stated that there
was no evidence that Mrs. Abbott ever expressly consented to a
search of the trunk. At most, she had only implicitly consented
to a search in her presence and with her assistance.
Second, the court warned that even if actual consent had
been obtained, the burden would be heavy upon the state to show
that it had been made freely and voluntarily and was not a product of the authoritative atmosphere in which she had been
placed.' The court emphasized that the atmosphere in which con' The court pointed out that the prosecution made no claim that the subject warrantless search was justified by any exigency of time or circumstances nor was it excused
within the bounds of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of
automobile at police station held proper where same search at place of arrest would have
been impractical) or South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search
following standard police procedures not a violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures). 546 F.2d at 884.
5 The government must meet a three-part test to justify a warrantless search based
upon consent. The requirements were paraphrased as set out below:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently" given; (2) the government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
Id. at 885 (paraphrasing the test enunciated in Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680,
684 (10th Cir. 1962).
1 Factors given as creating the authoritative atmosphere were the incarceration of
Mrs. Abbott's husband, the impoundment of the auto, the number of police officers in
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sent is given will always be a factor when the court is considering
whether or not one has waived a fundamental right.7
In United States v. Sor-Lokken,8 a "quitclaim" 9 deed to retain real and personal property was ruled to be a sufficient property interest to allow a third party to consent to a warrantless
search. The court ruled that such an instrument, regardless of the
exact nature of the property interest conveyed, bestowed upon
the grantee the right to enjoy access to the residence and its
contents, thus meeting the test of common authority set forth in
United States v. Matlock.'0
The deed was issued to a neighbor, Rhodes, by Sor-Lokken
while he was in the process of spiriting his children away from
visitation by his former wife. Mrs. Lokken, in an effort to locate
her children and former husband, informed police officials of the
location of several unregistered firearms within the abandoned
house of her former husband. As a result of this information,
police officers made two separate warrantless searches of the SorLokken home. The validity of the second search, made pursuant
to the neighbor's consent, became the issue on appeal."
The defendant challenged the authority of Rhodes to consent
to such police activity."2 The court found that the neighbor's conthe area, and the unlikelihood of Mrs. Abbot believing she could search the car in privacy.
546 F.2d at 885.
7Id.
557 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1977).
Defendant requested that his neighbor and personal friend take care of his property
while he was in absence. The neighbor, Mr. Rhodes, was given a key to the house and a
handwritten notarized note reading: "I Scott Sor-Lokken do hereby Quit Claim all my
household goods, cars, real and personal property to Dan Rhodes of Liberty, Utah. They
are his items as of this writing to disperse, keep as he desires 710 (1910 hours) 14 October
1975. Scott Sor-Lokken." Id. at 756.
70 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Mattlock allowed a third party to consent to a warrantless
search if he possessed either "common authority" over the inspected premises or property
or some other "sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."
Id. at 171.
The court also analogized the situation presented in Sor-Lokken to two other consent
search cases. In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the defendant shared the use of his
duffle bag with another and was said to have "assumed the risk" that his companion
"would allow someone else to look inside." Id. at 740; and United States v. Eldridge, 302
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). A gratuitous bailee in possession of a borrowed car was held
capable of giving consent, binding against the owner, to have the trunk searched. Id.
" The first search, made solely at the request of the former wife, had been found
clearly illegal by the trial court. Id. at 756-57.
" A second issue addressed by the court was whether the first search made without
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sent was voluntarily made prior to the officer's search and that
he had sufficient authority over the property as a result of the
"quitclaim deed" to give consent to the search. Thus, the search
and subsequent seizure of the unregistered firearms were held
valid under the fourth amendment.'3
B.

Validity of Search Warrant

In United States v. Millar,4 the Tenth Circuit ruled that in
a state search with minimal or no federal involvement, a search
warrant need only conform to federal constitutional requirements
to render evidence seized admissible in federal prosecutions. The
defendant had argued that the state officials' failure to have the
search warrant issued by a magistrate of a court of record as was
required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 was a fatal
defect to the use of the evidence discovered against him in a
federal action."
The court, however, ruled that the search was purely a state
search with no federal implications. Millar was stopped by a state
highway patrolman for a routine registration check. The odor of
marijuana and the presence of several marijuana seeds on the
floorboard resulted in the local police magistrate issuing a warconsent from Rhodes so irreparably tainted the second search as to make the evidence thus
procured inadmissible. This issue was resolved in favor of the government on the basis of
the independent source doctrine as outlined in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920). However, the court went beyond this ruling to point out that "[elven
if it were demonstrated that the officers' afternoon search was a necessary prerequisite to
the evening search, the carbine would still be unsusceptible to exclusion. . .[Clonsent
to search satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements apart from the presence or absence
of probable cause to conduct a search. The consent obtained in this case purged the
disputed search of any possible taint." 557 F.2d at 758 (citations omitted).
'

Id. at 757-58.

543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976).
FED. R. CiuM. P. 41(a). Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized
by this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate of a judge of a state court of record
within the district wherein the property sought is located, upon request of a federal law
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government (emphasis added).
"1 Millar was charged with the possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). 543 F.2d at 1282.
In his motion to suppress the defendant raised three arguments: (1) The initial stopping of his vehicle was arbitrary and merely a pretext for a general search; (2) the affidavit
presented to the New Mexico magistrate was insufficient; and (3) the warrant was issued
by a magistrate for the State of New Mexico, who was not a judge of a court of record,
and hence there was noncompliance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(a). Id.
The court dismissed the first two contentions and only the third argument will be discussed in this overview.
3,
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rant. The warrant was executed by a state patrolman. No federal
official played any role either in the obtaining of the search warrant or in the search that followed. 7 The search itself did not
violate any fourth amendment constitutional requirements.
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals stressed that
the mere fact that the court issuing the warrant was not a court
of record did not render the evidence obtained in the search inadmissible."

While admitting that the element of time is crucial to probable cause and the issuance of a search warrant, the Tenth Circuit
in United States v. Brinklow" nevertheless upheld the validity of
a search warrant based upon an observation made eleven months
previously. 20 Defendant was charged with four federal violations, 21
all of which arose out of his alleged bombing of a Port of Entry
building in Colorado Springs. Authorities, acting on information
received from Brinklow's accomplice in the bombing, executed a
search warrant upon defendant's mobile home. Seized in the
search were a citizens band radio (used to detonate the bombing
device electronically), a police radio scanner (used to avoid police
detection), and a notebook delineating dates and mileage figures
of trips taken in the mobile home.

"

The court pointed out that the complete state nature of the search distinguished
it from the situation presented to the Fifth Circuit in Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d
315 (1968). In Navarro, the search in question was deemed to be a federal search because
federal agents had participated in the search and thus the requirements of Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 41(a) were deemed applicable. 543 F.2d at 1284.
" The court was careful to point out that its holding in Millar did not "do violence"
to the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Elkins held that evidence obtained in a purely state search, which if conducted by federal
officers would have violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights, is inadmissible
over defendant's timely objections in a subsequent federal criminal proceeding. Id. at 223.
In Millar there was no violation of the defendant's constitutional fourth amendment
rights; it was merely an issue of compliance with federal procedural rules in a purely state
search. 543 F.2d at 1284.
" 560 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
In so doing, the Tenth Circuit expanded the holding of their 1972 decision in United
States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972). In Johnson the court held that the
element of time must be examined in conjunction with the nature of the unlawful activity,
and, where the affidavit recites a more isolated event, the existence of probable cause
dwindles with the passage of time; however, where the affidavit recites facts indicating
activity of a protracted and continuous nature, the passage of time becomes less significant. Id. at 287.
11Brinklow was indicted on four separate counts including: (1) interstate transportation of explosives; (2) destruction of a building used in interstate commerce; (3) transportation of stolen explosive material; and (4) illegal possession of a firearm. 560 F.2d at 1004.
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Significant in the holding was the fact that the objects
sought in the search were of the type "which could reasonably be
expected to be kept... for extended periods of time."22 The court
emphasized that:
[pirobable cause is not determined by merely counting the number
of days between the time of the facts relied upon and the warrant's
issuance. The significance of the length of time between the point
probable cause arose and when the warrant issued depends largely
upon the property's nature, and should be contemplated in view of
the practical considerations of every day life. The test is one of
common sense.2

Thus, due to the semipermanent nature of the property being
sought, the court in Brinklow held that eleven months was not so
long a period of time as to evaporate the probable cause inherent
in the coconspirator's tardy revelation.
II. FFi AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
In Goode v. McCune 4 the Tenth Circuit in dictums dismissed any suggestion that the double jeopardy clause barred
state and federal convictions arising out of the same act. The
court addressed this issue in an appeal of a denial of habeas
corpus where the defendant sought to credit part of a Texas bank
robbery sentence to a subsequent federal term.
The Tenth Circuit set out two reasons why the double jeopardy clause did not bar parallel state and federal trials. First, the
federal bank robbery charge differed in proof from the state
charge; the federal charge required a showing that the bank had
22 Id. at 1006. All of the items seized from the vehicle had been seen there within the
last year; all were designed for long term use; none were inculpatory per se; nor were any
of them of the type which were likely to be disposed of for any other readily apparent
reason.
23 Id. at 1005-06 (citations omitted). Among the cases cited as authority for the test
utilized were United States v. Rahn, 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1975), and United States v.
Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972). In Rahn the Tenth Circuit upheld a search warrant
based upon observations of alleged unlawful activity made more than a year and a half
before the application for a search warrant.
- 543 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 752. The court apparently was not obliged to address the issue. This conclusion is supported by the court's pronouncement that the only issue of the case was
"whether Goode [was] entitled to credit on his federal sentence for the period of time he
remained in state custody."
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some federal connection." Second, there were two separate sovereignties, Texas and the federal government, each having a right
to exact a penalty for violation of its laws.Y Thus, the double
jeopardy clause did not protect the defendant because he was
tried by separate sovereignties on different charges.
Using this dual-sovereignty rationale, the court denied the
defendant any entitlement to credit three years of his Texas sentence to his subsequent federal term.28 The court reasoned that the
defendant owed each sovereignty a debt, and since the Texas
sentence was attributable only to the state charges, the federal
government was not obliged to credit the state sentence.29
Although the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Goode is in conformity with the majority view, 0 it is not without criticism. In
double jeopardy issues, the dual-sovereignty approach is particularly suspect when the gravamen of the state charge is comparable to the federal charge.3" This criticism assumes that state and
federal interests in justice are sufficiently parallel, vitiating any
need to exact separate penalties for the same act.32
In United States v. Gunter3 the Tenth Circuit held that the
double jeopardy clause was inapplicable where the defendants
were tried a third time after the juries in the first two trials were

0 The federal

connection was proved by showing that the bank was insured by the

FDIC. Id. at 753.
v Id.

" There was conflict in the affidavits as to whether Texas had credited Goode's state
confinement from the period after his arrest to his conviction a year later. Id.
"Id.

See United States v. Abbate, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).
" If the state and federal statutes are similar in purpose, then the double jeopardy
clause could be construed to cut off a subsequent trial for the same act by a different
sovereignty. Contra, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959) (the Court stated that it
was a problem that could be resolved by state statute).
"2CompareWalker v. Florida 389 U.S. 387 (1970) (state and local prosecutions barred
by the double jeopardy clause); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (state and federal interests are sufficiently akin to bar parallel trials). See
generally Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitution, 28
U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1961); Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, 14 W. Ras.
L. REv. 700 (1963).
Normally, the federal government has not sought to prosecute where a state has
prosecuted for substantially the same offense. In two cases this policy has resulted in
dismissal of federal charges. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); Orlando v.
United States, 387 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977).
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unable to reach verdicts. 4 Nine defendants were charged with the
theft of an interstate shipment of auto tires. 5 At the conclusion
of the third trial eight of the defendants had been convicted. Four
36
appealed, raising the defense of double jeopardy.
The Tenth Circuit found clear authority supporting the first
retrial. Relying on United States v. Perez37 and its progeny,38 the
court upheld the discretionary power of the trial judge to discharge the jury and permit a retrial because the circumstances
were such that there was "a manifest necessity for the act
[retrial] or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.

'39

Retrials in deadlocked jury situations have been

equated with "manifest necessity" and "the ends of public justice" because of the vital interest in reaching final judgments.'"
In considering whether a third trial fell within the purview
of Perez, the court concluded that there were recognizable situations where the double jeopardy clause would create a bar." However, the facts of this case still militated toward a retrial. Of
particular significance to the court was the trial judge's proper
exercise of discretion in granting the two mistrials."
The court distinguished this case from two other circuit decisions where a third trial and a fourth trial were overturned because the trial judges had abused their discretion in granting the
" The court also addressed the issues of third party consent to an otherwise unlawful
search and seizure, amendments to an indictment, and other ancillary issues. Id. at 86769.
Id. at 864. Presumably much of the difficulty the juries had in arriving at a verdict
resulted from the large number of defendants and the complex facts surrounding the theft.
11The Tenth Circuit ruled that the double jeopardy issue was appealable after the
third trial because it represented the type of plain error which could be raised anew under
FED. R. CPiM. P. 52(b). Id. at 864-65.
3' 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
3 See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Downun v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963); wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
11546 F.2d at 861, 866. The judge could have discharged the deadlocked jury and
made a judgment of acquittal under FED. R. CaIM. P. 29(b) if he had found that the
government's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. See United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
,0 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 548, 470-71 (1973).
" The court wrote that "[tihere may indeed be a breaking point, but we do not
believe it was reached in the instant case." 546 F.2d at 866.
42 In Gunter the Tenth Circuit did not find an abuse of discretion in the declaration
of a mistrail after the second trial, even though the jury had deliberated only four and
one half hours. Id. at 865.
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mistrials." The court also seemed to embrace a view that as the
number of retrials increased, manifest necessity and the ends of
public justice might weigh less heavily in favor of another attempt to reach a final verdict."
In United States v. Appawool5 the Tenth Circuit faced a
procedural dilemma wherein it was obliged to hear appeals of two
judgments of acquittal despite a possible double jeopardy bar. At
the trial court level, District Judge Ritter refused to rule on
pretrial motions to dismiss the informations." The judge's refusal
to rule was in contravention of FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2).' 7 However, once the juries had been impaneled, thereby initiating jeopardy, 8 and the prosecution had presented its cases,"9 the judge
ruled on the motions and thereafter granted judgments of acquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).10
The judge's avowed purpose in delaying his rulings on the
motions was to.prevent appeals of pretrial motions5 ' which nor" In Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034, 1040-41 (3d Cir. 1975), the court
described the range of discretion in granting a mistrial as severely limited by recent
holdings of the Supreme Court, reflecting the weight to be given to the double jeopardy
clause. In Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the trial judge surpassed
his discretionary bounds by arbitrarily granting a mistrial because of improper comments
by the defense counsel.
" Id. at 866. The court wrote: "The rationale of Perez suggests to us the propriety of
a third trial where the prior juries were unable to agree upon a verdict. This assumes, of
course, that the concept of manifest 'necessity' and 'ends of public justice' referred to in
Perez are met." See also Preston Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
0 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977). This case was consolidated with United States v.
Casey, 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977).
4' The defendants raised the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which concerned
assaults as defined by state law in Indian Country. The defendants claimed that if they
were not Indians they would have faced less stringent federal charges under 18 U.S.C. §
113, which provides a lesser penalty and is harder to prove than assault as defined under
Utah law. Id. at 1243.
' This rule provides that defenses based on defects in the information "may be raised
only by motion before trial."
" See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
" In Appawoo the government had rested. 553 F.2d at 1244. In Casey the prosecution
had presented just one witness. Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1244-46.
"
At the conclusion of the trial in Casey, an attorney for the defendants in Appawoo
(Appawoo was tried later) moved for a dismissal on the same grounds upon which the
judge had just ruled in Casey. The judge responded:
You are not representing your client very good. You are overlooking something a practical man ought to think about. The defendant in the preceding
case was in jeopardy. . . . Now you are pushing your luck here. If I rule on
this motion before you confront a jury and that constitutional question is
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mally are appealable under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The delays initiated
jeopardy, thus creating a double jeopardy bar to subsequent appeals. The Tenth Circuit declared that the trial court's judgments
of acquittal under 29(a) were not actually acquittals within that
rule because hey were based on the constitutional issue in the
pretrial motions; 2 rule 29 requires that acquittals be based only
on the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. The court, citing
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 3 determined that the
trial judge had made no resolution as to the sufficiency of the
evidence produced by the prosecution. Thus, the double jeopardy
clause was not a bar to the appeal because the trial court's
"judgments of acquittal" amounted to no more than rulings on
the constitutional issue in the pretrial motions.54
In United States v. Fay,55 the Tenth Circuit barred an appeal
because the acquittal was in fact based on the evidence. The
double jeopardy clause prevented appellate review because there
was nothing to indicate that the trial was not bona fide. 8 At the
trial court level, Judge Ritter refused to rule on a pretrial motion
to suppress evidence. 57 However, after the prosecution began its
presentation, the judge ruled on the motion, suppressing evidence
vital to the government's case. Soon after, the judge granted a
judgment of acquittal, as it was clear that the prosecution could
not proceed. 8
The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Appawoo
litigated for the next ten years and goes up to the Supreme Court of the
United States and in the meantime the Government amends, you have done
your client a very great disservice, because there is no bar to him being
prosecuted .... Now, that is poor legal representation from my point of view,
and I am going to do what I can to protect him against his counsel, and we
will just keep that right where it is and get a jury for you one of these days,
and when we get the matter up before the jury we will get far enough down
the way with the evidence to see what is involved and then we will entertain
your motion.
Id. at 1245-46.
" Id. at 1244-45.
430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
553 F.2d at 1246. By declaring that its finding was a ruling on the pretrial motion,
the Tenth Circuit skirted the issue as to whether the remands it ordered were retrials
within the "manifest necessity" requirement of United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
553 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1249.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b)(3) requires the motions to suppress evidence must be raised
prior to trial.
" 553 F.2d at 1248.

1978

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

because it concluded that the judgment of acquittal was based on
the sufficiency of the evidence under rule 29(a). 9 A valid jeopardy was created, barring any subsequent appeal. Unlike the earlier case, the Tenth Circuit's refusal to allow the appeal precluded
it from reviewing the constitutional issues in the motion to suppress.6 0 The court denied review despite its own conclusions that
the trial judge had "frustrated the proper trial" of the defendants
and had "aborted a proper consideration of a challenge to a large
segment of the proof."'"
In granting the appeals in Appawoo, and barring review in
Fay, the Tenth Circuit's primary consideration was whether the
judgments of acquittal were in conformity with rule 29. If the
acquittal was based on the insufficiency of evidence, as in Fay,
the court looked upon the proceeding as a bona fide jeopardy with
no appeal possible. If the acquittal was not related to the evidence, the court did not feel constrained by the double jeopardy
clause because there was no bona fide acquittal.
The major difficulty in reconciling Fay with Appawoo is the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the judgment of acquittal in Fay
was based on the sufficiency of the evidence. It is arguable that
since' the motion to suppress evidence was not ruled -on before
trial and therefore was not reviewable, 2 the Tenth Circuit had no
way to determine what evidence the trial judge could use constitutionally in judging the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, since the ruling on the motion to suppress directly preceded
the acquittal, 3 and the ruling was based on constitutional issues,
it is arguable that these issues, and not the evidence presented,
were the real basis for the acquittal. Under this hypothesis the
judgment of acquittal was not based on the sufficiency of evidence under rule 29 and therefore was appealable. 4
B. Voluntariness of Confession
Appellant in United States v. Shoemaker65 contested his
The Tenth Circuit relied on the trial judge's exclamations made after his ruling to
suppress the evidence. Id.
w See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
" 553 F.2d at 1249.
62 See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
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conviction of murder while attempting rape6 on two grounds:
one, that his confession was involuntary under the McNabbMallory rule 7 and rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure; 8 and two, that the lower court erred in admitting into
evidence photographs of the victim which had limited probative
value and a highly inflammatory effect on the jury.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was
questioned for six hours before being released. He was interviewed again three days later; after several hours of questioning,
the defendant gave an oral confession. He was given a new
Miranda instruction before each questioning session began." On
Saturday afternoon, the defendant dictated and signed a confession after a final advisement of rights, and was taken before the
magistrate. 0
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's interpretation of rule
5(a) to the effect that a defendant had to be brought before a
magistrate within a "reasonable" time, six hours after arrest
under McNabb and Mallory.7 First, the court concluded that
18 U.S.C. 1111 (1966).
" Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). In Mallory, the Supreme Court reaffiruRed its prioropolicy set forth in McNabb,
that a defendant must be taken before a magistrate with no undue delay. The rule is
stated in no uncertain terms:
The arrested person may, of course, be "booked" by the police. But he is not
to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry
that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements
to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt.
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454.
0 FED. R. CraM.P. 5(a) provides in part: "An officer making an arrest under a warrant
issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate
a

* All of the questioning on Friday evening took place at defendant's place of employment, a carnival operating in a national park, where the victim had been found. 542 F.2d
at 562-63. Defendant remained in park headquarters until his confession, at which time
he was taken to the nearest federal jail. 542 F.2d at 562-63.
" Id. Some twenty-two hours elapsed between the time agents began the actual
interview on Friday evening and the time defendant actually appeared before a magistrate
on Saturday afternoon. For purposes of applying the McNabb-Mallory rule and rule 5(a),
notes 47-48 supra, the court analyzes a 13-hour delay: Arrest took place shortly after
defendant's oral confession around midnight and a written confession was signed sometime after 1 p.m. the following day.
"1 The origin of defendant's "six hour" rule is unclear. In Mallory, the delay between
arrest and arraignment was at least seven hours. 354 U.S. at 450-51. The delay in McNabb
was two or three days. 318 U.S. at 334-38. And delays of between 12 and 24 hours have
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until the defendant confessed, "he was never restrained physically nor told that he was under arrest or otherwise not free to
leave. Moreover, the evidence tended to show that [the] questioning sessions ...
cion .... 7

singularly lacked acts of oppression or coer-

Second, the court ruled that noncompliance with the sixhour rule did not ipso facto render the confession inadmissible.73
Rather, the time between arrest and arraignment was only one of
several factors to be considered by the trial judge in determining
admissibility, and it was not necessarily conclusive.7" Additional
factors weighed included the fact that some of the delay was
attributable to the defendant who had refused to go before the
magistrate without first seeing members of his family; the weekend day involved; the time of day of the arrest; the distance
traveled; and the numerous Miranda warnings.75 On balance, the
court concluded, a76 thirteen-hour delay did not render the confession inadmissible.
The court quickly dismissed the defendant's second contention, that the photographs of the victim were inadmissible. The
court ruled that the admission of photographs is a function of the
trial judge's discretiofi, and it found no abuse of that discretion.
been upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 988 (1972) (delay of 21 hours); Evans v. United States, 325 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964) (12-hour delay). See also FED. R. CiuM. P. 5(a),
note 68 supra.
" 542 F.2d at 563.
13Id. (citing United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1972)). In Crocker, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
statutory guidelines for determining voluntariness set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3501(a) (1969)
had been correctly applied. 510 F.2d at 1138. The guidelines specify that the trial judge
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including the time between arrest and arraignment, defendant's knowledge of the
crime with which he is charged or of which he is suspected, and whether defendant knew
of his rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
, 542 F.2d at 563. See note 73 supra.
" 542 F.2d at 563.
IId. The result reached is not inconclusive with Mallory:
The duty enjoined upon arresting officers to arraign "without unnecessary delay" indicates that the command does not call for mechanical or
automatic obedience. Circumstances may justify a brief delay between arrest
and arraignment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the accused
is susceptible to quick verification through third parties. But the delay must
not be of a nature to give opportunity for the exaction of a confession.
354 U.S. at 449. See also note 71 supra.
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SIXTH AMENDMENT

A.

Right to Counsel
In two recent cases, the Tenth Circuit denied claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth Amendment.
In Gillihan v. Rodriguez,77 the defendant, convicted on four
counts of first-degree murder, attacked the adequacy of his courtappointed lawyers at both the trial level and on appeal from the
New Mexico trial court conviction. The Tenth Circuit adhered to
the majority position that relief on the ground of ineffective counsel will only be granted where the "trial was a farce, or a mockery
of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court
. . . or [was] without adequate opportunity for conference and
preparation .
78

The court held that counsel's failure to seek a change of
venue despite massive publicity could not be challenged by the
defendant where he never requested a change and was unaware
of any publicity.
Rodriguez also contended that his counsel had failed to require the prosecutor to disclose the existence of exculpatory evidence. The court found, however, that counsel did not become
aware of this evidence until during the trial; the evidence was,
nevertheless, immaterial where the appellant had admitted committing the act alleged but was maintaining innocence by reason
of insanity. 0
Counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's reference to the
defendant as a "mad dog" during closing arguments was justified, in the court's view, because there was no chance of obtaining
a mistrial, the remark was consistent with a defense of insanity,
and his lawyers used the expression to the defendant's benefit
during their closing arguments."' The change of his plea from "not
551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977).
Goforth v. United States, 314 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1963). See also United States v.
Coppola, 486 F.2d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Johnson v.
United States, 485 F.2d 240, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1973); Tapia v. Rodriguez, 446 F.2d 410,
416 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Davis, 436 F.2d 679, 681 (10th Cir. 1971).
551 F.2d at 1185-86.
Id. at 1186.
I/d.
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guilty" to "not guilty by reason of insanity" was found to have
82
been made with the defendant's consent.
In view of the fact that the defendant had told the trial judge
he was satisfied with his lawyers, the Tenth Circuit, in line with
its prior decisions, determined that the appellant's dissatisfaction
with his counsel arose only after the imposition of sentence', and
that "[n]either hindsight nor success is the measure for determining adequacy of legal representation .... "4 The court also
agreed with the district court that " 'counsel need not appeal
every possible question of law at the risk of being found to be
ineffective.' "5 Thus, despite defense counsel's objection to the
trial court's temporary insanity instruction, he need not have
raised that issue on appeal.
In United States v. Allen,8 the defendant alleged that he had
not made his attorney aware of the seriousness of his mental
condition because he had not realized its importance at that time.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that evidence of the defendant's
mental condition was readily available to counsel before trial and
was not such "newly discovered evidence" as would warrant a
87
new trial.
Evidence of the defendant's mental illness was presented
during direct examination by his counsel. The court stressed that
a claim of lack of knowledge on the part of trial counsel, where
there was an abundance of evidence before him, could not be
transformed into an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal. According to the Tenth Circuit, the trial counsel's
statement, that he would have tried the case on an entirely different basis had he been aware of the existence of the defendant's
Id. at 1187.
1 Id. at 1188. See Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240, 242 (10th Cir. 1973).
Tapia v. Rodriguez, 446 F.2d 410, 416 (10th Cir. 1971); See also Lorraine v. United
States, 444 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1971).
551 F.2d at 1189.
554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1977).
554 F.2d at 403. "[N]ewly discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or
cumulative; it must be material to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably
produce an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with reasonable
diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial." Id. See also United States
v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441, 442-43 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975).
U 554 F.2d at 403. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir.
1973); United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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mental disorder, reflected nothing more than the natural expectation of unsuccessful counsel that improvement could be made the
second time around.
Where counsel has the basic facts but simply does not present a defense on the basis of those facts, the court will not grant
a new trial on the ground of inadequate counsel; to do so would
be to put a "premium on neglect" and encourage withholding
available information in order to present it as "newly discovered
evidence" should the verdict be adverse."
B.

Jury Composition

United States v. Test 1o involved a challenge to the jury selection plan adopted by the District Court for the District of Colorado based on the Jury Selection and Service Act of 196811 and
the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. The defendants argued that Chicanos, blacks, and persons
under forty years of age were underrepresented on the master jury
wheel and that jurors drawn from that wheel were not "selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community" as required
by the Act and the Constitution." They further alleged that the
excuse, exemption, and disqualification categories adopted by
the plan violated the Act. 3
The Colorado jury selection plan utilizes voter registration
lists as provided by the Act: these lists are the primary source of
names for prospective jurors, but the Act also provides for supplementation, where necessary, if great disparities exist.94
The Tenth Circuit, along with the majority of lower federal
courts, construed the statutory "fair cross section" standard as
0 554 F.2d at 405. Cf. United States v. Vowteras, 500 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1975).
550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 1861 provides: "It is the policy of the United States that all litigants
in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes . ... "
1"Under the plan, excuse, exemption, or disqualification was provided for persons
residing in the judicial district for less than one year, persons convicted or under indictment for serious crimes, persons not literate in the English language, persons residing in
certain divisions of the district, women with children under 10 years of age, sole proprietors, and persons without transportation. 550 F.2d at 593-95.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
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substantially equivalent to the constitutional standard, previously developed, 5 providing for "reasonable representation." In
order to show a violation of the Act, the defendants must show
that Chicanos and blacks constitute a cognizable group," that
these groups are systematically or totally excluded from the jury
selection process, 7 and, as a result, that the jury pools are not
''reasonably representative" of the community.
In Test, the defendants demonstrated only a disparity between the proportion of Chicanos and blacks in the voting-age
population and the proportion of Chicanos and blacks appearing
on the voter registration lists. No court has required supplementation of voter registration lists merely because an identifiable
group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population."
Nor has a challenge to a jury selection plan been successful where
based solely on statistical evidence, as here."
The Tenth Circuit relied on Swain v. Alabama'" to hold that
the jury roll need not mirror the community. 0' The court assumed without proof that Chicanos and blacks constitute a cog03 See, e.g., United States v. Whiting, 538 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1976); Anderson v.
Casscles, 531 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675, 678-81
(10th Cir. 1971). The latest Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue is Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), which is in accord with this construction.
N 550 F.2d 585. To establish cognizability, it is necessary to prove: "(1) the presence
of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group; (2) a cohesiveness of
'attitudes of ideas or experience' which distinguishes the group from the general social
milieu; and (3) a 'community of interest' which may not be represented by other segments
of society. United States v. Test, 399 F. Supp. 683, 689 (D. Colo. 1975).
17550 F.2d at 586. There are two lines of Supreme Court cases in which allegations
of systematic exclusion have proven successful. The first is the "rule of exclusion" where
there is proof that a cognizable group has been totally excluded or has received only token
representation on juries. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). The second line
of cases deals with "substantial underrepresentation" or "systematic decimation," combined with obvious opportunities for discrimination. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967). Under both lines, an inference of discrimination is raised which must be rebutted
by the government with something more than general averments of good faith, which are
otherwise sufficient. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227-28 (1965).
See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Lewis, 472 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973).
U 550 F.2d at 587.
"0 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
" Id. at 208.
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nizable group. In this case the defendants failed to show that
Chicanos and blacks had been totally or systematically excluded
from the selection process.
The court concluded that disparities of less than one person
in the demographic composition of petit and grand juries and a
difference of two persons on a jury panel of fifty are not substantial enough to warrant judicial intervention. 2 The court further
noted that persons under forty years of age did not comprise a
"cognizable" group as required to prove unconstitutionality or
a
violation of the Act. 0 3 The excuses, exemptions, and disqualifications alleged to be unconstitutional, were expressly permitted by
statute,1'0 and did not result in systematic exclusion or substantial underrepresentation. 01°

IV.

TRIAL MATTERS

A.

Joinder or Severance
In United States v. Walton,'06 the defendants were jointly
tried and convicted of aiding and abetting interstate transportation of forged securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2314.
On appeal, the defendants alleged prejudicial error in the trial
court's denial of their motions for severance.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the disposition of a
motion for severance is within the trial court's sound discretion. 07
A refusal to grant a motion for severance is error only upon abuse
of discretion such that defendant is denied a fair trial. 0 8
The court rejected defendants' various allegations of prejudice and determined that the denial of the motions for severance
was proper. °9
102
550 F.2d at 590. In Swain, the Supreme Court approved of disparities ranging from
10-16 percent between voting-age population and names on the master jury rolls. 380 U.S.
at 205, 208-09.
'1

550 F.2d at 591.

1- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(2), 1863(b)(3).
105 550 F.2d at 595.
'" 552 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1977).
'0 United States v. Davis, 436 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rodgers,
419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969). See also FED. R. Cam. P. 14.
10 United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Earley,
482 F.2d 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973); United States v. Mallory, 460
F.2d 243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972); United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d
1315 (10th Cir. 1969); Baker v. United States, 329 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 853 (1964).
"I Most of the different bases for the motions for severance were determined to be
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B.

Affirmative Defenses

In United States v. Rosenfeld, 10 the Tenth Circuit considered the affirmative defense of entrapment to a conviction of
illegal distribution of cocaine. The defendant alleged that the
persistent conduct and solicitations of a Federal Drug Administration agent, induced him to enter into the illegal transaction.
The agent contacted the defendant seeking to arrange a cocaine purchase. Upon defendant's refusal to do business with
him, the agent called him approximately 18 to 20 times to get him
to deal in drugs. The agent eventually induced the defendant to
deal with him when the defendant's father became hospitalized
without insurance coverage and the defendant's finances were

low.
The Tenth Circuit held that the persistent calls of the agent
did not constitute duress or entrapment."' The family troubles
which finally led the defendant to deal with the agent did not
"cause the defendant's act to be entrapement as a matter of
2
law.''9'
The elements required for a finding of entrapment are set out
in Martinez v. United States,"' cited by the court in Rosenfeld.
According to Martinez, entrapment does not become applicable
until the commission of the crime charged is admitted by the
accused," and occurs when "the criminal design or conduct originonprejudicial. On appeal, however, one of the defendants claimed that the unexpected
testimony of a co-defendant was highly prejudicial to the defendant's case. The court
didn't affirm or deny the prejudicial nature of this action, but, in veiwing the totality of
the circumstances, decided there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion. The court
stated that if there was no cooperation among the several defense counsel (as evidenced
here by the co-defendant's unexpectedly taking the stand) the defense cousel must so
inform the court. In this case, the court was not advised of any lack of cooperation and
could therefore presume cooperation between counsel. In addition, when the co-defendant
took the stand, neither of the other defendants moved for an in camera hearing to preview
the contents of the testimony, nor was a motion for severance made before or during the
co-defendant's testimony, nor was any motion to strike or motion for mistrial made after
the co-defendant's testimony. This inaction on the part of the defense counsel acted in
effect as a waiver of a subsequent attack on the prejudicial character of the co-defendant's
testimony. In support of this ruling, see Rhone v. United States, 365 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
545 F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 101.
112 Id.
11 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967).
,14
Id. at 811.
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nates in or is the product of the minds of the government officials
and is implanted by them in the mind of an otherwise innocent
person." 1" 5 When the affirmative defense of entrapment is raised,

the government has the burden of proving that entrapment did
not occur."' However, the government has this burden only where
the evidence of entrapment is undisputed. Where a question of
fact as to the existence of entrapment is present, it is unnecessary
for the government to proceed affirmatively.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the per se rule enunciated in
United States v. Bueno,17 that the government must come forward to contradict the defendant when the defense of entrapment is raised. Rather, where the existence of entrapment is disputed, the jury is entitled to reject uncontradicted portions of the
defendant's testimony despite a total lack of countervailing evidence. Rosenfeld demonstrates the lengths to which the Tenth
Circuit will go to deny that entrapment is present as a matter of
law.
Another affirmative defense was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Evans."I The court ruled that prison
conditions, whatever they might have been, could not justify a
prison riot or any other criminal conduct." 9 This holding is in
accordance with prior Tenth Circuit decisions and with decisions
of other circuit courts.120
In United States v. Gano,"' the court confronted the issue of
the admissibility of evidence pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 22 pertaining to crimes committed by the
at 812. Some years later, in United States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.
"1' Id.
1975), the Tenth Circuit stated that if a person is shown to be so, then there is no
entrapment. The court in Rosenfeld relies on both Martinez and Gurule.
"I United States v. Martinez, 373 F.2d at 812.
117 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973). In Bueno, the
Fifth Circuit held that entrapment is established as a matter of law when a government
informer furnishes the narcotics to the defendant for sale to a government agent.
Its 542 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976).
M'Id. at 819.
120See, e.g., Conte v. Cardwell, 475 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 873 (1973); United States v. Haley, 417 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1969); Nelson v. United
States, 208 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1953).
1'2560 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1977).
12 FED. R. Evi. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
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defendant other than those charged in the indictment.
The defendant was convicted on three counts of having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen. The defendant, a social worker, was assigned to counsel the family of a
patient. Pursuant to this assignment, he became sexually involved with the girl's mother and persuaded her to use marijuana
and to put it into her daughter's food. Eventually, the defendant
gave marijuana to the girl and induced her to have sexual intercourse with him.
The issue in the case was the admissibility of evidence concerning the defendant's sexual relations with the mother and his
insistence that the family use marijuana to relax. The court concluded that the evidence was both relevant, material, and indispensable to a complete showing since the numerous incidents
were so closely related. 2 3 The evidence was also admissible to
prove motive, preparation, plan, and state of mind, 2 despite the
fact that the commission of the act was undisputed in that the
defendant relied on insanity.I Thus, evidence is admissible both
to prove the offense charged and to show the complete picture of
the crime, even if the defendant has admitted the acts charged.
The Tenth Circuit held that the prejudicial effect of this evidence
was outweighed by its probative value.
C. Trial Court Discretion
In United States v. Munz, 21 the defendant was convicted of
robbing a federally insured bank and assaulting and jeopardizing
the life of a teller by the use of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(a) and (d). On appeal, the defendant alleged prejudical
error arising from hypothetical questioning of an expert witness
by the trial judge.
The defendant's defense was lack of mental competency at
the time of the offense. Extensive medical records were introduced into evidence by the defendant, clearly overcoming the
presumption of sanity. To attempt to establish the defendant's
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, indentity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
123560 F.2d at 993.
124

Id.

125 Id.

1- 542 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1976).
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competency, the prosecution presented testimony of an expert
witness. During the direct examination of this witness, the trial
judge questioned the witness regarding a hypothetical situation
which, although similar to that of defendant's, raised facts not
present in the case.
The trial judge instructed the jury that his questioning related only to a hypothetical situation and should be disregarded
in considering the defendant's case. The Tenth Circuit held these
curative instructions to be sufficient to eliminate any prejudice
resulting from the trial judge's participation.'2
United States v. Pinkey2 8 examined the proper participation
of a trial judge in the conduct of a trial.
Defendant was convicted of using the United States mails to
perpetrate a scheme to defraud and obtain money, in violation of
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341. While incarcerated in Colorado State Penitentiary, defendant wrote letters to recent widows, feigning a past
friendship with their deceased husbands and asking that portions
of cash loans made by the defendant to their husbands be repaid
as soon as possible.
Defendant elected to proceed pro se at trial.'2 During the
court's voir dire examination, the defendant, in the juror's presence, wrote suggested questions on a piece of paper and submitted them to the judge.
The trial judge, out of the presence of the jury, alerted the
prosecutor to the existence of the handwritten voir dire questions
and suggested that the prosecutor might wish to have his handwriting expert make a comparison of this sample of the defendant's writing. 130 On redirect examination, the expert witness

I"The defendant argued that the prejudice could not be cured by a subsequent
instruction, citing United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973), and Horton v.
United States, 317 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1963). These two cases are examplee of judges'
conduct and comments deemed so prejudicial as to not be cured by jury instructions.
However, the court felt that the prompt curative instructions given here did overcome any
prejudice. See United States v. De Angelis, 490 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
956 (1974).
1- 548 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1977).
In The court determined that the defendant had intelligently and voluntarily waived
his sixth amendment right to counsel with full understanding of the risks involved. Id. at
311.
1 In its case-in-chief the prosecution had introduced evidence through a handwriting
expert's analysis linking the defendant to the above-mentioned letters already in evidence.
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identified the writing as the defendant's and the judge admitted
it into evidence.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's contention
that the judge's suggestion constituted plain error because it denied defendant a fair trial and compelled the defendant to testify
in his own defense. The court held that the trial judge not only
has the prerogative but an obligation to inject into the trial matters which are important to the search for truth; a judge's participation in trials is proper so long as he remains impartial and does
not prejudice any party.' 3' The court concluded that the trial
judge's suggestion was within his 3discretion and that the defendant's rights were not prejudiced.

1

D.

Evidence
1. Suppression of Evidence
In United States v. Picone, 3 the Tenth Circuit had its first
occasion to apply United States v. Donovan,13,a Supreme Court
case on suppression of wiretap evidence when some defendants
were not named in the wiretap order.' As a result of information
obtained through two judicially authorized wiretaps, defendants
Picone and Simone had been charged with operating a racketeering enterprise. 13 The evidence as to Simone was suppressed because he had not been named in the initial wiretap order.'37 The
,",
United States v. Wheeler, 444 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1971); McBride v. United States,
409 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 938 (1969); Massey v. United States, 358
F.2d 782 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 878 (1966); Ayash v. United States, 352 F.2d
1009 (10th Cir. 1965); Gardner v. United States, 283 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1960).
112In addition, the court noted that even if it had found prejudice due to the trial
judge's participation, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, it
would have been harmless. 548 F.2d at 310.
"' 560 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1977).
'u 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
'' The Supreme Court ruled that failure to name a particular defendant in the
application for a wiretap order was not fatal absent a showing that "the presence of that
information as to additional targets would have precluded judicial authorization of the
intercept." Id. at 436.
,3,
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
,3 The first wiretap order was obtained on October 5, 1973, and it authorized interception of wire communications at defendant Picone's place of business and at the residences of two defendants. Five persons were named, but defendants Simone and Goodfellow were not named. The second wiretap order, obtained in November 1973, authorized
the same interception of wire communications; this order included Simone but not Goodfellow. 560 F.2d at 1000.
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evidence against Picone was also suppressed because it was
tainted by conversations with a third defendant, Goodfellow, who
had not been named in either order. 138 The Government appealed
from both suppression orders, but the Tenth Circuit withheld
13
disposition until Donovan was decided by the Supreme Court. 1
In Donovan, the Supreme Court ruled that under the wiretap
statute:' 0 (1) The Government must name all individuals whose
conversations it has probable cause to believe will be intercepted;' and (2) the failure to identify certain people whose
conversations are overheard does not warrant suppression so long
as the additional information, i.e., the omitted names, would not
42
have precluded judicial authorization.
In Picone, the Tenth Circuit first ruled that the failure to
name Simone in the initial wiretap order did not warrant suppression of the evidence. The court recited the statutory prerequisites for a lawful intercept order: probable cause to believe
that (1) an individual is engaged in criminal activity; (2) particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained
through the interception; (3) normal investigative techniques
have failed or appear unlikely to succeed; and (4) the target facilities are being used in furtherance of the specified criminal activity."3 Citing Donovan, the court ruled that suppression is not the
required remedy for every failure to comply with statutory requirements:
To the contrary, suppression is required only for a "failure to
satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device." '

The failure to name Simone did not warrant suppression because
the presence of Simone's name or other information about him
would not have precluded the court's authorization'of the wireI3 Id.

In United States v. Picone, 560 F.2d at 999 n.2.
11018 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
"'
142

429 U.S. at 428.
Id. at 436.

"1 560 F.2d at 1001 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970)).
1"560 F.2d at 1001 (quoting United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433). See also
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
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tap."' Moreover, no facts subsequently revealed would have
caused the judge to deny the order.' Thus, the suppression order
as to Simone was reversed.
In the second part of its opinion, the court addressed Picone's
argument that the Government deliberately withheld defendant
Goodfellow's name"17 from both intercept applications, thus tainting any conversations between himself and the unnamed Goodfellow.' The court rejected defendant's claim that the Government's failure to include Goodfellow was an improper attempt to
withhold pertinent information from the lower court which authorized the intercept. Rather, the court ruled that two factors,
the Government's representation that Goodfellow's name was
withheld to protect confidential informants and the defendant's
ample opportunity to raise this issue and question Government
witnesses about any improprieties, demonstrated that the defendant's claim was without merit." ' Conclusory allegations of
wrongdoing without proof did not constitute a sufficient basis for
suppression."0 Therefore, the suppression order in favor of Picone
was also reversed.
The Tenth Circuit rejected numerous grounds for appeal in
affirming defendant's conviction in United States v. Moore."'
Defendant was convicted of attempting to destroy the United
10 The court takes special note of the ample information provided by the F.B.I.
affidavit to the judge prior to judicial authorization. The court also notes that the affidavit
contained a substantial amount of information concerning Simone's involvement, even
though he was not specifically named. 560 F.2d at 1001-1002.
'" The court studied a supplemental F.B.I. affidavit, and found it persuasive in
concluding that all of the available information concerning Simone's involvement would
not have caused the authorizing judge to deny the intercept order. Id. at 1002 n.5.
I," See note 5 supra.
"0 Defendant Picone argued that the Government's intentional failure to comply with
the naming requirement of the wiretap statute made this case distinguishable from
Donovan, 560 F.2d at 1002. Picone rested his argument on a footnote to the Donovan
opinion:
There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents knowingly failed to identify respondents . . . for the purpose of keeping relevant
information from the District Court that might have prompted the court to
conclude that probable cause was lacking. If such a showing had been made,
we would have a different case.
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 436 n.23.
110560 F.2d at 1002.
"'
Id. See also United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533-34 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977); Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 1955).
"'
556 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1977).
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States Federal Courthouse Building in Oklahoma City by means
of a bomb device. 152 Among her grounds for appeal, 5 3 defendant
contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, and that evidence which showed that a bomb similar to the
one found in the courthouse had been discovered at the defendant's former residence should have been excluded." 4
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, although no one saw the defendant enter the building, the facts and circumstances 5 5 permitted
15218 U.S.C. § 844(f) (1976).
' Defendant urged six grounds for appeal:
(1) The evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction. See text accompanying notes 58 infra.
(2) The indictment was nonspecific and unconstitutionally vague, or alternatively, defendant's request for a bill of particulars should have been granted. The court held that
because the language of the indictment tracked the language of the statute, the indictment was sufficiently definite to apprise the defendant of the crime charged. United
States v. Moore, 556 F.2d at 482-83. As to defendant's request for a bill of particulars,
the denial of her request was within the sound discretion of the trial court and would not
be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 483.
(3) The trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of a former conviction in
California. Defendant's prior conviction had been expunged under a California statute,
CAL. PErAL CoD 1203.4 (West 1977), but the court ruled that the evidence was still
admissible for impeachment purposes. Citing United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883 (9th
Cir. 1975), and Barbosa v. Wilson, 385 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1967), the court concluded that
the evidence was admissible in a subsequent federal proceeding, the California expungement notwithstanding. United States v. Moore, 556 F.2d at 483-84.
(4) The trial court erred in not granting a mistrial when evidence of defendant's association with the Symbionese Liberation Army was inadvertently presented to the jury. The
court noted that the evidence was given voluntarily through no fault of the Government
and that the jury had been instructed to disregard the evidence. Under such circumstances, the brief reference did not taint the entire trial and it did not require reversal.
United States v. Moore, 556 F.2d at 484-85.
(5) The trial court should have prohibited evidence of defendant's fingerprints found on
a paper sack near the bomb and evidence of similar explosives found in defendant's former
residence. See text accompanying notes 9-15 infra.
(6) The prosecuting attorney should have given defense counsel copies of all statements
given by a Government witness to the F.B.I. prior to trial; the prosecution did not give
defendant the requested copies until shortly before the witness testified. The court found
no error because the defense counsel had the opportunity to study all the statements over
an evening recess before proceeding with cross-examination. United States v. Moore, 556
F.2d at 485.
I" Defendant had lived in a house owned by her mother and cared for by a great aunt.
After defenant moved out, the new tenant discovered what appeared to be a homemade
bomb and called police. The evidence at trial included testimony by a bomb expert about
the similarity of this bomb and the courthouse bomb. Id. at 481.
I" In addition to the bomb expert's testimony, see note 154 supra, the Government
presented four other witnesses: a fingerprint expert testified that prints taken from the
courthouse bomb matched those from the bomb taken from defendant's residence; a
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the inference that defendant had planted the bomb there. 5" In
the court's view, the inference was analogous to the wellestablished rule that a defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen goods is sufficient to support the inference that the
possessor is the thief.'57 The court concluded that the trial court
did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal. 5 '
Defendant also contended that United States v. Burkhart'59
prohibited the introduction of two specific pieces of government
evidence: defendant's fingerprints on a paper sack in which, it
could be inferred, the bomb was carried into the courthouse; 60
and evidence of a similar bomb and other explosive materials
found at the defendant's former residence.' The court rejected
the argument, ruling that Burkhart was distinguishable. In
Burkhart, the Tenth Circuit had ruled that evidence of prior
crimes was inadmissible absent a showing of continuity of the
offenses or a connecting link between the case on trial and prior
similar offenses. "'
In Moore, however, the admissibility of the evidence of explosive materials in defendant's home was governed by rule 404(b)
which provides that evidence of prior acts is "admissible . . . as

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowlchemical company employee testified concerning purchases of explosive materials by
defendant; defendant's former co-worker testified about defendant's claimed ability to
make bombs and her desire to bomb the federal building; and a policeman testified about
the observance of explosive materials and devices in defendant's home on a prior occasion.
Id. at 481-82.
"' Id. at 482.
157Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United States,
361 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1966).
" 556 F.2d at 482.
15'458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972) (admission of prior convictions to prove intent held
reversible error absent continuity between the prior offense and the offense on trial).
"' The paper sack and a matchbook had been found on the ground near the bomb.
The sack contained one burned match, thus leaving the impression that the bomb had
been lighted while still in the sack. 556 F.2d at 481.
18 See note 154 supra.
The language of the court is instructive:
Continuity of the offenses or a connecting link between the case on trial
and the tendered similar offenses is always essential and is to be considered
regardless of whether the evidence is offered to prove a plan, scheme, design,
motive, knowledge or intent ....
The lack of showing of a common plan,
scheme, design or intent is of itself a fatal deficiency here.
458 F.2d at 208 (emphasis added).
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edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."'' 3 The trial
court did not err in admitting the evidence because it bore directly on whether the defendant had planted the courthouse
bomb.'"
2. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
In United States v. Wiley 5" the Tenth Circuit considered
application of the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule.", The
conspiracy exception was invoked during a jury trial in which the
defendant was convicted of distributing heroin and cocaine. The
narcotics transaction was completed at Denver's Stapleton International Airport; the defendant's accomplice, Solomon, delivered
narcotics to an undercover government agent, handing them
under a restroom stall partition.
At trial the undercover agent testified that he could see Solomon's face over the top of the partition and that Solomon nodded
his head, indicating without words that he was carrying the narcotics with him in readiness for the exchange." 7 The defendant
objected to this testimony, arguing that the undercover agent was
restating the out-of-court assertion of another (Solomon's nod of
affirmation) to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein
(that indeed Solomon was delivering narcotics).
In reiterating the traditional rule, the court found that the
agent's testimony as to Solomon's nod of the head was hearsay
because the nod was intended to be assertive or communicative.
But, the court ruled that the conspiracy exception to the hearsay
rule was triggered under the facts of Wiley, permitting admission
of the undercover agent's testimony.'" However, in so ruling, the
Tenth Circuit muddled the foundational requirements of the conspiracy exception; and, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
' FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
' 556 F.2d at 485.

No. 77-1073 (10th Cir., June 27, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
"The hearsay rule prohibits use of a person's assertion, as equivalent
to testimony of the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in
court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the
grounds of his assertion and his qualifications to make it. Grand Forks
B. & D. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W. 2d 495
(1948). See 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1361, 1364."
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970).
"'

'"

'7

U

No. 77-1073 at 4.

Id. at 6.

1978

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

court probably erred in labeling the testimony hearsay in the first
place.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 provides: "A statement is not
hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is
. . a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy."' 69 The requirements of this
rule were met by the facts of Wiley: a statement by an unnamed
co-conspirator made during the conspiracy was offered against
the defendant. Therefore, under the rule, there was no hearsay to
begin with. The need for an exception to the hearsay rule was
obviated.
As to the foundational requirements of the conspiracy exception, the court properly noted that no conspiracy need have been
charged in order to trigger the conspiracy hearsay exception. 170
The difficulty comes in determining how much independent evidence of conspiracy the Tenth Circuit required in this case. The
court did not specify any quantum; it merely quoted an Eighth
Circuit case to the effect that a "likelihood of illicit association"
constitutes enough of a conspiracy to validate the hearsay exception. 7' Thereafter, the court stated in conclusive fashion, without
supporting details, that "there is sufficient evidence of concerted
action (conspiracy) by Solomon, the declarant in this case, and
' 2
the appellant."' 1
In future appellate proceedings, it may be deceivingly easy
to find a likelihood of illicit associationthat, under Wiley, will let
in untrustworthy and damaging hearsay.
In United States v. Plum 7 3 the Tenth Circuit considered the
business records exception 7 to the hearsay rule. The court ruled
*

"' The general heading of FED. R. EVID. 801(d) is "Statements which are not hear-

say. "

70 The court reasoned that "the acts and declarations of one co-defendant are admissible against the other if the existence of a conspiracy is in fact shown by independent
evidence .... Id. at 6. This is consistent with previous decisions. United States v. Jones,
540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974);
Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1973). There is considerable support in
other jurisdictions. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964); Cossack v. United
States, 82 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1936).
'T, United States v. Sanders, 463 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1972).
'7' No. 77-1073 at 7.
'T' No. 75-1834 (10th Cir., July 11, 1977).
'" The traditional rule is succinctly stated in Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E.
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inadmissible a loss-claim document filled out by the intended
buyer of a shipment of silver bars that had been stolen. The lossclaim document had been offered at trial to show that the value
of the silver shipment was in excess of the $5,000 minimum for
conviction of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 2315.
The Tenth Circuit decided that the loss-claim document had
not been completed in the regular course of the buyer's business
and therefore lacked indicia of trustworthiness as a business record exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).171 Nevertheless, the court ruled that admission of the document was
harmless error because a second document, a purchase order,
clearly established the value of the silver shipment at greater
than $5,000. The purchase order properly fell within the hearsay
exception, having been maintained in the regular course of busi76

ness. 1

In Plum the Tenth Circuit also emphasized the general admissibility, as substantive evidence, of prior recorded testimony
taken at a preliminary hearing. Under traditional analysis, such
prior testimony was inadmissible hearsay if introduced to prove
the truth of the matters asserted therein. 177 The trial court in

Plum reflected this traditional approach by apparently limiting
testimony for impeachment
the use of the preliminary hearing
78
purposes only (not hearsay).

In commenting on the trial court ruling, the Tenth Circuit
noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence have enlarged on prior
517 (1930); the modern counterpart is FF. R. Evm. 803(6), "Records of regularly conducted activity," which provides:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions
or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation ....
17

Id.

Id. at 11.
Such hearsay might be admissible if it was "testimony of a witness given at a
former trial of the same case on substantially the same issues, and where there was
opportunity for cross-examination" and the witness was now unavailable (dead, insane,
physically unable to testify, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or whereabouts unknown
despite diligent search). Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681, 697
(1941).
'T No. 75-1834 at 14.
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recorded testimony. Rule 801(d)(1) defines it as not hearsay at
all, in contrast to the traditional rule. It is substantive evidence,
admissible for all otherwise acceptable purposes. 7 ' Nevertheless,
the court said that limiting the use of prior recorded testimony
in Plum was not reversible error, for its only obvious value in the
trial was for impeachment. And it clearly had been admitted for
that purpose.0
3.

Evidence of Prior Convictions

In United States v. Nolan,'"' the Tenth Circuit upheld the
admissibility at trial of a prior foreign conviction as evidence of
"intent, design, a continuing course of conduct, guilty knowledge,
mental disposition, capacity, habit, plan, motive and identity"' 8
in relation to the present charge of importing marijuana from
India. The defendant previously had been convicted in Britain of
importing hashish from India in a similar fashion.
The court sidestepped the defendant's primary contention
that the British conviction was inadmissible because there was no
evidence that the British authorities had met or exceeded American constitutional standards for protection of personal rights. The
British conviction wasn't introduced to "support guilt or enhance
punishment," the court noted; '8 it was introduced, not as a conviction per se, but as evidence tending to show activity that was
relevant to the likelihood that the defendant imported marijuana
from India in the present case.
V.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

In United States v. Walker'" the Tenth Circuit held that the
trial court erred in refusing to provide additional instructions
,

FED. R.
(d)

EVID. 801(d) provides, in part:

Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay

if (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
or in a deposition ....
,' No. 75-1834 at 15.
,' No. 76-1177 (10th Cir., March 22, 1977).
,S2Id. at 4-5.

Id.
I5

,L 557 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1977).
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requested by a jury during its deliberations.' Jury confusion had
resulted because an indictment was worded in the conjunctive
while one of the two statutes the defendant was accused of violating was worded in the conjunctive and the other in the disjunctive.'5 ' Compounding the confusion was the fact that the jury was
forced to rely upon memory for the judge's instruction.
The jury sent a note to the judge expressing bewilderment
over the conjunctive/disjunctive situation. The Tenth Circuit,
relying upon Rogers v. United States,5 7 found the failure of the
trial court to respond to the jury question in open court in the
presence of opposing counsel to constitute sufficient "possible
prejudice to the defendant 18 to require reversal of conviction.
In United States v. Corrigan,'89 the Tenth Circuit considered
the issue of the sufficiency of the trial court instruction concerning the burden of proof relating to the affirmative defense of selfdefense. The court was largely persuaded by two cases from the
Ninth Circuit' 0 in holding that the trial court instructions were
not sufficiently clear to avoid confusion among instructions concerning self-defense and other affirmative defenses and the burden of proof related thereto.''
I" In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court was correct in ordering a
new trial because of harrassment of a witness.
"' Walker had been indicted for "knowingly obtaining and exercising control over the
personal property of another" (emphasis added), in violation of (1) the Assimilative
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 7,13 (with this cause dependent upon the Colorado theft statute,
•CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-4-401 (1973)) and (2) the federal theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 661.
557 F.2d at 742. The Colorado statute is worded in the disjunctive as "knowingly obtaining
or exercising control over" the property of another (emphasis added), while the federal
theft statute uses the conjunctive but different language of "takes and carries away with
intent to purloin." During deliberations, only a copy of the indictment was available to
the jurors.
1"7422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975).
U 557 F.2d at 741, 745.
'u 548 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1977).
Two special agents of the I.R.S. attempted to arrest the defendant at a meeting of
the Wyoming Patriots. The defendant pulled a spray canister from his pocket and sprayed
the contents - liquid red pepper - into the faces of the agents.
I" The two Ninth Circuit cases were DeGroot v. United States, 78 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.
1935), and Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966). 548 F.2d at 882.
"' The court stated that the instruction should make clear that "[U]nless the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in selfdefense, the jury should find him not guilty." 548 F.2d at 883.
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VI.

POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Sentencing and Plea Bargaining
United States v. Fairfax"' involved an appeal pursuant to
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" 3 alleging the
imposition of an illegal sentence. The pro se appeal of Fairfax
claimed that he had changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of
the charge of rape upon the representation by his attorney that
his sentence would be less than the thirty-year sentence imposed
by the trial court. The Tenth Circuit rejected the Rule 35 claim
as a "conclusory assertion.""' The court said that Fairfax might
still collaterally attack the trial court sentence if the standards
of specificity of allegation and other criteria enunciated in
Blackledge v. Allison"" could be met.
The issue in United States v. Davis"' was whether guilty
pleas should be vacated where the trial judge erroneously told the
defendant he could be sentenced to a total of fifty years, and the
actual sentence imposed by the court was forty-five years. Relying upon the prior Tenth Circuit case of Murray v. United
States,"'7 and finding persuasive the Fifth Circuit reasoning in
United States v. Blair,"8 the court held that the misstatement of
the maximum possible term did not entitle the defendant to relief
where there was no claim that the misinformation had had any
effect on the guilty pleas. The court did, however, remand the
case for resentencing.
B. Prisoner's/Parolee'sRights
James v. Rodrigues"' involved the validity of a proceeding
'" No. 77-1055 (10th Cir. July 28, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
10 FED. R. CraM. P. 35 provides in part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided herein for the reduction of sentence."
'" No. 77-1055 at 3, 4.
Is 431 U.S. 63 (1977). The Supreme Court in Blackledge allowed collateral attack on
the judgment of a state court through the filing of a writ of habeas corpus. The petition
brought in Blackledge (1) presented specific factual allegations and (2) alleged that defendant's guilty plea was induced by an unkept promise. The Tenth Circuit noted that in
the instant case, the misrepresentation of Fairfax's lawyer might not qualify as an "unkept
promise" to fall within the Blackledge criterion. No. 77-1055 at 4.
544 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1976).
II
419 F.2d 1076 (10th Cir. 1969) (court's misstatement of the possible maximum
sentence held not error).
n 470 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 908 (1973).
1" 533 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1977).
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initiated by a New Mexico district attorney under the New Mexico Habitual Offender Act, NMSA 40A-29-5 and 40A-29-6, subsequent to the appellant's retrial and reconviction. Both the trial
and appellate proceedings had resulted in sentences of one to five
years. However, subsequent to the appeal and contrary to his
action following the original proceeding, the district attorney filed
an habitual criminal charge which culminated in the sentencing
of appellant to life in prison.
Relying upon Supreme Court rulings in North Carolina v.
Pearce200 and Blackledge v. Perry,2 10 the court held the filing of the
habitual criminal charge to be "manipulative" and "tactical,"
constituting an interference with the right to appeal in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court
reasoned that an appellant with a one to five year sentence should
not have to anticipate a possible sentence of life in prison. Justice
McWilliams dissented upon the ground that the habitual criminal statute is mandatory in its terms.
C.

Appeals by the Government

United States v. Barney2 2 involved a situation where the
trial court had ordered the Government upon three working days'
notice to be ready to proceed to trial on twenty-three cases under
pain of dismissal if the Government was not ready to proceed.
When the Government asked for a continuance on some of the
cases, the trial court proceeded to dismiss certain of the cases.
The Tenth Circuit found the trial court conduct to be an abuse
of discretion and "utterly unreasonable, ' ' 203 and held that "the
Government, as well as the defendant, is entitled to notice and a
reasonable time within which to get its witnesses to the court-

house.'

'204

VII.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) prohibits physicians from "distributing" and "dispensing" controlled substances except when acting
no

395 U.S. 711 (1969).

' 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

550 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1977).

Id. at 1255.

m Id.
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in the usual course of professional practice. United States v.
Fellman °5 held that an indictment under section 841(a)(1),
charging the defendant with "distributing" rather than "dispensing" such substances to undercover agents posing as patients, was not fatally defective. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the contrary position of the Fifth Circuit on the identical
issue,211 choosing instead to align itself with the reasoning of the
First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. °7
B. 18 U.S. C. § 2114
18 U.S.C. § 2114 provides in part:
Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control or
custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the
United States, with intent to rob, steal or purloin . . .or rob any
such person of mail matter, or of any money, or other property of
the United States, shall . . .be imprisoned ....

The question presented in United States v. Smith0 was whether
an "assault with intent to rob" is adequately charged for purposes
of section 2114 by an indictment alleging an "attempt to rob."
The Tenth Circuit found the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit on this
identical issue to be persuasive, 0 9 concluding that the indictment
must fail since "statutes are to be construed so that each word is
given effect."21
18 U.S.C. § 1503

C.

18 U.S.C. § 1503 punishes by fine or imprisonment whoever
"endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede any witness, in any
court of the United States," or whoever injures any "witness in
his person or property on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter therein." United States v. White 21 1 involved
the issue of who is a "witness" for purposes of establishing an
549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977).
See United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973).
20?Under similar fact situations, the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that a physician may be properly charged with unlawful "distribution" of controlled
substances. See United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1976).
2"
'

553 F.2d 1239 (10th Cir. 1977).
See Aderhold v. Schlitz, 73 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1934).
553 F.2d at 1239-42.

211557 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1977).
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intent to obstruct justice within the purview of section 1503.
White, who had already pleaded guilty to charges of counterfeiting, approached the car driven by Disney while Disney, a witness
for the counterfeiting case, was inside the car. White proceeded
to kick the door and yell profanities at Disney.
White argued at trial that since he had pleaded guilty prior
to the assault of Disney, he knew that there would be no trial at
the time of the assault, so that there was no prospect that Disney
would ever be called as a "witness." White thus reasoned that he
could not possess the requisite specific intent to intimidate or
injure a "witness" in his person or property for purposes of section
1503. The Tenth Circuit rejected White's argument, reasoning
that so long as a federal proceeding was pending, there existed a
real chance that Disney would be called to testify.
Bruce A. Lampert
David W. Miller
Mark R. Muller
Jack R. Olsen
John S. Upton
Karin I. Wyman
Karen S. Westrell

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

Introduction
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit decided more
than a hundred cases involving federal jurisdiction, the Federal
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and other issues relating to
practice in the federal courts. Many of the cases arose under the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and are of interest here
only in the procedural or jurisdictional context.
Although few of these cases represent issues of first impression, the overview which follows presents a limited discussion of
a representative number of cases, to indicate the types of legal
issues dealt with by the Tenth Circuit during this period. Following the overview are comments on two areas of greater importance, class action certification and availability of mandamus relief from discovery orders.
Throughout the entire Federal Practice and Procedure section, all references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
I.

A.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

In Personam Jurisdiction;Minimum Contacts

In Eckles v. Sharman,I the Tenth Circuit concluded that a
California corporation, owner of the Los Angeles Lakers basketball team, had sufficient direct contacts in Utah for the United
States District Court for the District of Utah to exercise in personam jurisdiction by service under Utah's long-arm statute. 2
The extent of defendant California Sports' contacts with
Utah were "exhibition and scouting ventures and nation-wide
548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977). Eckles was trustee in bankruptcy for Mountain States
Sports, owner of the Utah Stars basketball team. In the action, he alleged that defendant
California Sports, Inc. had tortiously induced William Sharman to breach his coaching
contract with the Utah Stars and sign a new contract with the Los Angeles Lakers.
2 UTAH CODe ANN. § 78-27-22 (Supp. 1971). Long-arm statutes are state statutes
conferring upon courts jurisdiction over a party not served with process if the party has
constitutionally sufficient contacts within the state. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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telecasts," '3 and this was sufficient contact for the Utah trial court
to sustain in personam jurisdiction over the California corporation.
The Tenth Circuit approved this exercise of jurisdiction,
stating simply that "there were sufficient direct contacts," 4 but
the court did not state whether any of the three activities by the
out-of-state corporation (exhibition and scouting ventures or nationwide telecasts) standing alone would have satisfied the
"minimum contacts" requirement.5
The "minimum contact" criteria were set forth in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.' The Supreme Court has
ruled that the contacts need not give rise to the cause of action.7
The trial court in the case at the bar acknowledged this, and
correctly gave little or no credence to the fact that California
Sports' contacts in Utah were unrelated to the alleged inducement of Sharman to breach his contract.
InternationalShoe permits extension of in personam jurisdiction to a nonresident if there are minimum contacts, and if
local maintenance of the suit would not offend traditional standards of fair play.8 The Tenth Circuit noted with approval that
the trial court had indeed applied "the twin tests of fairnessreasonableness to the defendant on the one side and territorial
respect for sister states' due spheres on the other." 9
B.

Venue
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., '0 the Tenth Circuit considered the application of two venue
statutes" in a diversity action brought to recover a bond.
548 F.2d at 908.
Id.
If scouting ventures and nationwide telecasts are sufficient contacts, it would seem
that all or most professional sports teams would be susceptible to in personam jurisdiction
in all states with similar long-arm statutes.
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
548 F.2d at 908.
Id.
" 541 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1976).
II Relevant sections are as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970) provides:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where
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The case had been transferred for improper venue from the
United District Court for the Northern Division of Utah to the
Central Division "for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice."' 2 It was later dismissed for failure
to state a claim.
The Tenth Circuit, in applying 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1393,
stated that defendant Aetna was a resident and therefore could
be sued in the Northern Division as well as the Central Division
"because it is licensed to do business throughout the state."' 3
Such residency made venue in the Northern Division proper,"
and the Tenth Circuit set aside the dismissal. The case was retransferred to the Northern Division.
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970) provides:
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
28 U.S.C. § 1393(a) (1970) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, any civil action, not of a local nature, against a
single defendant in a district containing more than one division must be brought in the
division where he resides.
" 541 F.2d at 870.
" Id. at 871.
" The Tenth Circuit cited Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Seattle, 159 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.
Wash. 1958), "as holding that a corporation is a resident for venue purposes of any division
in which it is incorporated, or licensed to do business, or is doing business." 541 F.2d at
871.
" In Cassity v. R.J. Connor, Inc., No. 76-1704 (10th Cir., Apr. 14, 1977) (Not for
Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit considered the jurisdictional mandate of 40
U.S.C. § 270b(b) (1970), a section of the Miller Act, which requires that performance
bonds be posted by persons doing certain kinds of contract work for the United States
government. Cassity filed suit against R.J. Connor, Inc. and its surety, seeking an award
from the performance bond. However, the suit was filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, not in Nevada where the contract in dispute was performed.
Id. at 2.
Citing McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 812 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975), the Tenth
Circuit held that 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b) requires that the suit be instituted in "any district
in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere .
I..."
Id. at
6. The Utah trial court therefore was correct in dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction, since no part of the contract had been performed in Utah.
Plaintiff had argued that the wording of section 270b(b) was merely a venue requirement and that the matter could be brought in any United States district court. Id. at 4.
In rejecting that logic, the Tenth Circuit said that the statutory language was to be strictly
construed. Further, the Tenth Circuit noted that the language of the statute was a clear
statement of Congress' intention as to venue and jurisdiction. Id. at 7.
Secondarily, the Tenth Circuit rejected Cassity's contention that defendant had
waived its right to object to improper venue because it had appeared in the case and had
not raised the venue objection previously. Id. at 7.
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C.

Mootness
In Napier v. Gertrude,8 the Tenth Circuit outlined the circumstances under which a class action may or may not proceed
after the named plaintiffs claim has been declared moot.
The named plaintiff, a "child in need of supervision" according to a state adjudication, sought habeas corpus release alleging
that she was being held in a state institution under an unconstitutionally vague statute. 7
The Tenth Circuit upheld the statute and denied habeas
corpus, saying that her intervening release from custody had
mooted the action. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit said the action was mooted as to the class because the class was not yet
certified and the failure to certify, while attributable to a trial
error, was not now correctable. 8
In stating that criterion, the Tenth Circuit rejected the trial
court's more simplistic logic that the request for a class action
becomes moot when the merits are determined against the named
plaintiff." Should the non certification error of the trial court now
be corrected, permitting the class to go forward without the
named plaintiff?
. The Tenth Circuit answered the question, applying a test
that considered whether the cause of action was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 0 Quoting from Sosna v. Iow a, ' the
Tenth Circuit stated:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the
named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the
District Court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification
'

542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).

' Id. at 826.
"

Id. at 827-28.

Nothing in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates
the merits of the case should be determinative of whether the class should
be certified ....Class determination does not become 'moot' when the merits
are determined against the named plaintiff ....
[C]lass members maintain
a vital interest in the outcome of any possible appeal. Also, a judgment in a
class action is not intended for use only to benefit class members when the
representative prevails but is meant to preclude them from further litigating
the issue when it is decided against them.
Id. at 827.
" Id. at 828.
" 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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motion. In such instances, whether the certification can be said to
"relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of
the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review (emphasis
added).

The Tenth Circuit said that the issue in the case at the bar
would not evade review, as members of the class would in some
instances "be in state custody for several years and could maintain a personal adverse interest throughout the course of litigation." Therefore the class could not go forward in the face of
mootness as to the named plaintiff.
D. Retention of Jurisdictionin Bankruptcy
In Tilco Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,24 the Tenth Circuit stated
that the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over a Chapter
X bankruptcy so that the trustee could reject executory contracts
of the debtor well after the assets had been transferred from the
debtor.
Ordinarily, it would be expected that the trustee's standing
to seek rejection of such executory contracts (for the sale of natural gas) would expire with the bankruptcy's "closing agreement"
and the trustee's transfer of the bankrupt's assets.2 However, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the trustee had retained standing because the reorganization plan recognized that the trustee might
seek rejection of the executory contracts. Moreover, the bankruptcy court had approved the closing agreement, "which obli2
gated the Trustee to seek rejection of the executory contracts.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Bankruptcy Actr provides
that property transferred according to the reorganization plan be
free of debtors', creditors' or stockholders' claims "except such
claims and interests as may otherwise be provided for in the plan
or in the order confirming the plan or in the order directing or
authorizing the transfer or retention of such property."'
= 542 F.2d at 828.

SId.
'

558 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).

Id. at 1371.
SId.
11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).

558 F.2d at 1372.
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Thus, reorganization courts "have been permitted to retain
jurisdiction after transfer of assets to assure the consummation
of the approved plan." 9
E.

Relations Between Federal Courts and the Military
In Schulke v. United States,30 the Tenth Circuit held that an
action for mandamus relief3' was not available to direct a general
court-martial against military personnel.32 The court noted that
a decision whether to prefer military charges against military
personnel is discretionary 33 and an internal military affair.3 , Citing a number of prior cases, 35 the court held that "[t]he role of
the federal judiciary" in such cases was "narrow and restricted. 3 ,
F.

Federal-StateJurisdictionConflicts

The Tenth Circuit considered the propriety of a state court
injunction of federal proceedings in Aluminum Products Distributors, Inc. v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. 37 Although the case
mainly concerned the validity of a contract arbitration clause, the
jurisdictional question arose when the defendant, Aaacon, unsuc29 Id.

- 544 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
Sergeant Schulke had sought to bring court-martial proceedings against former
President Richard M. Nixon in 1973. Shortly thereafter, he was referred to Fitzsimmons
Army Hospital in Denver for psychiatric evaluation. After being returned to active duty,
he sought courts-martial against the persons responsible for his hospitalization; after
exhausting the military channels, he filed the instant suit in federal court. 544 F.2d at
454-55.
3 Mandamus is not appropriate when the act sought to be compelled is discretionary.
See, e.g., Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff had sought notice
before issuance of an I.R.S. summons to a third party).
3 544 F.2d at 455.
" E.g., Arnheiter v. Chafee, 435 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1970) (unsuccessful attempt by
plaintiff to convene a court of inquiry to investigate his relief from command Vietnam
War); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusal to review reserve commander's
decision that plaintiff's hair was too long; holding, however, that the Army must abide
by its own regulations; 406 F.2d at 146); Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo.
1974) (after writing a series of letters to Congress, plaintiff was relieved of his teaching
duties and given psychiatric examinations; no showing, however, of abuse of discretion).
" 544 F.2d at 455. Several months later, Sergeant Schulke was back before the Tenth
Circuit, this time attempting to force the Lowry Airman, the base newspaper, to print
several advertisements requesting congressional candidates to state their views on
"redress of grievances by military personnel." The court held that his suit must fail for
the same jurisdictional defects faced by his earlier suit. Schulke v. United States, No. 761565 (10th Cir., Mar. 1, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) at 2, 4.
549 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1977).
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cessfully maintained that the district court" must give full faith
and credit39 to a prior New York state court decision 0 that the
arbitration clause was valid. The Tenth Circuit held that
Donovan v. City of Dallas,4' which held that a state court could
not enjoin an in personam action in federal court, was "the complete answer" to the issued raised. 2
In Donovan, the Supreme Court did not decide whether a
plea of res judicata could bar the federal proceeding, where the
state court determination went to the merits.43 Unfortunately,
Aaacon failed to plead res judicata, relying solely on its full faith
and credit argument. Although the Tenth Circuit noted that the
full faith and credit argument was distinct from a plea of res
judicata, it refused to consider the effect of a successful plea by
Aaacon,4 4 and thus did not expand the Donovan decision in this
regard.
The Tenth Circuit also held that federal district courts have
no jurisdiction to review a state's refusal to admit a law school
graduate to the bar, in Doe v. Pringle.5 The trial court had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, distinguishing between "constitutional challenge[s] to the state's general rules and regulations governing admission," where federal
courts do have federal question jurisdiction, and claims, whether
or not based on constitutional grounds, that "the state has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission."4
In an opinion by Judge Barrett, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's dismissal, holding that Doe's only remedy was
3' The plaintiff had originally tiled suit in Oklahoma state court. Aaacon removed the
case to the Western District of Oklahoma, on the ground that original federal jurisdiction
lay under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), dealing with cases arising under acts of Congress
relating to commerce. 549 F.2d at 1382.
" See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
" Before removal, Aaacon filed suit in New York state court to compel arbitration.
549 F.2d at 1383.
" 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
" 549 F.2d at 1383.
377 U.S. at 412.
" 549 F.2d at 1384.
550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976). Doe, a convicted felon, was denied admission to the
Colorado bar " 'on the basis of the proofs submitted on [his] ethical and moral qualifications.' " Id. at 597.
4"

Id.
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review of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision by certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.47
Cases in this area can be divided into two classes: those
dealing with refusal of admission to a state's bar, and those dealing with state disbarment. In the latter cases, although a federal
trial court may not directly review the state disbarment, it may
nevertheless re-examine the grounds for state disbarment in determining whether federal disbarment will follow." As a result,
these cases are not directly on point with the issue in Doe, although Judge Barrett's opinion does not draw a clear distinction
and, in fact, relies heavily on Theard v. United States," a disbarment case.
Three of the cited cases dealing with disbarment involved
attempted direct review of the state disbarment, the respective
circuit courts of appeals holding that certiorari to the Supreme
Court was the only appropriate means of review ° However, in a
Supreme Court opinion not cited by Judge Barrett, Selling v.
Radford,51 the Court, while reviewing a federal disbarment, gave
some indication that it would not review a state disbarment proceeding, even on certiorari. 5 Theard, which reached the Supreme
Court through the federal system, was also a review of a federal
disbarment. It would therefore appear that the disbarment cases
provide poor precedent for the issues raised in Doe.
Two companion cases concerning review of an admission
denial, Konigsberg v. State Bar5" and Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners," actually reached the Supreme Court on certiorari
from the state courts. In neither case, however, did the Court
specifically state that this was the only proper method of review.
Of the cases cited by Judge Barrett concerning a challenge to a
general admission requirement, only one, Keenan v. Board of
"7 Id. at 597, 599.
0 Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46
(1917).
, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969);
Ginger v. Circuit Court, 372 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967); Gately
v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1962).
" 243 U.S. 46 (1917).
" Id. at 50.
353 U.S. 252 (1957).
353 U.S. 232 (1957).

1978

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Law Examiners,55 actually discussed the federal jurisdiction
issue.5

Nevertheless, Judge Barrett's opinion is consistent with
every case cited, and is clearer on the jurisdictional issue than
most.57 It represents the logical, if not inevitable, explication of
precedent in the area and should be of great assistance to courts
in the future in resolving state bar admission issues.58
II. PROCEDURE

A. Rules 12(b) and 56(c)
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co."9
and Torres v. First State Bank,60 the Tenth Circuit addressed
itself to a common misapplication of rule 12(b)(6) by the district
courts; trial courts often "receive, and do not exclude, matters
outside the pleadings and then grant a motion to dismiss rather
than a summary judgement"'" as required by rule 12(b).
In Torres, plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
317 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (challenge to residency requirement for
admission to North Carolina bar).
- In other cases, federal jurisdiction was either presumed or the issue was quickly
settled with little or no discussion. See Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d
699 (8th Cir. 1971) (challenge to bar examination grading procedures); Goldsmith v.
Pringle, 399 F. Supp. 620 (D. Colo. 1975) (challenge to Colorado reciprocity rule); Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D. Mont. 1974) (challenge to Montana's diploma privilege).
" After holding that the federal courts had no subject matter jurisdiction in the case,
Judge Barrett went on in Part IIof the opinion to discuss a number of recent Supreme
Court opinions restricting federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases. This lengthy-and
totally gratuitous-discussion probably prompted the two concurrences by Judges Breitenstein and Seth, 550 F.2d at 604, which would have limited the holding to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over denial of admission to a state bar.
I In a third case concerning federal-state jurisdictional conflicts, Wright v. Douglas,
No. 76-1419 (10th Cir., Aug. 29, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit
held that the entire suit was barred in federal court by the eleventh amendment. This was
a diversity action for wrongful death, brought against the State of Wyoming, the project
supervisor (Douglas) and the principal contractor (Rissler & McMurry Co.) of a highway
construction project. The court noted that a waiver of sovereign immunity by a state in
state courts does not waive its eleventh amendment immunity in federal courts, id. at 4,
and that a suit against a state employee acting in his official capacity (defendant Douglas)
is also barred, because it seeks a judgment from state funds. Id. at 7. Finally, Wyoming's
common law of sovereign immunity extended to the contractor, and therefore the federal
court was totally without jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 10-11.
s'551 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1977).
550 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1256-57.
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(1970) against the defendant bank. Defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to rule 12(b)(6). Although the trial court received
depositions and exhibits which it did not exclude, it granted defendant's motion. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the
complaint adequately alleged a violation of section 1983, that the
good faith of the bank was in issue, and that the good faith issue
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. 2
Judge Breitenstein stated the applicable law as follows: (1)
When matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56;13 (2) noncompliance with the provisions
of rule 56 deprives the court of authority to grant summary judgment.6"
Since the district court had accepted material outside the
pleadings and had not complied with the provisions of rule 56(c),
one would expect that the inquiry would end there-with reversal
of the district court's decision to grant the 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. But the Tenth Circuit continued its analysis, stating the
rule: "If, as a matter of law, the complaint, without consideration
of matter presented but not excluded, is insufficient, a motion to
dismiss is proper." 5 The Tenth Circuit found that the complaint
was sufficient in this case.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Torres rule in the
6 case. That case, a diversity action,
American Home Assurance"
involved substantive questions of Montana state law and presented essentially the identical issue raised by Torres. Judge
Breitenstein stated that if the trial court did not consider matters
outside of the pleadings, the question was whether Montana law
permitted plaintiff's recovery. 7 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that material questions of fact existed which could not be decided
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 8
0

Id. at 1257.
0 Id. This well settled principle is expressly stated by the last sentence of rule 12(b).
Accord, Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972).
" 550 F.2d at 1257. See Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 483 F.2d 1351 (10th
Cir. 1973).
550 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 69 infra.
661 F. 2d 804 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 807.
" Id. at 808.
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Since both Torres and American Home Assurance were reversed despite the Tenth Circuit's inquiry into the possibility of
accepted outside material not being considered, it can be hypothesized that the court was merely adding boiler plate to its decision
and did not create an exception to the general rule that where
outside materials are accepted the trial court must proceed to
rule 56. But the Torres decision casts doubt on that hypothesis
by citing Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns & Company."
In that case, upon defendant's filing a motion to dismiss, supporting affidavits were filed on each side. The Tenth Circuit did not
articulate its reasoning, but held that the granting of a rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings was proper.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit has apparently created an exception
to the rule that a 12(b) motion cannot be granted after outside
materials have been received and not excluded. The court's new
rule leads to confusion, since it is difficult to know whether the
trial judge considered matters received and not excluded. In any
event, since a plaintiff is normally free to amend his complaint
upon dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), the Torres rule will probably
not be prejudicial to future plaintiffs affected by it.70
B. Statutory Interpleader
In GeneralAtomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 7' plaintiff General
Atomic, a seller of uranium concentrates, sought subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 statutory interpleader, 2
alleging that there were adverse claims between two or more of
the defendants for uranium in which plaintiff had rights. The
Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court properly decided it lacked
'73
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the "exacting demands
of the statute: the res was not under the control of the person
- 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977).
70

5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (1969).

553 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Named as defendants were four utility companies, with whom plaintiff was under
contract to sell uranium, and United Nuclear Corporation. United Nuclear was under
contract to supply plaintiff with the quantity of uranium required to fulfill plaintiff's
contracts with the utilities. (United Nuclear had been the direct supplier to the four
utilities but had assigned its rights under the contracts to General Atomic. United Nuclear
retained its duties under the contracts). The lawsuit arose when United Nuclear claimed
it was entitled to be released from its obligations under the supply contract or that it was
entitled to receive current (inflated) market prices.
7 553 F.2d at 56.
71
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bringing the lawsuit,7" but was in the possession of United Nuclear; secondly, the suit lacked the element of competing claimants75 since United Nuclear was not asserting entitlement to anything General Atomic had tendered to the district court and because the four utilities were not competing among themselves for
the benefit of their individual contracts.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that as a result of the dismissal, plaintiff would be subject to a number of lawsuits involving the potential of conflicting adjudications. But the court concluded that Congress did not intend that interpleader be a cureall for every multi-party relationship, citing State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Tashire.6
The court's holding that the action was lacking in adverse
claimants may be criticized; a more liberal77 reading of the statute could have supported a ruling that United Nuclear's claim
was adverse to the claims of the utility companies. The utilities
claimed that they were entitled to the uranium at the agreedupon prices; United Nuclear claimed that it could retain the
uranium or sell it elsewhere unless it received higher prices. The
Tenth Circuit conceded that if General Atomic had the material
in its possession the parties might have met the adversary claimants requirement.7"
C.

Rule 37: Failure to Comply With a Discovery Order

In Glezos v. Blackett,79 the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a default judgment, citing defendant's failure to file an
answer to interrogatories in compliance with law. 0
" 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1970) requires plaintiff to deposit the money, property, or
obligation sought by the adverse claimants or to deposit a bond payable to the clerk of
the court.
75 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (a)(a) (1970) requires that two or more adverse claimants claim
to be entitled to the money, property, or bond deposited by the plaintiff.
70 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
17 The court stated that plaintiff's theory did not satisfy the "exacting demands" of
the statute. See text accompanying note 73 supra. Other courts have held that the statute
should be read liberally. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523
(1967). See also 7 C. Waor & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1704 (1972).
, 553 F.2d at 57.
' No. 76-1225 (10th Cir., Apr. 25, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
Plaintiff filed a motion for an order compelling an answer on August 18, 1975.
Defendant filed an answer on August 25, 1975. When defendant failed to respond to
plaintiff's motion for production of documents and plaintiff's interrogatories on the agreed
day, the court ordered that the interrogatories be answered and the documents produced.
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Under rule 37, trial judges have authority to enter default
judgments in cases where a party fails to comply with a discovery
order.8 The question presented in Glezos was whether the trial
judge abused his discretion" in granting the default judgment
under the stated facts. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court
did abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for default
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that dismissal as a sanction
should be applied only in extreme cases"3 since the Rules of Civil
Procedure favor ultimate determinations on the merits. The court
ruled that where noncompliance is not willful or in bad faith, but
is merely technical, a default judgment should not be granted."
Arguably, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this
case. There is little in the Tenth Circuit's opinion to indicate
that the defendant's noncompliance was inadvertent or was due
to an inability to comply. The opinion does not disclose whether
defendant ever complied with the order for production of documents. On the other hand, the trial court could have imposed one
or more of the less stringent sanctions available under rule 37.55
D.

Rule 42: Consolidationfor Settlement

American Employers' Insurance Co. v. King Resources Co. 6
was an appeal by John M. King (King) of a district court's en
Within the time allowed, defendant filed answers to the interrogatories, but they were
signed by defendant's attorney rather than defendant (rule 33(a) requires that interrogatories to a party be signed by the party served).
The Tenth Circuit did not make clear whether defendant complied with plaintiff's
motion for production of documents.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), 37(d).
a E.g., 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284 (1969).
See, e.g., Murphy v. Fatzer, No. 76-1265 (10th Cir., June 1, 1977) (Not for Routine
Publication). In Murphy, plaintiff, a law school graduate, appeared pro se. Plaintiff's
answers to interrogatories were ruled not responsive and plaintiff was ordered to give
further answers. Plaintiff failed to comply. Defendant's initial motion to dismiss was
denied, but plaintiff was again ordered to answer defendant's interrogatories. Again,
plaintiff failed to comply with the order. The trial court's subsequent dismissal was upheld
by the Tenth Circuit.
"' See Robinson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1966).
" While any failure to comply with a discovery order brings rule 37 sanctions into
play, the reason for the failure is to be considered in determining which sanction is
appropriate. The Tenth Circuit determined that the eventual compliance, though technically imperfect, was sufficient to make default judgment inappropriate.
- 545 F.2d 1265 (1976). The nine actions included securities fraud cases, reorganization proceedings, bankruptcies, and a rescission action.
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banc denial of his motion to consolidate nine actions "for purposes of settlement only. '"87

The Tenth Circuit found that in the King case it would be
difficult for a judge to be impartial and fair 8 to all of the parties
while trying to settle nine actions with interrelated facts and
facets."
While the involvement of John King provided a common
thread among the several actions, the Tenth Circuit found no
common question of law or fact, a requisite for consolidation
under rule 42. King was involved in each case, but in varying
degrees. Even though King was not predicating his motion to
consolidate on a common basis of fact or law, but rather "for
purposes of settlement only,"" the Tenth Circuit found no finality to any of the actions and a settlement, given their development to that point, might be unfair because of the many unresolved matters related to the nine actions.'
Citing NAACP of Louisiana v. Michot,12 the court noted that
denial of a motion to consolidate had been held to be a nonappealable order. 3
For all of the above reasons, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
denial of King's motion to consolidate for purposes of settlement
only.
E. Relief from ExtraordinaryActions by the Trial Court
In Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 4 before the Tenth Circuit for the third time, petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to
review the district court's action in the case and asked for removal of the trial judge. 5 After a second remand from the Tenth
"7 Id. at 1269.
" For this part of its decision, the court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) as amended
by P.L. 93-512: "Any justice . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 1268.
0 Id. In United Family Life Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 452 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1971), a
Chapter XI action and suit for recovery on life insurance policies, the court held that the
interrelationship of the actions precluded assigning them to one judge.
0 545 F.2d at 1269.
IId.

480 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1973).
545 F.2d at 1269. Judge McWilliams, in a specially concurring opinion, would have
denied the motion on this ground alone. 545 F.2d at 1270.
" No. 77-1293 (10th Cir., June 9, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
0 When the complaint was originally filed, the case was assigned to a district judge
92
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Circuit, in this class action suit, the trial court was still expressing doubt as to the appropriateness of a class action and further
indicated at a pretrial conference that it was "his intention to
start from the beginning as if the two decisions of the Tenth
Circuit had never been written.""6 He refused to acknowledge as
controlling the previous holdings of the Tenth Circuit in the case.
Because of the delay involved in such actions by the trial court
judge and the resulting unfairness from the judge's seeming predilection for one result-no class action-the Tenth Circuit
ordered the judge removed from the case.
Because of the repeated filing of frivolous claims 7 by plaintiff, in Miller v. Continental Oil Co."' the district court tried to
enjoin plaintiff from filing any further actions without obtaining
the court's prior approval. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that
there are sanctions for abusing process. While the Tenth Circuit
upheld the district court's dismissal of the action against the
defendants,100 it directed the district court to vacate that part of
its decision which attempted to deny plaintiff free access to the
courts.
F.

Res Judicata

Katzburg v. Krebs'0 1 involved an action between stockholders in a New Mexico corporation. The action, originating in state
court and later removed to the federal court, was based on fraud,
conspiracy and violation of a fiduciary duty.' 2 The trial court
who denied certification of the requested class action, ordered the district court to reconsider the class action motion and to give reasons for its refusal to certify. Id.
When the action again came before the trial court, a class action was again denied
and the case was dismissed. Id. at 3. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case a second time,
ruling that it had been dismissed on erroneous grounds and that, contrary to the district
court's holding, the case was a classic one for class action treatment. Id.
"

Id.

0 Plaintiff made 17 appeals to the Tenth Circuit, eight in one year alone. Plaintiff
also had a history of refusing to appear at hearings, either in person or represented by
counsel.
" No. 76-1229 (10th Cir., Feb. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 3.
I' Id. at 2.
'o' 545 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1976).
The plaintiff and defendants had formed a corporation in New Mexico for the
production of Christmas ornaments. The corporation began experiencing financial difficulties. The defendant, Erika Krebs, was authorized by the board of directors to negotiate
with the bank for a settlement. She did reach an agreement with the bank on behalf of
her family, but not the corporation. Through a judicially approved sale, the collateral was
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granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants; the Tenth
03
Circuit reversed. 1
The trial court based its res judicata finding on a judicially
approved sale of the collateral in an action brought by the lender
against the corporation.'"4 The Tenth Circuit stated that the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable. After considering the purpose of the res judicata-collateral estoppel doctrine,0 5 the Tenth
Circuit determined that a comparison of the two proceedings
must be made. Through this analysis, the court found there was
an identity neither of parties nor of causes of action. The first
proceeding was between the lender and the corporation on an
overdue note; the second action, between directors of the corporation, was based on fraud and conspiracy. Under these circumstances, res judicata was not applicable and the summary judgment was an error.'0 8
Johnson v. City of Wheat Ridge'"7 involved an action brought
sold to a limited partnership, owned by the defendants. The plaintiff, a director in the
New Mexico corporation, brought this action asserting that the defendants had breached
their fiduciary duty by purchasing the corporation assets for their own benefit. In other
courts, the plaintiff sought to have a constructive trust placed on the properties acquired
by the defendants, and asserted fraud by the defendants seeking punitive damages. Id.
at 107.
103 Id.
104 Id.
"I Id. at 108-09. The Tenth Circuit stated that the rule of res judicata provides that
a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction binds the parties to the action and their privies with regard to every issue that
was or might have been raised. However, if the second proceeding is upon a different cause
of action between the same parties, there is an estoppel upon only the controverted issues
which were the basis of the prior judgment.
IN Another case, Burch v. Stringham & Follet, No. 76-1223 (10th Cir., Apr. 22, 1977)
(Not for Routine Publication), involved a federal action arising under various rules and
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77-78 (1970). The trial
court dismissed the action under the doctrine of res judicata. The state court had dismissed an earlier complaint involving the same parties, stating that the state statute did
not provide a remedy. No. 76-1223 at 2.
In discussing the doctrine of res judicata, the Tenth Circuit stated that the first ruling
must be a judgment on the merits. Id. at 5 (citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 33 U.S. 591
(1948)). If the second cause of action between the same parties contains different issues,
then there is an estoppel with regard to the controverted points which were the basis of
the first finding or verdict. No. 76-1223 at 5.
The Tenth Circuit in reversing the district court judgment determined that res judicata was not applicable in this case; the cause of action in the state court was different.
Secondly, the state court had no jurisdiction to consider the federal cause of action, and
therefore there had been no decision on the federal merits in the state action. Id. at 6.
707 No. 76-1526 (10th Cir., Jan. 3, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
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by the executor of an estate alleging deprivation of property and
due process violations of the fifth and fourteenth amendment.
The property which was the subject of the federal cause of action
had been involved in a quiet title action between the same parties
in the state court. A determination was reached by the state court
that the property was validly donated. 08
The Tenth Circuit applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel
and affirmed the district court decision. 0 9 Though the causes of
action were different, the issues, underlying facts, and parties
were identical. The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be contrary
to the policies underlying res judicata and collateral estoppel to
allow such similar actions to be brought in the federal and state
court.,10
G.

Privacy of Jury Deliberations

In Crowley v. Cloes"' the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action as administratrix of the estate of William F. Crowley, Jr." '
The verdict form given to the jury allowed a consideration of the
negligence of Crowley and Cloes, but not of a third party to the
accident, Harris. After the jury had begun its deliberations, the
trial judge and counsel for both parties decided at a meeting in
chambers that the verdict form was erroneous. After the jury
returned a verdict based on the first form and was polled, the
court explained the error in the verdict form. While the jury
members were still in court, grouped around the bench, they were
given a second verdict form which allowed for a consideration of
Harris' negligence. The court indicated the differences in the
forms. Jurors signed the new form in open court, they were then
polled again, and discharged. There were no deliberations on the
new form."'
'~'

Id. at 2.

"

Id. at 3.

Id., citing Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
893; Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1965).
No. 76-1232 (March 15, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
1 This wrongful death action was brought under the Oklahoma comparative negligence statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 23 § 11 (Supp. 1973). The deceased and defendant Cloes
had parked on a rural road at night. Though Cloes noticed an approaching car a quarter
of a mile or more away, he failed to warn the deceased who was standing behind the car,
until the oncoming vehicle was about 100 feet away. The deceased was struck by a truck
driven by Harris. Plaintiff settled with Harris pursuant to a covenent not to sue and
asserted a claim of negligence against Cloes. No. 76-1232 at 2-3.
"I Id. at 4-5.
10
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case."' The
court considered the issue of the privacy of jury deliberations and
found an invasion of that privacy, finding no federal precedent for
the deliberation process which took place."'
The Tenth Circuit also found that the trial court's good faith
participation resulted in a directed verdict, as a practicality.",
The consequence of the trial court's failure to return the jury to
further secret deliberations on the second verdict form and its
participation in the voting process constituted an impermissible
invasion of an exclusive province of the jury.'17
H. Judgment N.O.V.
In Yazzie v. Sullivent '5 the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the district court properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 9 The case was submitted to the jury which
returned a verdict for the plaintiff for wrongful death. The trial
court then granted the defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v. on
the basis of insufficient evidence of a causal relation between the
negligent driving of Sullivent and Yazzie's death. 20
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6. The trial court participated in the voting process of the second verdict
form, though authority indicates that the status of the vote is not to be disclosed to anyone
prior to rendering a verdict or reaching a deadlock. Id. at 6-7. The Tenth Circuit cited
United States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1972); Benscoter v. United States, 376 F.2d
49 (10th Cir. 1967); Mullin v. United States, 356 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The trial court is not permitted to ask questions or make suggestions after the jury
begins its deliberations. No. 76-1232 at 7 (citing Castleberry v. NRM Corp., 470 F.2d 1113
(10th Cir. 1972).
"'
"'

III No. 76-1232 at 7.

17 Id. at 8.
"I Yazzie v. Sullivent, 561 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd on rehearing,No. 75-1619
(10th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' The defendant Sullivent was the driver of a tractor trailer rig which allegedly
struck the decedent Yazzie and apparently dragged his body 18 to 20 miles. Sullivent was
arrested for, and admitted, to drunken driving. Evidence showed erratic driving. Bloodstains were found on the side-board racks of the trailer, on the mud flaps, and on the rear
guard. A discernible trail of blood and body parts extended along the highway. Near the
beginning of the trail, Yazzie's blookstained shirt sleeve was discovered slightly off the
road and between two tracks of the trailer rig. Significantly, there was no direct testimony
concerning the accident and Sullivent claimed to know nothing about any contact with
the body of Yazzie.
I" In a memorandum opinion denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, the New
Mexico District Court stated:
At its most favorable, plaintiffs evidence showed that defendant Sullivent was driving his truck in a negligent manner, and that decedent's body
came into contact with the truck and was dragged by the truck for a number
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On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the majority upheld the
judgment n.o.v. in an opinion written by Judge Barrett, with
Judge Doyle dissenting.' On rehearing the court reversed, and
Judge Doyle, writing for the majority, held that the district court
22
erred in setting aside the jury's verdict.
Judge Barrett and Judge Doyle differ on the role of inference
in showing causation and the legitimacy of the inferences drawn
from the facts in Yazzie. 123 Since there was no direct evidence of
how the accident occurred, Judge Barrett claimed insufficiency
of evidence.' 24 Furthermore, he maintained that finding. a causal
relationship required piling inferences upon inferences and that
12 5
New Mexico law does not permit establishing proof in that way.
On the other hand, Judge Doyle urged a broader use of circumstantial evidence. To sustain the burden of proof, the plaintiff need not prove that his own conduct was not a cause. Rather,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to raise a jury question
where the reasonable person could conclude that it is more probable than not that the event was caused by the defendant.'2
of miles. There is no evidence to show how or why decedent's body came into
contact with the truck or even if decedent was alive at the time his body
came into contact with the truck. In short, there is no evidence that decedent's death was proximately caused by defendant Sullivent's negligence.
No. 75-1619 at 4.
' No. 75-1619 (10th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
' 561 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1977).
123In granting judgment n.o.v., the court must view the evidence most favorable to
the party against whom the motion is made and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Judgment n.o.v. should not be granted where the party
against whom the motion is made presents substantial evidence, but more than a scintilla
of evidence is required. Ahrens v. American-Canadian Beaver Co., 458 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
1972).
4 No. 75-1619 at 6. Judge Barrett refused to find a causal relationship because one
must assume "that Yazzie was walking along the side of the highway in a reasonable
manner, remaining clear of traffic thereon, when Sullivent negligently drove his truck off
the side of the hardtop and struck Yazzie, thereby causing his death." Id. Judge Barrett
proposed alternate explanations that Yazzie was already dead or had crawled into the
spare-tire rack.
11 Id. Judge Barrett cited Adams v. Highland Corp., 450 P.2d 442 (N.M. Ct. App.
1969). However, Wright and Miller do not support the theory of piling inference upon
inference. They state: "There are still traces in the cases of the ancient slogan that an
inference cannot be based on an inference. Modern scholarship has demolished this fallacy
and most courts recognize that there has never been such a rule and, in the nature of
things, could not be." 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2528
(1969). Furthermore, state law ought not to be considered. Id. n.33 at 569.
"' Judge Doyle posited that the sufficiency of evidence is a federal question, and the
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Judge Doyle contended that the most probable theory is that
Yazzie was killed by contact with the truck.' 7 He dismissed the
piling-of-inferences argument and stated that it is the nature of
circumstantial evidence that inferences must be drawn. Judge
Doyle's position seems more persuasive, especially in view of the
philosophy behind judgment n.o.v. of minimum interference with
the jury.
I.

Rule 60(b)

Fleming v. Gulf Oil Corp.'28 began in 1972, when Fleming
sued Gulf for misrepresentation of the value of a business that he
agreed to lease from Gulf. In 1974, the Agrico Corp., which had
been assigned Gulf's rights to the lease contract, won a favorable
judgment against Fleming in another suit to recover rentals and
possession under the same lease. Gulf then filed a motion which
was granted to dismiss Fleming's action against Gulf, based on
the argument that the settling of the Agrico-Fleming matter resolved the Gulf-Fleming matter. 9
31
In 1976,130 Fleming filed a motion for relief under rule 60(b)'
because of Gulf's failure to notify plaintiff of the 1974 motion to
dismiss. The district court denied the motion and this appeal
followed.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Fleming was entitled to
relief from the judgment. It based the decision on two factors.
First, Gulf had received authorization to supplement the record
on appeal; 13 however, instead of supplementing an existing rejudge stated the federal standard. 561 F.2d at 188. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 437 (1959); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696 n.6.
(1962).
'7 "We viewed the speculations as to possibilities such as the decedent being dead
when he was caught up by the trailer or that he had crawled into the spare tire rack as
being no more than guesses or speculations." 561 F.2d at 188.
128 547 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977).
'2 The motion to dismiss and the order to do so are reprinted. Id. at 909.
"
The Tenth Circuit found nothing to indicate that Fleming should have made an
earlier discovery of what had happened to him. Id. at 913.
"I'FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b) states: "[Tihe court may relieve a party ... from a final
judgment ... for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."
'31 Gulf had requested authority to proceed under FED. R. APP. P. 10(c) (allows preparing a new record from the best available means if no report or transcript of the proceedings is available), but no such authority was granted. 547 F.2d at 910.
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cord with documents that had been presented in court or that
accurately reflected the previous proceedings,
Gulf attempted to
33
create a new record for the appeal.

Secondly, rule 60(b)(6) provides relief from a final judgment
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." The judges found that this rule is not limited to fact
situations which would authorize relief under the common law
writs of coram nobis and audita querela.3 In the opinion of the
Tenth Circuit, failure to give notice to the plaintiff denied him a
fair opportunity to be heard. The case had been disposed of by
the trial court without notice and without legal authority;'35 when
these factors were viewed with the appellee's attempt to create a
new record on appeal, the case was one in which relief should be
granted.
In reversing the dismissal, the Tenth Circuit determined that
the trial judge's "positive participation"'' 3 in the dismissal of
plaintiff's appeal precluded that same judge from retrying the
case.
Bernadette M. Bauman
Medora Douden Mayne
Jack R. Olsen
Ervin B. Pickell
Sharon Oxman Roth
Patricia C. Brennan Tisdale
"= An affidavit of appellant's former attorney was "prepared for the occasion" of the
appeal. Id. at 910. Gulf also presented a deposition of appellant which was represented as
having been prepared in July of 1973 and not transmitted with the original record on
appeal. The reporter's cerification indicated, however, that the deposition was, in fact,
transcribed just before its filing in March, 1977.
"'
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
547 F.2d at 913.
"'
Id. at 914. The trial judge furnished a document (in which he made findings in
response to the affidavit in the supplemental record) which described what took place in
January of 1974 at the Agrico-Fleming disposition. At that time, the judge concluded that
the Agrico-Fleming matter also disposed of the Fleming-Gulf matter and that the court
and "all parties ... understood" that to be the situation.

LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW

Few labor cases were presented to the Tenth Circuit during
the 1976-1977 survey period. Those cases brought before the court
were factually routine and afforded little opportunity for the
court to set new trends or to refine existing principles. The treatment herein, therefore, is summary.'
I.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
2
RELATIONS ACT'

BargainingOrders3
In Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB,l the court of appeals
held that there was substantial evidence 5 to support the Board's
finding that the company's actions were proscribed under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.'
The Board had overruled the administrative law judge's recommendation for a new election and had ordered the company to
bargain. In upholding the order, the court relied on its prior broad
reading of the Board's authority to evaluate the necessity for a
bargaining order to overcome the influence of unfair labor practices.' The court noted that, although the evidence as to the impact of the unfair labor practices on the election might appear
sparce, s "[tihe same conduct in a small, closely knit unit, beA.

' Three unpublished cases are not discussed in this overview: Lanning v. Kramer, No.
75-1947 (10th Cir., July 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (Fair Labor Standards
Act); NLRB v. Allied Meat, No. 76-1072 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (bargaining order); Diamond Crystal Salt v. NLRB, No. 76-1091 (10th Cir., Mar.
31, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (bargaining order).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 191-197, 557 (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
4 543 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 742 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)).
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1970).
543 F.2d at 743. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969) affirmed the authority of the Board to go beyond the statutory cease-and-desist
order when deemed necessary and to fashion the appropriate remedy, including a bargaining order, to overcome the effects of unfair labor practices. For Tenth Circuit interpretations of the authority conferred in Gissel, see NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498 (10th Cir.
1973); NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., 417 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
' Thirteen out of twenty employees had signed authorization cards. The union lost
the election five to twelve. 543 F.2d at 741.
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cause of such smallness, might render a fair election unlikely."9
On much the same reasoning and case authority, the court,
in NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.," upheld the Board's finding of unfair labor practices and enforced the bargaining order.
Because the union held a majority by only one set of authorization cards, posing a danger of disenfranchising a majority of employees, the court modified the bargaining order to include notice
to the employees of their statutory right" to petition for a new
election."
In NLRB v. John Zink Co.,' 3 the Board petitioned the court
to have the defendant company held in civil contempt for violating the court's 1973 order enforcing an NLRB order. The matter
was referred to a master from whose decision both parties appealed. The court held that the Board must establish a violation
of a judicial enforcement order by clear and convincing evidence
and that the master's findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous,
were binding.' 5 The court upheld the master's findings and
adopted the master's recommendation for a cease-and-desist
order because there was "a reasonable expectation that the wrong
would be repeated."' 6
7
B. Secondary Boycotts
CarpentersDistrict Council of Southern Colorado v. NLRB 8
arose from an NLRB order holding that the recognition picketing
of a primary construction contractor and the fining of two union
employees of a neutral subcontractor for working behind the
picket line evidenced an impermissible secondary objective. The
administrative law judge had found that the picketing ostensibly
met the criteria enunciated in Moore Dry Dock, thereby raising
I Id. at 744

(citing NLRB v. Scoler's Inc., 466 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1972)).

10 554 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1972).

29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1970).
554 F.2d at 1003.
13 551 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See NLRB v. John Zink Co., No. 74-1254 (10th Cir., June 22, 1973) (Not for Routine
Publication).
15551 F.2d at 801 (citing W.B. Johnston Grain Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir.
1969)).
551 F.2d at 804.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B) (1970).
" 560 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1977).
"
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an inference of primary activity." He had concluded, however,
that the total circumstances dispelled the inference and disclosed
an intent to enmesh the neutral subcontractor and its employees
in the primary dispute.20 The Board had affirmed those findings
and conclusions.
The court ruled that the determination of intent was essentially factual and accepted the Board's findings as supported by
substantial evidence. 2 ' The court concurred in the Board's ruling
that, in this context, the fines imposed on the union members did
not meet legitimate internal union interests. It also declined to
extend the related-work doctrine2 3 to construction industry pick24
eting.
C. Interference with Union Activities:5 The No-Solicitation
Rule
The issue in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing v.
NLRB2 was the extent to which the admittedly special circumstances inherent in a hospital environment permit modification
" Sailors Union of the Pac. (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). The
criteria are:
(a) The picketing is strictly confined to times when the situs of the dispute
is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the
picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business on the
situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location
of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with
the primary employer.
Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
560 F.2d at 1018-19 (citing National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612
(1967); Northeastern Washington-Northern Idaho Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 152
N.L.R.B. 975 (1965)). The administrative law judge found the following specifically indicative of secondary objectives: photographing the site and fining union members for working behind the picket on days when the primary employer was absent from the site; the
hours of picketing; and the union's failure to approach the primary employer for an
agreement prior to picketing. 560 F.2d at 1019 (citations omitted).
21 560 F.2d at 1019 (citing NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977)).
2 560 F.2d at 1020 (citing Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969)).
" The doctrine derives from TUE Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), wherein
the Supreme Court held that the distinction between primary and secondary picketing
turned on the relationship between the normal operations of the primary employer and
the work performed by the secondary employees. The issue arose over picketing of a
reserved gate at a General Electric plant.
21 560 F.2d at 1020 (citing NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675 (1951)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
- 557 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
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of established standards governing solicitation rules. 7 The hospital rule prohibited solicitation on work time in both patient and
visitor access areas and in work areas. It also prohibited distribution of union material in those same areas. Solicitation and distribution were limited effectively to nonworking, employee-only
areas, such as the employee cafeteria.
The NLRB agreed that legitimate hospital purposes permitted prohibition of distribution and of solicitation, even on nonwork time, in strictly patient care areas, such as patients' rooms,
x-ray rooms and therapy rooms. The Board reasoned, however,
that patients well enough to frequent hallways, lounges, and public areas of the hospital were well enough to withstand any
"unsettling effects" of union publicity. The Board further decided that solicitation could not be restricted in employee-only
working areas.
The court of appeals upheld the Board's ruling to the extent
that the rule prohibited solicitation and distribution in work
areas where there was "no commingling of patients and employees. "2 The Board's ruling as to patient access areas, however,
turned upon an evaluation of the relative condition of each patient, which the Tenth Circuit stated was well outside the recognized expertise of the Board. ' The court observed inconsistencies
between the Board's rationale in this case and the recent Mount
Airy FoundationN ruling.
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that the hospital's interest
in purely commercial areas, such as public cafeterias and gift
shops, was not affected by their location in a hospital, thereby
permitting a prohibition on solicitation and distribution in these
areas. 3 1 NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital32 was distinguished largely
' Rules forbidding solicitation during nonworking time and distribution of union
literature in nonworking areas during nonworking time are presumptively invalid.
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
557 F.2d at 1376.
0 Id. at 1373.
217 N.L.R.B. 802 (1975). In that case the Board declined to distinguish between
"direct" and "indirect" patient care for unit-determination purposes, as all employees
were involved in patient care. The Tenth Circuit commented that this interrelation of
operations applied equally to an attempt to distinguish patient-care and nonpatient-care
areas. 557 F.2d at 1373 n.6.
11557 F.2d at 1375 (citing Marriott Corp. (Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978 (1976);
McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404 (1973)).
3 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977).
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on "the very substantial employee use" of the cafeteria and coffee
shop and the apparent absence of comparable employee-only
33
areas.
34
D. JurisdictionalDisputes
Sheet Metal Workers Local 49 v. Los Alamos Constructors,
Inc.3 involved a determination of the appropriate forum for settlement of a dispute over the company's division of work between
sheet metal workers and ironworkers. Plaintiff union filed a grievance with the sheet metal industry dispute forum, the National
Joint Adjustment Board [NJAB], as provided for in its collective bargaining agreement with the defendant. The company declined to participate in the hearing on jurisdictional grounds. The
trial court refused to enforce the resulting award against the company on the grounds that the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes
Board [IJDB] of the Building and Trades Council, AFL-CIO,
with whom all three parties had an agreement to submit jurisdictional disputes, was the appropriate forum. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed.
The court of appeals dismissed the union's claim of limitation on the court's authority to overrule an arbitral decision36 on
the basis that the issue was not the arbitrability of the jurisdictional dispute, but the proper forum for a binding determination.
In rejecting the jurisdiction of the NJAB, the court, relying heavily on the rationale in Local 416 Sheet Metal Workers v. Helgesteel Corp.,37 stated that both prior case law38 and the collective
bargaining agreement itselP required inquiry into pertinent out-

'

554 F.2d at 1375-76 n.7. The Seventh Circuit recently ruled opposite to the Tenth
Circuit on two major points. First, a hospital may prohibit organizational activities in
immediate patient care areas, but not in other patient access areas. Second, the primary
purpose of a hospital is patient care. As such, the more relaxed retail standards do not
apply to purely commercial areas. Lutheran Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 82 LAB.
CAS. (CCH)
10,165 (1977).
29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), 185(c) (1970).
550 F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1977).
The courts "have no business overruling [an arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is different from his" as long as the award "draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 597 (1960).
r 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974).
Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157
(1966), rehearingdenied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967); Sheet Metal Workers v. Aetna Steel Prods.
Corp., 359 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 839 (1966).
1 "Agreements, national in scope between Sheet Metal Workers International Asso-
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side agreements. In its examination of the documentary evidence,
the court ruled that both unions, through affiliation, were bound
by the Trades Council constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the IJDB.40 All of the parties were further bound by their separate agreements with the Council.4 As additional support for its
position, the court noted the deference accorded IJDB decisions
by the NLRB12 and the conditions under which this deference is
permissible.4 3
In response to the union's contention that section 10(k) of the
National Management Relations Act" demonstrates congressional intent for voluntary jurisdictional-dispute settlement, the
court cited case authority indicative of the need for a binding
decision when voluntary attempts fail." The court also dismissed
the union's claim that the defendant's failure to petition the
IJDB when the dispute arose estopped it from raising the jurisdictional claim at trial."8
II.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT

7

In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit in Usery v.
District 22, UMW8 ruled that the union's preliminary support
requirements"9 for qualification as a candidate for district and
subdistrict elections violated the "reasonable opportunity" standard established in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disciation and other international unions, covering work jurisdiction
shall be respected
and applied by the employer ...... 550 F.2d at 1262.
40 Article X of the constitution provides: "All jurisdictional disputes between or
among affiliated . . . unions . . . and employers shall be settled and adjusted according
to the present plan established by the Building & Construction Trades Department ....
Said present plan . . .shall be recognized as final and binding ....
Id. at 1264.
41Id.
" Id.
(citing Don Cartage Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1966)).
550 F.2d at 1264 (citing Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971)).
U 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970).
41 550 F.2d at 1263 (citing NLRB v. Radio & TV Broadcast Engineers Local 1212, 364
U.S. 573 (1961)).
" 550 F.2d at 1265.
47 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
" 543 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1976).
4
Candidacy for a district office required nomination by five locals within the 16-local
district. Candidacy for a subdistrict office required nomination by three locals within the
subdistrict. Subdistrict One was composed of four locals in Wyoming. The 12 locals of
Subdistrict Two were scattered throughout Utah and Arizona. Each local was permitted
to nominate one person for each available position. It was, therefore, possible for a candidate representing a substantial number of employees to fail to qualify. There could be only
one candidate for subdistrict offices in Wyoming. Id. at 747-48.
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closure Act.5 The court recognized the statutory intent of insuring a "free and democratic election"'" and found that the statutory standard did not differ greatly from the standard enunciated
in Storer v. Brown 2 and Williams v. Rhodes" which governs in
political elections. Although the UMW constitution had been
amended immediately after the 1973 elections at issue, so that
the exact situation could not recur, the court reluctantly ordered
new elections for the positions which carried four-year terms.
NORIuS-LA GUARDIA ACT 5
Utilities Services Engineering v. Colorado Building & Construction Trades Council55 involved an allegation of conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and a petition to enjoin
picketing. Utilities Services was a non-union contractor which
employed no one the union wished to represent. Utilities Services
refused to sign an agreement which was not limited to a particular site and which would have required their subcontractors to
honor area wage standards. The defendant picketed Utilities'
worksite on Johns-Manville property. The picketing caused
plaintiff Blackington & Decker's 450 union employees to walk off
the job at another Johns-Manville site located over one mile
away. At the hearing for a temporary restraining order, the trial
court made no express ruling on the legality of the agreement.,
Without admitting evidence, the court dismissed the petition for
a temporary restraining order on the grounds that provisions of
the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited such relief. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of both the temporary restraining order and a
hearing for a preliminary injunction. 7

Ill.

0 "A reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and
every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office
(subject to . . .reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) ....
29 U.S.C. § 481(e)
(1970).
11 543 F.2d at 749 (citing Wirtz v. Local 153, GBBA, 389 U.S. 463 (1968); Wirtz v.
Motel & Club Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968)).
" 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
53 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932).
549 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1977).
9 The Sherman antitrust action is pending in district court. Utilities Servs. Eng'r
v. Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, No. 76-M-447 (D. Colo., filed May 23, 1976).
0 Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a secondary boycott charge with the NLRB. The
administrative law judge ruled that the agreement, which exempted employees in a collective bargaining relationship and which was not limited to the jobsite, was not designed to
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After reviewing relevant case authority, 8 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the controversy arose from a labor dispute within
the meaning of the statute. 5' Since admittedly no fraud or violence marred the publicity picketing and, inasmuch as the pickets had been removed, obviating any immediate threat of harm,
the court found no grounds for interference under 29 U.S.C. section 104.60
The court also dismissed plaintiff's claim that an injunction
should issue on the allegation of an unlawful agreement. Mere
allegation of a statutory violation has repeatedly been held insufficient to overcome the Norris-La Guardia proscription on injunctions.6' The court distinguished Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW on its
facts. 2 Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that a union
is subject to antitrust laws in negotiating agreements with contractors relative to subcontractors, 3 the Court did not address the
propriety of an injunction where the agreement is found to be
illegal.6 4 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, declined to anticipate that
preserve unit work or to maintain area standards. The thrust, instead, was to foster "topdown" organizing in violation of sections 8(3) and 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. The administrative law judge relied heavily on Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975); see n.63, infra.
0 549 F.2d at 175, 176 (citing New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 202 U.S.
552 (1938); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960)).
"
29 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 113(c) (1970).
549 F.2d at 177 (citing Taxi-Cab Drivers Local 889 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co.,
123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941)).
11Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (Sherman Act);
Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) (Sherman Act); Milk
Wagon Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) (Sherman Act);
Lee Way Motor Freight Lines v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1942)
(Motor Carrier Act).
0 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The Supreme Court ruled that an injunction could issue where
the union, with a view to increasing members' wages, combined with electrical contractors
and manufacturers to restrain competition in the marketing of electrical goods. The effect
of the agreement was to bar the sale within New York City of electrical equipment manufactured elsewhere.
0 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
Connell arose out of facts nearly identical to those in Utilities Services. In a five-to-four
decision, the Court ruled that the agreement "indiscriminately excluded non-union subcontractors from a portion of the market" irrespective of the source of their competitive
advantage, if any. Id. at 623. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the
agreement violated the Sherman Act.
" Id. at 637 n.19.
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the Supreme Court would retreat from prior rulings holding allegations alone insufficient to justify interference. 5
Sandra D. Besseghini
u 549 F.2d at 178.

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Circuit was surprisingly idle in this area of heightened regional activity. Little litigation in natural resources
reached the federal appellate level; those cases that were decided
all involved oil and gas (and the derivative product of helium),
and not mining. Public lands and environmental law-the other
two areas addressed in this section-yielded even fewer decisions
in the Tenth Circuit, although it is to be expected that 1977's
congeries of new federal legislation' will shortly begin generating
important cases in both fields.
Noteworthy Tenth Circuit lands and natural resources decisions are described below. Two in particular may have farreaching consequences. In Backus v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co., 2 state ability to regulate natural gas pipelines was

shown to be significantly hedged by constitutional restraints. In
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,3 the court, by finding an implied
reservation of federal easements of access, created a potentially
troublesome federal incursion on some private lands that adjoin
the public domain.
I.

NATURAL RESOURCES

The Tenth Circuit decided four cases of interest in the natural resources area. In Marathon Oil Co. v. Kleppe,I Judge McWilliams held that water injection wells located off the participating
area may be counted in determining the royalty owed to the
United States. The royalty is calculated by dividing the average
daily production of all wells by the total number of wells, and
subjecting the result to the percentage rates specified by the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 1977); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 7 ENmV. L. REP. 42,401
(1977) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1977); Clean Air Act, as amended, 7 Ew.m. L. REP.
42,201 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West 1977).
558 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1977).
No. 76-1138 (10th Cir., May 17, 1977).
556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977).
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lease.5 Thus it is to the lessee's advantage to have the nonproducing, water-injection wells included in the total number of wells.,
The court decided to include the well not located in the participating area based on the following: The plain meaning of the
governing regulation and unit agreement, a refusal to resort to
technical grammatical interpretation, and the policy of encouraging the most efficient production techniques, including off-area
injection wells.7
In the second case, McCombs v. FederalPower Commission,
the Tenth Circuit decided that a formal application is not essential to an abandonment under section 7(b) of the Natural Gas
Act.' The parties' recognition of the gas well's depletion and the
Commission's participation in that recognition through two letters requesting a formal application were deemed by the court to
be sufficient for abandonment.' 0 The holding of abandonment in
McCombs meant that, although the abandoned tract had previously been certified for interstate service, new wells, on the
same tract, discovered several years after abandonment were not
subject to the certification and so could be used freely for intrastate service without violation of the Natural Gas Act."
In another oil and gas decision, Judge Breitenstein in Backus
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.' 2 held unconstitutional an

Oklahoma statute" which required pipeline companies to furnish
gas on request to landowners whose land the pipeline crossed. The
statute violated the commerce clause" because it operated to
"withdraw a large volume of gas from an established interstate
current,"" and so interfered with interstate commerce." The
5 Id. at 983. The provision setting the royalties in this case is found at 30 C.F.R. §
221.49 (1977), quoted in 556 F.2d at 984. As a similar provision was incorporated in one
of the unit agreements before the court, the agreement provision was controlling in that
instance. 556 F.2d at 983.
556 F.2d at 983.
Id. at 984-86.
542 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1976).

15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
IS

542 F.2d at 1148-49.

Id. at 1149. The certification provisions of the Natural Gas Act appear at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f (1976).
I2 558 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1977).
* OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 10 (1971).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
IS 558 F.2d at 1375 (quoting FPC v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 406 U.S. 621,
633 (1922)).

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES

1978

court considered the possible cumulative effect of service to the
landowners to be substantial enough to bring the statute within
the commerce clause, even though the service to any one
landowner would probably be insignificant."
The Oklahoma statute was also violative of the supremacy
clause,'" since it "frustrated the full effectiveness"'" of the Natural Gas Act. 0 The Act gives the Federal Power Commission authority to regulate, among other things, natural gas pipeline companies." The Oklahoma provision trespassed the Commission's
authority by creating an exception to its jurisdiction," and so was
unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. The court noted
additionally that the Commission had previously acted in the
area of service to those whose lands were crossed by pipelines.2
The area was thus pre-empted by the federal agency, and the
state could exercise no authority.
The other major case in the natural resources area this year,
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.," dealt with the purchase price of helium under the Helium Act.21 The majority opinion, written by Judge Seth, held that the price paid to the owners
of the helium, extracted from natural gas and sold to the United
States, is determined by the "work-back method. 26 The Tenth
Circuit rejected the market price-comparable sales method because there is no free market in helium gas and other sales of
helium were not comparable.Y Expert testimony as to the value
of the helium was rejected as mere opinion.2
In applying the work-back method, the court noted that elements of proper starting value from which to "work-back," return
6

558 F.2d at 1375.
Id.

"

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 654 (1971), cited at 558 F.2d at 1376.
15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
21Id. § 717.
" 558 F.2d at 1376.
2 Id. at 1375 (citing Northern Natural Gas Co., F.P.C. Op. No. 773 (Aug. 13, 1976)).
24 554 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1977). The court also considered the procedural issues of
limitations, prejudgment interest, attorneys fees, and choice of law. Id. at 389-92. Judge
Doyle dissented, objecting to the use of the work-back method. Id. at 393-98.
- 50 U.S.C. §§ 167-167n (1970).
" 554 F.2d at 387-88.
" Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
"
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on investment, costs allocable to gas production, and various
other factors should be considered.29 The result of the work-back
method is not tied to any contract price for helium negotiated
between the natural gas producer and the government, 30 and in
the Ashland case the method appeared to result in a higher value
than that agreed upon between the gas producer (Phillips) and
the government. 3'
II. PUBLIC LANDS
In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States32 the United States appealed a summary judgment in favor of the Leo Sheep Companya3
for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Quiet Title Act.
Appellees, who owned certain odd-numbered section of land as
successors-in-title to the Union Pacific Railroad, claimed that the
United States unlawfully entered their property by blading a road
across their section corners in order to give the public access to
interlocking sections of public domain.
Reversing the Wyoming District Court, the Tenth Circuit
found that in the original grant of land to the railroad in 1862,
"Congress by implication intended to reserve an easement to permit access to the even-numbered sections which were surrounded
by the lands granted to the railroad. '34 If the contrary were true,
the court continued, the remaining public domain lands would
have been inaccessible and under the railroad's exclusive control,
35
a state of affairs Congress could not have intended.
In support of their finding of an implied easement, the court
cited the Unlawful Inclosures Act of 1885,'3 which outlawed obstruction of passage over or through the public lands, and three
early cases. The cases forbid fencing of private lands in such a
manner as to encircle government lands, 37 and allowed a passage
2

Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 389.
I'
Id.

No. 76-1138 (10th Cir., May 17, 1977).
28 U.S.C. § 2409a (Supp. II. 1972).
No. 76-1138 slip. op. at 8.
0 Id. at 8.
- 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1970).
" Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
'
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for sheep trailing over the privately-owned interlocking sections
to reach pasturage on publicly owned lands.The dissent argued that the majority misstated the issue"whether the United States may take the private land for access
purposes without compensation"-and argued that the government had not claimed such an easement for 110 years."'
Plains Electric Generation & Transmission Coop. v. Pueblo
of Laguna removed a lingering threat to the sovereignty of Pueblo
lands in New Mexico. Plains brought a condemnation action for
an electrical transmission line and substation right-of-way
through lands held by the Laguna Pueblo. Jurisdiction was based
on the Act of May 10, 1926,1' which allowed condemnation of
Pueblo lands in accord with New Mexico law for any public purpose. The Pueblo and the United States' motion for dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction was denied by the New Mexico District
Court.4 2 The Tenth Circuit reversed and dismissed the case, finding that the 1926 Act had been repealed by implication and that
the district court was without jurisdiction.
The court voted that, although repeals by implication are not
favored, the legislative history and congressional intent of the Act
of April 21, 1928,'4 demonstrated that the Act was intended to be
a substitute for the 1926 Act, thereby replacing it. The earlier act
had been passed to allow the state to get a right-of-way for a
railroad through the plaza of the Pueblo. The railroad was built
before a New Mexico district judge found the 1926 Act to be
insufficient to authorize condemnation because there was no
mechanism to join the United States as a party." Congress passed
the 1928 Act to give its ratification to the already existing railroad
and to allow future rights-of-way through the Pueblo "under such
rules, regulations and conditions as the Secretary of the Interior
may prescribe." 5 The Tenth Circuit found that Congress' method

n Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S.

320 (1890); Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 219 F.2d 116 (8th

Cir. 1914).
" No. 76-1138 slip. op. at 1-2 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
542 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Act of May 10, 1926, 44 Stat. 498.
42 542 F.2d at 1376.
,3 Act of April 21, 1928, 45 Stat. 422, 25 U.S.C. § 322 (1970).
542 F.2d at 1377.
25 U.S.C. § 322 (1970).
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did not amend the earlier act, but supplanted it, since if the 1926
Act were still in effect, the section of the 1928 Act requiring the
Secretary of Interior's permission would be without effect."
The New Mexico judge dissented, saying that the Pueblo and
the United States had not adequately met the burden of proof
necessary to demonstrate repeal by implication.
The remaining case of interest in the public lands area is
Boyd v. United States.18 Plaintiffs alleged an agreement made
with a Corps of Engineers attorney to exchange Boyd's piece of
property, which would be required for a Corps flood control project, for property not required by the project which had been
purchased by the Corps was binding on the government. However, sole authority to exchange government land for private
property in relation to river improvement rests with the Secretary
of the Army." Since the Secretary did not approve, the agreement
was without effect. The Tenth Circuit relied on longstanding
principles to find that "unauthorized acts of government agents
cannot result in the government's loss of its property."50
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The Clean Air Act 5 and the Federal Water Pollution Control
5
2
Act produced no Tenth Circuit decisions, and the 1977 amendments to the former have, or course, yet to make their effects felt.
Likewise, federal acts for the preservation of wilderness or wildlifess gave rise to no Tenth Circuit cases in 1977, and the "second
generation" of federal act" remain too recent for Tenth Circuit
interpretations. The only two environmental law decisions of 1977
both arose under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
542 F.2d at 1379.
"

Id. at 1381 (Seth, J., dissenting).

No. 76-1398 (10th Cir., July 18, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
33 U.S.C. § 558b (1970).
No. 76-1398 at 9.
4' 7 ENvuR. L. REP. 42201 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642).
4 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (Supp. 1975).
13 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1970); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1970); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(Supp. 1975).
" Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 1977); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 7 ENVm. L. REP. 42401 (1977) (to be codified
in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j9 (Supp. 1975);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (1977).
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5 and they, in the main, only refine established, though
(NEPA)1
controversial, Tenth Circuit constructions of that legislation.
In League of Women Voters v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,5" the Tenth Circuit prolonged a split in the circuits by
applying the irreparable harm test for a preliminary injunction
pending a decision on whether an environmental impact statement is required. The League had requested an injunction of
contract negotiations between the Corps of Engineers and the
City of Tulsa concerning water storage rights in the Oolagah Reservoir.5" The League sought the injunction separately from its
principal suit challenging the Corps' failure to file an EIS with
regard to the contract.
Judge McWilliams, in allowing the principal suit to proceed
without halting the contract negotiations in the meantime, relied
on the conventional preliminary injunction test of irreparable
harm.5 8 The district court had found that, as the contract was
only at the negotiation stage, no immediate and irreparable harm
could be shown. 5" The Tenth Circuit affirmed that finding, as no
abuse of discretion was indicated, 0 and affirmed the denial of the
injunction.
In adverting to the irreparable harm test, Judge McWilliams
cited four cases,' none of which dealt with NEPA. That the subject matter of the requested injunction was merely an unsigned
contract, and nothing more irrevocable, did provide a reasonable
context for invoking this test. 2 Even so, other circuits have
adopted a special test for preliminary injunctions under NEPA:
A preliminary injunction pending a decision on the need for or
adequacy of an EIS requires only a showing that a major federal
action is involved. 3 In other words, a prima facie showing that
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1970) (hereinafter cited as NEPA).
" No. 77-1401 (10th Cir., Aug. 19, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id. at 2.
" Id. at 4. The court did not find it necessary to reach the other traditional preliminary injunction issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

" Id. at 3.

0 Id. at 4.
" Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc. 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975); Tape Head Co. v.
RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969).
' But see National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1971), where
the Tenth Circuit held that contract termination was sufficient to require an EIS.
" See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975). See
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NEPA has been violated warrants a preliminary injunction.0 ' The
court could have analyzed the unsigned contract as not being a
major federal action significantly affecting the environment, 5 but
instead chose to remain indifferent to injunction exigencies under
6 by applying the standard of irreparable harm.
NEPA1
In Manygoats v. Kleppel7 an injunction was sought against
the performance of an agreement, approved by the Department
of Interior, between the Navaho Tribe and Exxon Corporation for
the mining of uranium on 400,000 acres of tribal land. Seventeen
members of the tribe challenged the adequacy of the EIS filed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs relating to the mining lease. 8 Judge
Breitenstein affirmed the denial of the injunction on the ground
that the EIS was adequate.
After holding that, under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Navaho Tribe need not have been joined, 9
the court reviewed the adequacy of the EIS under the three-part
test of National Helium Corp. v. Morton:0
(1) Whether [the statement] discusses all of the five procedural
requirements of NEPA.
(2) Whether the environmental impact statement constitutes an
objective good faith complaince with the demands of NEPA.
(3) Whether the statement contains a reasonable discussion of the
subject matter involved in the five required areas."

The court stated that the EIS was adequate as to each part and
also Note, Injunctions, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the Fourth
Circuit's Chimera of Revocability, 60 IoWA L. Rlv. 362 (1974), and F. ANDERSON, NEPA
IN THE Coutrs 240 (1973). It appears that only the Tenth and Fourth Circuits have backed
away from the per se rule for preliminary injunctions under NEPA.
"1 Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Hwy. Auth., 563 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir.
1972).
See Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974); Note,
EnvironmentalLaw-The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Standardof Review
of Agency Action in the Tenth Circuit, 52 DEN. L.J. 299, 305-07 (1975). League of Women
Voters may be read as enforcing the Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to view agency inaction
as a negative EIS determination, although that issue was not reached.
" In an earlier case, Vivant v. Trans-Delta Oil & Gas Co., Nos. 74-1115, 74-1116 (10th
Cir., Nov. 27, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit also applied the
irreparable harm test under NEPA.
'7 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977).
' The court confirmed that mining leases of Indian lands do engage NEPA requirements. Id. at 557.
'
?0

Id. at 559.

486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).

11558 F.2d at 560.
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rejected each of the plaintiffs' six objections to it."
The case may be criticized for utilizing the National Helium
test to effect excessively low standards for EIS adequacy. Inquiry
into three of the objections was avoided through the court's characterization of them as "conflicting scientific findings. 7' 3 EIS
consideration of the cumulative effect of the project with other
resource development projects was not required because to do so
would involve "prophecy beyond the capabilities of both scientists and courts. . . .It is enough that the EIS mentions and
discusses foreseeable problems." 4 The court appeared to be secure in its less than extensive scrutiny of this EIS because of the
project's "continuing federal control."7 5 That federal supervision
will prevent environmental depredations by Exxon is, perhaps,
arguable. And, at any rate, the intent of NEPA is that the EIS
be a method of guaranteeing that federal action is deliberate,
prudent, and informed of risks to the environment. Thus, that a
private action will be federally supervised ought not to excuse a
superficial EIS.
Manygoats is significant in two regards: (1) Because the case
was not dismissed for nonjoinder of the tribe, it is apparent that
the Tenth Circuit will treat Indian lands under NEPA in the
same way as any other lands, and not through special supervision
by the tribe; (2) the National Helium standard of review of an
EIS will be characterized by deference to the agency.
Baine Kerr
Wendy Bush
BarbaraBill
'

Id. at 560-61.

Id. at 560. These objections concerned inadequate discussion of dewatering, tailings
seepage, and permanent contamination of aquifers. Id.
" Id. at 560-61.
13

71Id.at 561.

SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the past term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed five decisions' brought under the federal securities
laws.2 Of these five decisions, Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns & Co. was the most
important.3 The following comment will focus exclusively on the
Utah State University decision.
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF EXCHANGE,
ASSOCIATION, AND FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD RULES

In Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science
v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,' the plaintiff-University brought eight
companion appeals from judgments dismissing actions against
various brokerage houses for losses sustained in certain securities
transactions. 5 In the district court, the plaintiff had presented
I Pollution Control & Eng'r Corp. v. Lange, No. 76-1338 (10th Cir., July 11, 1977)
(Not for Routine Publication) (a discussion of the elements of section 10(b)); Chandler
v. Kew, Inc., No. 76-1083 (10th Cir., April 19, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication)
("economic reality" of the sale of all the stock was a sale of a business not a security);
SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976) (naked commodity options are securities but are governed by the CFTC); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller
and Danneberg Explor., Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965
(1977) (fractional oil and gas interests offered in their entirety are not securities).
I See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj (1970).
549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 264 (1977).
Id.
' Utah State University (USU) is a land grant university operating under the Constitution of the State of Utah. The defendants in the lower court suits were (1) Bear, Stearns
& Co., (2) Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., (3) Bosworth, Sullivan & Co., (4) Hornblower &
Weeks - Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., (5) Shearson, Hammil & Co., (6) Sutro & Co., (7) Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. All of these brokerage firms were members of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). In 1972, the governors of USU
adopted a resolution allowing USU to maintain brokerage accounts, with two named
officers to act thereunder by resolution. The resolution was to remain in effect until notice
of termination was delivered to the brokers. During the subsequent year, Catron, one of
the named officers, opened various accounts. The assistant attorney general of Utah
declared that some of Catron's securities transactions were illegal. USU ordered Catron
to stop purchasing securities. Catron did not stop until four months later when USU sent
notice of revocation of Catron's authority to the brokerage firms. USU filed suit against
the brokers to recover its losses. Id. at 165-67.
It must be emphasized at the outset, that the rules and statutes, as analyzed in this
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three alternative arguments in support of recovery: (1) Violations
of rules 405 and 411 of the New York' (NYSE) and American
Stock (AMEX) Exchanges,' and violations of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice;" (2)
violations of Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board;9 and, (3)
violation of section 10(b),10 the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 The district court dismissed the first
and second claims on the grounds that no implied private right
of action existed for violation of such rules. The court also found
that the plaintiff failed to support his section 10(b) claim." On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, although it rejected the district court's position that violation of
exchange and association rules never gives rise to a private cause
of action.
comment, are those that were effective during the period under examination. No attempt
is made to analyze the impact of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The impact of the Act on the area of SEC supervision of exchange
and association promulgation of rules is expected to be far-reaching. See Castruccio &
Tischler, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation-1975, 31 Bus. LAw. 1855, 188485 (1976); Rowen, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975: A Legislative History, 3 Sac.
RFG. L.J. 329 (1976). The Supreme Court's mode of analysis should remain the same,
however, whether one is looking at implied private rights of action before or after the 1975
Act.
, Rule 405 provides, "Every member organization is required . . . to (1) Use due
diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or
margin account . . . and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried.
... Rule 405, reprinted in [1973] 2 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUmE (CCH)
1 2405.
7 Rule 411 is the American Stock Exchange's equivalent to NYSE Rule 405. See
(1973] 2 Am. -STOCK EXCH. GUIDE (CCH) 9431.
Article Ill, Section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice requires that:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs.
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. l, § 2, [1976] NASD MANuA (CCH) 2152.
1 Regulation T concerns the extension of credit by brokers and dealers to their customers. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-130 (1977). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970), regulation
X was also promulgated. See 12 C.F.R. § 224.1-.6 (1977). Regulation X makes it illegal
for a customer to obtain, receive, or enjoy credit in violation of Federal Reserve Board
Regulations. Id. § 224.1.
, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
The plaintiff's complaint also alleged various pendent claims under state laws, but
no questions were raised on appeal concerning these matters. 549 F.2d at 166-67.
,2 549 F.2d at 167.
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This comment will examine two rather disturbing aspects of
the Utah State University decision. First, the court appears to
have confused the very subtle but basic distinction between the
concepts of creating an implied private right of action and defining or identifying the elements of that action. Second, the method
of analysis employed by the court in its examination of the
"Know Your Customer"'" and "Suitability"' 4 rules is so noticeably dissimilar from the analytical framework employed by the
Supreme Court in recent securities law opinions that the precedential value of Utah State University is highly suspect.
This comment will focus on these two questions and will
discuss the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the section 10(b) question
only with respect to its impact on the court's analysis of the
exchange and association rules. To adequately understand the
analytical framework in the Utah State University decision, one
must examine the divergent lines of the development case law.
I.

NYSE, AMEX,

NASD RULES: IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION
The issue of whether violations of exchange and association
rules give rise to an implied private right of action is a relatively
recent concern. 15 The federal courts have come to differing, often
opposite, conclusions during this issue's short eleven-year hisAND

" "Know Your Customer" has become the accepted title of rule 405 of the NYSE and
rule 411 of the AMEX, supra notes 6 and 7. For a discussion of these rules see Hoblin,
Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered
Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 253 (1970); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DEN. L.J. 63 (1970); Wolfson and Russo, The Stock
Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CAL. L. REv. 1120
(1970); Comment, The "Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of BrokerDealers Under the UCC and FederalSecurities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489.
" The "Suitability rule" has become a shorthand phrase for Art. Il, § 2 of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice. See note 8 supra. For a general discussion of the rule see
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE L.J. 445; Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD
Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. R~v. 15 (1969); Note, Implied Civil Liability Arising From
Violation of the Rules of the NationalAssociation of SecuritiesDealers, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rev.
151 (1975); Comment, Civil Liability for Violations of NASD Rules, SEC v. First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. REv. 388 (1973).
, The development of this issue began with the decision of Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). In ColonialRealty,
Judge Friendly traced the development in earlier decisions of a related question, implied
civil liability of a stock exchange for failure to enforce rules adopted pursuant to section
6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 181.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

tory.' Although the courts have applied or developed many different "legal tests" to apply to the facts before them, all of these
tests appear to be variations on, or hybrids of, two decisions of
the late 1960's.
The first test was formulated by Judge Friendly in the 1966
decision, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. In Colonial
Realty, 7 the plaintiff urged that violations of Article III, section
1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice 8 afforded an investor an
implied private right of action. The court qualified its rejection
of the plaintiff's argument by noting:
[Wihether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for violation
of exchange or dealer . . . rules .
simplistic all-or-nothing basis ....

.

. cannot be determined on the
[T]he court must look to the

nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme
.*.

.

The case for implication would be strongest when the rule

imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law. The rules
here at issue, however, are near the opposite pole."9
" The federal courts have split on the issue of whether exchange and association rules
may give rise to an implied private right of action. For a discussion of why such an action
has been rejected see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1977);
Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975); Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411,
418-20 (D. Minn. 1977); Parsons v. Horblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes [1976-19771
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,885, at 91,249-50 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 1977); Zagari v. Dean
Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809-13 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 1976); Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 889-90 (D.
Conn. 1976); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-19751 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,021, at 97,581-82 (S.D.N.Y. March 11, 1975); Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., [19741975] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 at 96,715 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 1974); Golob v.
Nauman Vandervoort, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
For decisions recognizing that violations of exchange or association rules may give rise
to a private cause of action, see Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160
(8th Cir. 1977); Lincoln Commodity Services v. Meade, 558 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1977);
Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974); Faturik v. Woodmere
Securities, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 894, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon
& Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Evans v. Kerbes & Co., 411 F. Supp.
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); NYSE v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
These cases represent only a limited survey of the judicial responses to the implied
private right of action issue. See notes 13 and 14 supra for a discussion of these general
concepts.
" 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
, Id. at 180. This section of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides that "A
member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade." NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. m, § 1,

NASD MANUAL (CCH)

,1 358 F.2d at 182.

2151 (1973).
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Judge Friendly reached this conclusion by an analysis of certain
factors which had been developed in past cases examining the
potential existence of an implied private right: (1) whether an
explicit condemnation of certain conduct existed, (2) whether a
general grant of jurisdiction to enforce the liabilities created by
the statute could be found, (3) whether a duty to effectuate the
federal policies of the Act were present, and (4) whether existing
judicial and administrative remedies to effectuate those policies
had proven ineffective. 0 Superimposed upon this analytical
framework was Judge Friendly's additional concern for the potential impact that the recognition of implied civil liability might
have on the self-regulatory plan formulated by Congress for bro2
kers and dealers. 1
The second bellweather test was formulated by Judge Cummings in 1969, in Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 22Purporting to apply the Colonial Realty test 2i to the
question of whether violations of the "Know Your Customer" rule
gave rise to an implied private right of action, Judge Cummings,
in effect, fashioned a new two-element test, requiring consideration only of whether the particular rule in question "was designed
for the direct protection of investors," and whether the particular
defendant's conduct had been "tantamount to fraud. 2 Qualifying this test by noting that a violation of the "Know Your CusId. at 181. The court found these factors to have been decisive in J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d
Cir. 1951), and Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944), (all dealing with implied private rights of action under various provisions of
the federal securities laws).
" See 358 F.2d at 182-83. The self-regulatory nature of exchanges and associations
was amply supported by the recent congressional statement that "[tihe self-regulatory
roles of the exchanges and the NASD have been major elements of the regulatory scheme
of the Exchange Act since 1934 and 1938, respectively." SECURIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF
1975, S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 179, 201. See also REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE
SECURImES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95 Pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
In Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 349-61 (1963), the Supreme Court went to some lengths
to discuss the self-regulatory scheme devised by Congress.
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
2 Id. at 142. Judge Cummings quoted the specific language of the Colonial Realty
opinion that may be found in the text accompanying note 19 supra. In addition, Judge
Cummings noted that "[sluch a breach of fair practice undermines the protection of
investors and surely 'play[s] an integral part in SEC regulation' of Exchanges and their
members. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.
(citation omitted)."
2' Id. at 142-43.
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tomer" rule was not per se actionable, Judge Cummings believed
that the conduct before him was sufficient to give rise to an implied private right of action. 5
As noted earlier, the federal courts have split, both in the
results they have reached on this issue and in the "legal test" they
have applied.26 The courts within the Tenth Circuit have fared no
better in their analysis of the problem.
The first federal court within the Tenth Circuit to address
the issue of whether violations of exchange and association rules
give rise to an implied private right of action was the tenth Circuit Court of Appeals itself in Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co. 7 In
dictum, Judge Seth cited the Buttrey decision with approval, and
noted: "[W]hile we recognize that in an appropriate case, violations of exchange rules designed for customer protection might
give rise to a private cause of action . . . such a case is not now
before us." 2 Without mentioning the second "tantamount to
fraud" element of the Buttrey test, or the reason for the court's
adoption of the Buttrey test over the Colonial Realty test, the
court resolved the case on traditional agency law principles."
One month after Ocrant, in October of 1974, the Utah Federal District Court rejected an implied private right of action for
violation of the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules.
Without any mention of Ocrant, Judge Anderson, writing for the
court in Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc.,-3 relied solely on Judge
Friendly's analytical framework in Colonial Realty. 3' The court,
Id. at 142. It is interesting to note that what may have been envisioned as merely
a variation of the Colonial Realty test in the Buttrey decision has come to be viewed as a
separate and totally distinct test. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 164-66 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 418-19 (1977), Zagari
v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,807-09 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 1976). See also, Hoblin, supra note 13, at 258-66; MacLean, supra note 13,
at 66-71; Wolfson and Russo, supra note 13, at 1126-33.
0 See notes 13-16, 25 supra.
" 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974).
n Id. at 858.

0 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Subsequently Ocrant has been cited for
the proposition that the violation of certain exchange rules may give rise to an implied
private right of action. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. at
1040; Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Zagari v. Dean Witter
& Co., [1976-19771 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,808.
[1974-19751 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 (D. Utah, Oct. 1, 1974).
31Id. at 96,714-15. The plaintiff alleged violations of Art. m, §§ 1, 2 of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, rule 405 of the NYSE, and rule 411 of AMEX. It is interesting to
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only briefly adverting to the Seventh Circuit (Buttrey) rule, rejected the Buttrey test and adopted Colonial Realty on the
grounds that the latter better differentiated between mere ethical
standards of professional service and rules designed to prevent
32
fraud.
This rejection was followed, in time, by the Wyoming District Court's recognition of an implied private right of action for
violation of the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules
in Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, and Curtis, Inc. 31 In contrast
to State of Utah, Judge Kerr, in Geyer, relied almost exclusively
upon the Ocrant and Buttrey decisions. 34 Citing Mercury Investment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Judge Kerr distinguished
Colonial Realty on the grounds that that decision involved a violation of Article III, section 1 of the NASD rules rather than rule
405. In a perceptive analysis of Colonial Realty, the court noted
that Judge Friendly had not rejected an implied private right of
action for violation of all exchange or association rules, but rather
had rejected such actions only for those "catch-all" rules based
on vague adjurations of general forms of conduct.3 Relying heavily on the Buttrey analysis, Judge Kerr termed Article III, section
1 of the NASD rules a "house-keeping" rule as opposed to a
specific rule creating a duty on the part of brokers to directly
protect investors from fraudulent conduct. 7 In the Geyer opinion,
note that the court erroneously adopted the Colonial Realty test based on its interpretation that the test would give rise to an implied private action only when fraud was proved.
Id. The court never discussed why the same was not true for the Buttrey test, especially
in view of its "tantamount to fraud" second element.
11Id. at 96,715.
13 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975).
" Id. at 683.
" 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1969). The Texas court noted: "Colonial did
not issue a blanket holding that such dealer rules could never give rise to federal civil
liability."
' The court noted that in contrast to Art. III, § 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice,
the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules were "quite precise" and had
"among their purposes the protection of the investing public." 389 F. Supp. at 683. Art.
m, § 1, in contrast merely precluded conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade." See note 18 supra.
" 389 F. Supp. at 683. The court stated that the Securities Acts, "although designed
to protect the investor, are essentially directed at fraud. In holding that the rules in
dispute are actionable, the Court does not mean to imply that mere negligence . . . will
" Id.
suffice to sustain an action ....
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the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules were found
to fall into the latter category.
In Thompson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., the Western District of Oklahoma held the "Know Your
Customer" rules to be nonactionable by a private investor."
Without any discussion in the opinion of the case law behind this
issue, Judge Eubanks granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment after plaintiff conceded the nonactionability of the rule
in question. 0
The most recent attempt by a court within the Tenth Circuit
to resolve the issue of whether violations of the NASD's
"Suitability" rule give rise to an implied private right of action
occurred in Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., a
Northern District of Oklahoma decision." Again without any discussion of the case law, Judge Cook simply noted that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate even negligence on the part of the
broker-defendant, or that the broker's conduct was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's loss. The plaintiff's allegation that the defendant had made an unsuitable investment was therefore denied.,
From this extremely weak intra-circuit district court line of
analysis, the Tenth Circuit attempted to resolve the lower court
split in Utah State University. Following is discussion of Judge
Breitenstein's analysis.
A.

II. UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Exchange and Association Rules
After recognizing the split existing in the Tenth Circuit as a

Geyer was cited with approval in Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp.
at 1041. The Geyer decision was criticized in Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414
F. Supp. at 890, where the court noted: "While the SEC's view of a broker-dealer's duty
to supervise his employees is certainly of some significance, adoption of a rule imposing
stringent standards of conduct does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that a federal
court ought to create the basis for a lawsuit in damages for breach of that rule."
401 F. Supp. 111, 112 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
, There is no indication in the opinion as to why the plaintiff conceded this highly
questionable issue. Thompson has only been cited twice since it was decided, but neither
subsequent case discussed the actionability of exchange rules. See Franke v. Midwestern
Okl. Development Authority, 428 F. Supp. 719, 723 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Vacca v. Intra
Mgmt. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
" 413 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
42 Id. at 384. The Marshak decision has not been cited in any subsequent decision.
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result of the decisions discussed above,' 3 Judge Breitenstein disposed of the implied private right of action issue in summary
fashion:
In Ocrant

..

by way of dicta, and citing Buttrey, we recognized

that "in an appropriate case, violations of exchange rules designed
for customer protection might give rise to a private cause of action
The statement in Ocrant is pertinent. In an appropriate case a
rule violation may give rise to a private cause of action.
Applying the statements of the Court to claims asserted under
association and exchange rules, something more than mistake or
negligence must be shown . .

.

.The allegations, taken separately

or together, are not Tantamount to fraud."

Without expressly so stating, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
5 It is different to determine
Buttrey test in toto. 4
from reading the
opinion, however, whether the court felt compelled to include the
"tantamount to fraud" element in its analysis because of the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Buttrey, or the recent Supreme
47
Court decision of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder," or both.
Two criticisms may be leveled at Judge Breitenstein's mode
of analysis. First, there is little guidance in Utah State
University, for distinguishing rules "designed for customer protection" from those rules aimed at accomplishing other purposes.
One could take the position that, all the rules of exchanges and
associations exhibit some degree of concern for the "protection of
'1

549 F.2d at 168.

44 Id.

,3See text accompanying note 24 supra.
" 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
' The "tantamount to fraud" element has been a prominent aspect of many decisions
applying the Buttrey test. Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975). See, e.g.,
Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160. The Tenth Circuit, however, has
never cited this element as mandated by the Buttrey test. See notes 38, 31, and accompanying text supra. See the discussion of Ocrant, text accompanying note 28 supra.
In contrast to the lack of any mention of Buttrey, Judge Breitenstein devoted extensive space to Ernst & Ernst, citing the legislative history behind the Supreme Court's
position that conduct is actionable under section 10(b) only if fraudulent. 549 F.2d at 168.
This analogy is highly suspect, however, for Congress had no intentions regarding the
purpose and scope of rules promulgaed by an exchange or association. A counter argument
can even be made that to make only fraudulent conduct actionable under exchange and
association rules would be merely duplicative of section 10(b). See Zagari v. Dean Witter
& Co., 11976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,812; Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F.
Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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customers."'48 If this is so, the Tenth Circuit has made no attempt
to identify those factors which will help in determining the actionability of a specific rule.
Perhaps, this failure to identify such criteria is more a shortcoming of the Buttrey test, itself, than something peculiar to the
Tenth Circuit.'9 An example of the guidance that could have been
offered by the Utah State University decision may be found in
Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. w In that opinion
Judge Kerr attempted to distinguish "house-keeping rules," such
as the composition and election of the board of governors, transfers of memberships, dues and other fees, registration of floor
employees, and back-office procedures, from those rules promulgated by organizations for the direct protection of customers from
fraudulent conduct.' Even the Geyer court's analysis is questionable if one notes that the Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets of the Securities Exchange Commission found the
"Know Your Customer" rules to have been designed primarily to
protect member firms against irresponsible customers." Based on
4' See generally Allen, Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act For Violations of
Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAW. 1493, 1501 (1970); Wolfson and Russo, supra note
13, at 1130; Comment, Civil Liability For Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v. First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 393 (1972).
11 In Buttrey, the Seventh Circuit did refer fleetingly to the trial court's discussion
of nonactionable housekeeping rules, but the circuit court failed to expand on this. 410
F.2d at 141. Other commentators have attempted to identify the element distinguishing
actionable from non-actionable exchange and association rules. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. at 1040-41 (rules must be sufficiently precise); Allen
supra note 48, at 1500; Hoblin, supra note 13, at 274-79; MacLean, supra note 13, at 76;
Wolfson and Russo, supra note 13, at 1135-1141; Comment, The "Know Your Customer"
Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities
Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489, 547-48.
" 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975). For a discussion of the facts of Geyer see text
accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
51 389 F. Supp. at 683. See also Allen, supra note 48, at 1500-01. Allen discusses the
various forms of "housekeeping rules," i.e., rules dealing with access and communication
with the trading floor (NYSE Rules 35-38); making and settling exchange contracts
(NYSE Rules 45-47); maintenance of market through bids and offers (NYSE Rules 6179); handling of orders and reports (NYSE Rules 115-126); and, comparison and exchange
of contracts (NYSE Rules 131-143).
52 See SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MASKERs OF THE SEcUmRTES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 316 (1963), where
it was noted:
In the study's public hearings, President Funston of the Exchange expressed
the opinion that the "know your customer rule" was primarily designed to
protect member firms against irresponsible customers, and the past applica-
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this analysis, the "Know Your Customer" rules would, and
should, fail even the Buttrey test.
A second ground for criticism of the Utah State University
decision's adoption of the Buttrey test lies in the second element
of the test, i.e., whether the defendant's conduct had been
"tantamount to fraud."" Working from the basic premise that
the primary concern is whether a particular rule is designed for
customer protection, the court concluded that the defendant's
conduct was not tantamount to fraud, and the plaintiff could not
assert an implied private right of action. It is difficult to discern
from a reading of the opinion whether the court found that no
cause of action existed because the defendant's conduct was not
tantamount to fraud, or that a cause of action exists but fraud is
a necessary element to recovery. 5 ' In either instance, the failure
to prove fraud will result in a denial of recovery by the plaintiff.
These two methods of analysis are quite distinct, however.
The Buttrey test makes the presence of fraud a prerequisite
to the recognition of an implied private right of action. Zagari v.
Dean Witter & Co., criticized such a position by noting:
It is one thing to say as the United States Supreme Court just
said in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder ... that while a private right

tion of the rule in exchange disciplinary proceedings confirms the view that
it has generally been restricted to such use.
See also, Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. at 419-20; Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [19761977] FED. SEac. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-14 n.10; Wolfson and Russo, supra note 13, at
1130.
53See text accompanying note 24 supra.
See Hoblin, note 13 supra, at 267, where the author stated:
What is the relationship between a fraud concept and that of a rule
violation? No one disputes that a charge of fraud is actionable at common
law or under rule 10b-5; that was not the question before the court. With
respect to that count, fraud was irrelevant; either the violation of the rule
was actionable or it was not. The question of fraud should not have entered
into the court's consideration.
See also, Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. at 419:
The "tantamount to fraud" requirement makes the determination concerning the private right of action depend upon individual conduct rather than
upon the nature of the rule in question, with the legally illogical result that
violation of the same rule would not consistently give rise to a cause of action.
See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc ..... Courts have also expressed
concern that application of the Buttrey standard would cause excessive litigation because a determination of the facts regarding fraud would be required before subject matter jurisdiction could be determined with certainty.
See Piper Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Landin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Lange
v. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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of action exists for violations of rule 10(b)-5, the rule itself is not
violated unless there is evidence of scienter, and an entirely different
thing to say as does the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey, that while rule
405 may be violated by simple errors of judgment, a private action
will only lie where the rule is violated by conduct "tantamount to
fraud.""

In contrast to the Buttrey form of analysis, however, the
court, by its numerous references to the Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder decision,5" may have implicitly adopted the position
that an implied private right of action lies for violation of an
exchange or association rule, and that fraud is a necessary element thereof.57 This interpretation of the Utah State University
decision may help to account for the emphasis placed by the
Court on Ernst & Ernst, while totally ignoring the fact that
"tantamount to fraud" is also the second element of the Buttrey
test. While a close reading of the Utah State decision supports
this latter interpretation, clarification by the court in the future
would be of great assistance.
The third, and most important, ground for criticism of the
Tenth Circuit's decision was the court's failure to take cognizance
of the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in Cort
v. Ash.5 In Cort, the Court formulated a four-pronged test for
determining whether a statute gives rise to an implied private
right of action. The factors identified by the Court were: (1)
Whether plaintiff was a member of the class for whose benefit the
statute was passed; (2) whether Congress indicated an explicit or
implicit legislative intent to grant or deny such a remedy; (3)
whether an implied right of action is consistent with the legislative scheme; and, (4) whether the cause of action would be in an
area of law traditionally relegated to state law.59
In two very recent Supreme Court opinions decided subse[1976-19771 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-14 n.ll.
425 U.S. at 196. Justice Powell stated, "Although § 10(b) does not by its terms

create an express civil remedy . . . the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the statute and the Rule is now well established." But cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (the Court stated it has only recognized an implied cause of action
under some circumstances).
11 425 U.S. at 196-97. Even the dissent in Ernst & Ernst did not view the majority's
opinion as doing anything more than defining an element of a section 10(b) cause of action.
Id. at 218.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Id. at 78-85.
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quent to Utah State University by only two months, the Supreme
Court applied the Cort criteria to the implication of private actions under the federal securities laws. In Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 10 the Court rejected an implied right of action for
defeated tender-offerors under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In that instance, the Court found that the
tender-offeror-plaintiff failed to satisfy any of the four Cort elements." In a subsequent decision, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, the Court found that an alleged breach of corporate fiduciary duty, absent an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation did
not violate section 10(b) . 2 Part four of the Green opinion contains
language similar to that found in the Utah State University decision, namely, that without proof of fraud, a breach of fiduciary
duty did not give rise to a private cause of action under section
10(b).13 Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in part, aptly noted that
part four was unnecessary to the decision, in light of the earlier
resolution of the case on the grounds that the facts alleged by the
plaintiff in his complaint did not constitute "fraud" within the
meaning of section 10(b). 4 The Green decision, therefore, is an
excellent example of the vagueness, overbreadth, and confusion
also demonstrated in Utah State University.
At the time of the Utah State University decision Judge
Peckham, in Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., had already recognized
that in comparing the Buttrey and Colonial Realty standards, it
was apparent that the former embodies only the first of the Cort
factors.6 5 In contrast, Colonial Realty implicitly encompassed the
first factor in Cort, and explicitly addressed the remaining
so430 U.S. 1 (1977).
61The Court examined each of the four elements of the Cort test, determining that:
(1) The Williams Act (§ 14(e)) was enacted solely to protect investors, not tender-offerors;
(2) there was no indication that Congress intended to create a private action for the loser
in a tender offer contest; (3) the Williams Act was designed as a disclosure mechanism
not a means for recovering monetary damages by a person outside the protection class;
and (4) the common law action of interference with commercial advantages was available.
Id. at 37-41. It is interesting to note that in coming to the opposite conclusion of the
majority, the dissent also based their argument on Cort v. Ash.
62 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" Id. at 477-80. This portion of the opinion was dictum, however, for the Court had
already dismissed the plaintiffs claim for failure to prove a necessaary element of the
cause of action: scienter. Id. at 474-77.
' Id. at 480-81.
0 [1976-19771 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,809.
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three. 6 In a decision subsequent to Utah State University, Nelson
v. Hench, the Minnesota District Court noted, "The appropriateness of Judge Friendly's approach [Colonial Realty] was implicitly confirmed recently by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash
....
,"67Numerous other courts have also attempted to resolve
the implied private right of action for violation of exchange or
association rules by applying the Cort criteria.68
The analysis in Nelson v. Hench 9 succinctly demonstrates
the result obtained from an application of the Cort test to the
"Know Your Customer" rule. Considering each element, the
court noted: (1) The rule "must have been enacted primarily for
the protection of the dealers . . . . [Pilaintiffs . . . cannot establish . . . that the protection of investors . . . was more than
an incidental motive for enactment of these rules."; (2)
"[Cilearly Congress did not contemplate causes of action arising
under rules promulgated by exchanges or dealer associations"; (3)
"Moreover, the implication of such rights of action is diametrically opposite to the concept of self-regulation that is essential to
the regulatory scheme and purpose of the 1934 Act"; and, (4) "In
essence, the NYSE and NASD have incorporated into their rules
one standard by which defendant firms' duty could be measured
in a negligence action."70 The Zagari court paralleled this analysis, and in addition, noted that section 10(b) was also an avail7
able, existing remedy. '
To apply the Cort test and recognize an implied private right
would require proof that under the "Know Your Customer" rule
the "protection of investors" was as important, if not more imporMld.
428 F. Supp. at 419.
Numerous other opinions have also recognized the applicability of the Cort test to
the issue of whether violations of exchange or association rules will give rise to a private
cause of action. See, e.g., Lank v. NYSE, 548 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1977) (Cort used in the
context of a suit by one exchange member against another); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegler
& Co., 534 F.2d 156, 166 (9th Cir. 1976) (pursuant to Cort a private action will lie against
an exchange for violation of the registration provisions); Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon
Auchincloas, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977) (applying Cort, violations of
margin requirements may give rise to an implied private right of action); Lange v. H.
Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (no implied private right of action
for violations of NASD Rules of Fair Trade).
U 428 F. Supp. 411 (D. Minn. 1977).
Id. at 419-20.
"[1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809-13 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 27,
1976).
"
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tant, than the protection of brokers; the potential for implied civil
liability was consistent with the regulatory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act; and, that despite a fraud requirement, the
"Know Your Customer" rules still preclude conduct not actionable under presently existing theories. No plaintiff, within the
framework of the Cort test, has attempted this argument to date.
Whether the Tenth Circuit, therefore, implicitly rejected the
applicability of Cort to Utah State University, or the defendants
failed to raise the issue of the Cort test, is unimportant. Of greater
importance is the very questionability of the mode of analysis
relied upon by the court.
B. Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board72
A brief discussion of the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a
violation of regulation T (margin requirement) of the Federal
Reserve Board does not give rise to a private cause of action is
merited more because of the method of analysis used in that
portion of the opinion than because of the result reached.73 The
issue of whether violation of regulation T should give rise to a
private cause of action has been the subject of as much debate
as whether violation of exchange or association rules should give
rise to such a remedy. Again the federal courts have demonstrated a clearly distinguishable split both in the results they
have reached and the analytical frameworks they have used.74
72 See note 9 supra.

549 F.2d at 169-70.
7, For an indication of the divergence in many circuits see generally Shull v. Dain,
Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1977); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251,
260, (4th Cir. 1975) (no cause of action created); McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620,
627 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975) (no right of action); Gordon v.
duPont, Glore Forgan Inc., 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974)
(no action under these circumstances); Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246, 247 (6th
Cir. 1973) (right of action allowed); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German Co., 429 F.2d 1136,
1142-44 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Junger v. Hertz, Neumark, &
Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970); Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933 (1966); Goldenberg v. Bache &
Co., 270 F.2d 675, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1959) (right of action allowed); Drasner v. Thomson,
McKinnon Securities, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no cause of action exists);
Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977)
(cause of action exists); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) at 90,813 (rejected existence of a cause of action); Freeman v. Marine Midland
Bank, 419 F. Supp. 440, 451-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussion of regulation T and regulation
X); Architectural League of N.Y. v. Bartas, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (no action absent
showing that broker induced investor to buy); Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646,
"
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Judge Breitenstein's analysis of the regulation T issue was
markedly different from his analysis of the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules. In examining the issue, the court
questioned whether the regulation was presently intended to protect investors,7 5 whether an implied private action was consistent
with the legislative scheme behind the regulation of margin requirements,7" and whether criminal sanctions were available
against a violating broker." A closer examination of these concerns reveals that they coincide almost exactly with elements one,
three, and four of the Cort v. Ash test.7" Judge Breitenstein also
noted that in 1970, after numerous cases had imposed civil liability upon brokers for violation of margin requirements, Congress
amended section 7(f) of the Securities Exchange Act, making it
illegal for a customer to obtain or receive credit in violation of
Federal Reserve Board Regulations.7" Therefore, the second element of Cort, whether Congress expressly or implicitly intended
to grant or deny an implied private right of action, was indirectly
addressed in Utah State University. Nowhere in the 1970 amendments was implied civil liability ever mentioned. s0 As with the
exchange and association rules, the Zagaril' court applied the
Cort factors to its analysis of regulation T and arrived at the same
conclusion as Utah State University.
One can only wonder why the Tenth Circuit did not apply
the same analytical framework to exchange and association rules
as it applied to violations of regulation T. With this in mind,
therefore, it can certainly be argued that the issue of the existence
650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (duty on brokers to ensure that customers understand).
See also, Comment, Civil LiabilityFor Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f)
and Regulation X, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 93, 104-17 (1974); Note, Regulation X and
Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes, 57 MtNN. L. Ray. 208 (1972).
549 F.2d at 170. (The primary purpose was to promote market stability).
Id. (Broker is no longer the sole party responsible for observing margin requirements).
11Id. (The court noted that, although the criminal penalty depended on who the
violator was, that was not grounds for imposing civil liability. As a second form of liability,
if fraud were involved, the conduct would be actionable under section 10(b). See, e.g.,
Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir. 1977); Zagari v. Dean
Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-3.
' See text accompanying notes 58 and 59 supra.
' This was done through the promulgation of Regulation X, 549 F.2d at 170. See also
note 9 supra.
0 See Note and Comment, note 74 supra.
" [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-3.
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of an implied private right of action for violation of exchange and
association rules has not totally been foreclosed by the acceptance of such in Utah State University.
CONCLUSION

The Utah State University decision reflects the Tenth Circuit's attempt to align itself more closely with the holdings of
various recent Supreme Court securities decisions, while demonstrating a lack of understanding of the policy basis from which
the Supreme Court opinions arose.8" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, when viewed from the perspective of the Supreme Court
decisions following it, appears to have been a logical step for
the Court in light of its earlier decisions, Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores and Cort v. Ash." The Utah State University decision reaches a result consistent with the recent position
of the Supreme Court without exploring the analytical underpinnings so carefully laid by the Supreme Court as justification
for its decisions. It is for that reason that although the decision
is seemingly correct in the result it reaches, the Tenth Circuit's
mode of analysis and the conclusions it draws therefrom are not
totally consistent. In conclusion, the Utah State University
decision represents the difficulties that the Tenth Circuit,
like many other circuit courts, is having in reconciling the rather
drastic reversal in the policy rationales being used by the
Supreme Court in recent securities litigation and the broad, remedial, and flexible approach to the securities acts that for so
long has been the touchstone of securities litigation in the federal
courts."4
John L. Ruppert
For a discussion of this recent reversal in the Supreme Court's attitude toward the
federal securities laws, see, Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Ruppert, The
Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: A New Securities Law Perspective,
3 J. CowP. L. 112 (1977). For a graphic demonstration of the shift, see Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); ForemostMcKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" See Lowenfels note 82 supra. See also Ruppert note 82 supra.
U See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (interpret the
acts flexibly to effectuate their remedial purpose); Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (protection of
investors).

TAXATION
OVERVIEW
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered a
limited number of cases'involving federal taxation. Due to the
relatively small number of cases and to make the survey of this
area as complete as possible, most of these cases will be discussed.'
King v. United States2 involved a number of tax-related issues raised in the determination of the amount and the validity
of taxes assessed and liens filed by the IRS pursuant to the assessments in proceedings for arrangement under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act.' Of primary interest' was the Tenth Circuit's
affirmation of the district court finding that a price adjustment
clause in an agreement for the sale of the taxpayer's corporate
stock to his children's trust could be enforced to defeat an assessment of gift tax under section 2512(b). King had sold stock of a
closely held corporation to his children's trusts. The price adjustment clause in question appeared in the letters of agreement for
the sales. 5 The price agreed upon by King and the trustee was
All citations to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended;
all citations to sections refer to sections of the Code.
2 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976).
4 The other issues treated by the Tenth Circuit in this case involved findings that:
(1)King was entitled to an ordinary loss deduction under § 165(c)(2) for losses incurred
as a result of abandonment or worthlessness of oil and gas leases in which King had held
a net operating profits interest; (2)an interest equalization tax under Pub. L. No. 88-563
(1964), formerly I.R.C. §§ 4911-4922, repealed for tax years after 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94455, § 1904(a)(21), should not be assessed for the taxpayer's acquisition of 40,000 shares
of foreign securities; (3)a loan is not a "sale or exchange" for purposes of the Interest
Equalization Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563 (1964), formerly I.R.C. §§ 4911-4922, repealed for
tax years after 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1904(a)(21) (1976), and, therefore, taxpayer
was properly assessed under the former I.R.C. § 4911(b)(1)(A) for the 173,500 shares of
foreign securities purchased with monies from loans.
King had created trusts for each of his four children. The clause in question appeared in the letters of agreement reflecting sales by King of the closely held stock of The
Colorado Corporation to the trustee of the trusts. Each letter provided that King was to
retain title to the stock as security for payment of the purchase price, and in addition,
each letter contained the following language:
However, if the fair market value of The Colorado Corporation stock as of
the date of this letter is ever determined by the Internal Revenue Service to
be greater or less than the fair market value determined in the same manner
described above, the purchase price shall be adjusted to the fair market
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later redetermined by the IRS, and a gift tax assessed against
King for the difference resulting from the increased value of the
stock.' The government argued that the price adjustment clause
could not be given effect to alter the terms of an already completed transfer and thereby avoid gift tax on the increased value
as determined by the IRS. In making this argument, the IRS
relied on authorities dealing with contingencies which, upon the
happening of the contingency, altered or destroyed the nature of
the transaction. 7 However, the Tenth Circuit found that the provision for the adjustment of the purchase price of the stock "did
not affect the nature of the transaction." 8 The Tenth Circuit further supported its decision to allow the price adjustment proviso
to effectively insulate the transaction from gift tax by finding that
King had intended the transaction as a sale and not as a gift?
However, Judge Doyle's strong dissent on this issue pointed out
that the subjective motives of the donor should not be determinative for purposes of the application of the gift tax to a transfer.' 0
The majority in King found further that the transaction in
question "was made in the ordinary course of business at arm's
length, free from any donative intent."" Therefore, under the
12
Treasury regulations, the transaction was not subject to gift tax.
Observation: Although a technique such as the one in question would be valuable in situations where, as here, the subject
value determined by the Internal Revenue Service.
545 F.2d at 703-04.
1 The agreed price for the sale of the stock was $1.25 per share. The IRS determined that the stock had a fair market value of $16.00 per share at the date of the transfer
and assessed a gift tax against King for the difference. Id. at 704.
1 In this argument, the IRS relied substantially upon Commissioner v. Procter, 142
F.2d 824 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944). The IRS also argued that for
accounting purposes, tax consequences are fixed at the end of fixed accounting periods,
regardless of the effect of subsequent events, and that taxpayers cannot retroactively
amend a transaction to avoid federal tax consequences of earlier taxable periods. 545 F.2d
at 705.
O 545 F.2d at 705.
* Id. at 705-06.
10Id. at 713. The majority recognized that, generally, absence of a donative intent
will not in itself prevent taxation of a transfer as a gift, but found this not to be controlling
where, as here, the transfer was found to have been made at arm's length. Id. at 706.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1977) provides in part that "a sale, exchange, or other
transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona
fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
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of the sale is difficult to value and may subsequently be revalued
by the IRS, caution is advised in relying upon a price adjustment
clause to avoid later adverse gift tax consequences upon revaluation. As pointed out in the dissent, such a price adjustment clause
is in conflict with the general rule that once a transaction and a
tax year are completed, the tax consequences attach and retroactive adjustments in the transaction are not allowed to alter these
tax consequences. 3 The effect of allowing such clauses will be
substantial, and it may be anticipated that the IRS will continue
to oppose such price adjustment clauses.
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit
considered, on remand from the Supreme Court, 5 the applicability of the doctrine of official immunity to IRS agents." The Supreme Court had determined that while levying on property pursuant to a jeopardy assessment the IRS agents, by making a
warrantless entry into the plaintiff's cottage, had made an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The Supreme Court, upon its finding that plaintiff's constitutional rights
had been violated, remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for
consideration of the issue of damages against the individual
agents. 8 On remand, the court of appeals reiterated the general
rule that a cause of action for damages will lie against a federal
officer or agent who violates Fourth Amendment rights under
color of his authority."' On the remaining issue of whether the
doctrine of official immunity would shield the IRS agents from
such an action, the Tenth Circuit declined to invoke the protection of absolute immunity in these circumstances. 20 Instead, the
court applied a standard of limited immunity, which protects an
IRS agent from liability if he acts in good faith upon a reasonable
belief that his conduct is proper. 2'
545 F.2d at 714.
14560 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1977).
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
IS Traditionally, the doctrine of official immunity protects officials from damage suits
for acts done in the course of their duties. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), for a
statement of the doctrine.
"7429 U.S. at 340.
" Id. at 341.
" 560 F.2d at 1013.
" Id. at 1015.
" Id. In formulating this standard, the court relied on Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), which applied a similar standard of limited
'"
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2 presented a case of first impression
Marvel v. United States"
to the Tenth Circuit. Taxpayers sought review of a district court
order denying their motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the IRS from levying on taxpayers' assets during the pendancy of their suit for refund and abatement of allegedly unpaid FICA, federal withholding, and federal
unemployment taxes.13 This case presented somewhat unusual
circumstances insofar as the taxpayer had paid only a portion of
the allegedly owing taxes and there was a possibility of an IRS
seizure of the taxpayer's property during the pendancy of the
refund proceedings."' Only a portion of the allegedly owing taxes
had been paid because, under the "divisible taxes" rule, certain
taxes are considered to be divisible per transaction or event. The
jurisdiction of the district courts may be invoked by payment of
the assessed taxes for any one transaction or event without payment of the full assessment.2 Taxpayers had made such a partial
payment of the allegedly owing taxes,'2 and sought injunctive
relief from seizure of their assets during the pendancy of the
litigation.
In Marvel, the statute under consideration was section
7421(a) [the Anti-injunction Act]. The Act provides that no action may be maintained for the purpose of restraining the assessment of any tax, except as allowed in certain specific statutes.'

immunity. In applying this standard in G.M. Leasing, the Tenth Circuit found that the
agents had in good faith believed that they were acting in accordance with the law in
entering the cottage without a warrant. Id.
n 548 F.2d 295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
" 548 F.2d at 297.
2 I.R.C. § 6331 allows the IRS to levy upon the property of a person liable for a tax,
if the tax has not been paid.
0 Before a suit for a tax refund may be maintained in a district court or in the court
of claims, the taxpayer must first pay the taxes which are contested. Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). However, Flora also created an exception to this rule for taxes
which were "divisible." Flora stated this divisible-taxes rule with regard to excise taxes,
but the exception that only partial payment need be made has been extended to other
types of divisible taxes, including employment and social security taxes. Steele v. United
States, 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960).
" Taxpayers, on November 6, 1974, paid the employment taxes of one of the alleged
employees for each of the periods in question. 548 F.2d at 296.
27 I.R.C. § 7421(a) provides:
Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426 (a) and
(b)(1), and 7429 (b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether
or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
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This statute had been strictly construed on previous occasions by
the Supreme Court, but all of the previous cases involved suits
for injunctive relief prior to any payment of the taxes assessed.
However, the Supreme Court had never ruled directly on the
availability of injunctive relief in suits for refund of taxes paid.
The taxpayers argued to the Tenth Circuit that without injunctive relief from seizure during such partial payment refund suits,
the "divisible taxes" exception to the general rule requiring full
payment of taxes to invoke jurisdiction for a claim for refund
would be, in effect, meaningless. The IRS could, by levying on
taxpayers' assets, unilaterally require full payment of the assessed taxes at any time, and thereby circumvent the exception
allowing partial payment for divisible taxes. The Tenth Circuit
declined to create a judicial exception to the Anti-injunction Act
for refund cases involving partial payment of assessed taxes, and
upheld the district court's denial of injunctive relief."9
Observation: This holding supports the emerging trend of
strict construction and enforcement of the Anti-injunction Act, in
contrast with earlier decisions which seemed to be willing to
apply a more liberal standard of judicial interpretation to the
30
language of the statute.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. United States31 presented another issue of first impression to the Tenth Circuit. Monfort, in
its operation as a large cattle finisher, buys tremendous quantities of feed subject to frequent and substantial price changes. In
an effort to lend some price stability to its feed acquisitions,
Monfort participated as a hedger in the grain futures market. 3 As
a hedger, Monfort's commodity transactions were solely for the
" See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974). Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), created one exception to the general
rule that injunctions could not be maintained to restrain the assessment of a tax. Under
the Williams Packing exception, a showing "that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail" and that "equity jurisdiction otherwise exists," would make
injunctive relief available. Id. at 7.
" The taxpayers in Marvel made an alternative argument that they satisfied the
Williams Packing requirements and should therefore be given injunctive relief. The Tenth
Circuit, however, found that they did not meet the "under no circumstances" test of
Williams Packing and therefore were not entitled to an injunction. 548 F.2d at 300-01.
" See Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
3' 561 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 406 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1976).
" Within a commodity market such as grain, hedgers contract to buy or sell a certain
quantity of grain on a specific date at an established price.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

purpose of inventory cost protection, and not for investment or
speculation.33 Initially, Monfort reported its gains and losses on
the futures market as separate income items or as direct adjustments to its costs of goods sold.Y In 1967, however, several years
after its entry into the futures market as a hedger, Monfort began
utilizing its futures market gains or losses as direct adjustments
to its ending inventory.3 By 1967-1968, Monfort was also active
in the relatively new commodity market developed for live cattle.
As a result, Monfort reduced its 1968 ending cattle inventory by
the amount of its 1968 cattle futures gain.3 Since 1951, Monfort
had utilized the last-in-first-out method (LIFO) to establish its
inventories and costs of sales for income tax purposes.3 7 Upon its
review of Monfort's 1968 return, the IRS determined that Monfort's treatment of its hedging gains did not clearly reflect its
income as required by the Treasury regulation, section 1.4461(a)(2).3 In addition, the IRS determined that Monfort's treatment of its hedging gains constituted a change in accounting
methods made without prior approval of the Secretary or his
delegate as required by I.R.C. section 446(e). 9
In Monfort, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
finding that hedging gains and losses as a direct adjustment to
inventory accurately reflected Monfort's acquisition costs and
that this practice was in keeping with the Treasury regulations
which allow flexibility in valuations of inventory in order to give
effect to trade customs. 0
The decision in Monfort also upheld the district court with
regard to the second issue of whether Monfort's treatment of its
hedging gains constituted a change of accounting method without
approval. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's find3 561 F.2d at 192.
4 Id.
3Id.
"3 Id.

' Id. at 191.

- 26 C.F.R. 1.446-1(c)(2) (1977).
3 The Tenth Circuit found it significant that the IRS expert, in his testimony before
the district court, acknowledged that there was nothing in the treasury regulations which
specifically prohibited Monfort's tax treatment of its hedging gains. Id. at 193.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(b) states: "inventory rules cannot be uniform but must give
effect to trade customs which come within the scope of the best accounting practice in
the particular trade or business."
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ing that Monfort had not changed its method of accounting by
its treatment of its hedging gains as an adjustment to inventory."
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand' presented another
issue of first impression to the Tenth Circuit. The IRS appealed
the district court's denial of enforcement of an IRS summons,
issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 7602,' 3 directing Coopers & Lybrand [C&L], an independent auditing firm, to testify and produce its books relative to its examination and audit of JohnsManville's [J-M] consolidated financial statements for 1971 and
1972. C&L had responded with "voluminous workpapers and documents"" but had refused to provide its audit program and the
tax pool analysis file. The denial was made upon the ground that
both sets of documents were irrelevant to the preparation of J-M's
1971 and 1972 tax returns which were the subject of the IRS
investigation. C&L functioned solely in an auditing capacity and
did not participate in either the preparation or review of J-M's
federal tax returns;' 5 J-M's returns were prepared internally.
Thus neither the audit program" nor the tax pool analysis file'
was used in the preparation of J-M's 1971 or 1972 tax returns.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the IRS argument that the tax
pool analysis file was relevant to the IRS audit of J-M's tax re11561

F.2d at 197.
2 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975).
" 26 U.S.C.A. § 7602 authorizes the Secretary:
(t)o summon . . . any person having possession, custody, or care of books of
account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax . . .to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place
named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other
data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry ....
" 550 F.2d at 617. The court noted that C&L's cooperation with the IRS, except for
the two sets of documents in issue, had been extensive. Id. at 619.
" Id. at 617.
" The audit program is a master plan developed by C&L specifically for use in
auditing J-M. The plan contains no factual data regarding J-M corporate transactions,
but consists solely "of a listing of procedures to be followed by C&L personnel throughout
the United States in examining books and records of J-M, documentation of the extent
to which such proceedings were followed, and suggestions for the future modification of
such procedures." Id. at 618.
" The tax pool analysis file "prepared by J-M personnel contains its estimates of JM's contingent liabilities for future income tax periods." Id. at 617. The file is used by JM to prepare financial statements in compliance with SEC requirements; it is also used
by C&L to verify that J-M's financial statements are prepared according to generally
accepted accounting principles. Id.
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turns because "it might show tax fraud, because it might show
substantial tax liability, and because it would be relevant to show
and establish the state of mind of employees at the time the
returns were filed." 8 Such an argument, the court noted, would
lead to a virtually unlimited discovery power.49
While the court acknowledged that the IRS' authority under
section 7602 was extensive, 50 it noted the limitations on the
agency's investigative powers:
Although the IRS need not establish probable cause prior to the
issuance of a summons, it must establish that the investigation is
pursuant to and relevant to a legitimate purpose; that the information is not already available; that a determination has been made
by the secretary or his delegate that further examination is necessary; and that the other administrative steps required by the Code
have been followed."1

This standard, the court noted, had been applied frequently to
sustain the validity of a summons directed to a third party. 5 In
these cases, however, "the documents summoned dealt directly
with the taxpayer's return as filed or were a source of information
for the retum" while in this case the court stressed that C&L
had no responsibility for J-M's tax returns. The court cited with
approval the Eighth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Matras:5' "the government should not, for the mere sake of its
convenience, impose unnecessary burdens on a taxpayer in conducting an audit or investigation for tax liability. The term
'relevant' connotes and encompasses more than 'convenience." ,,
" Id. at 619. The investigation of J-M's 1971 and 1972 returns was part of a continuing
review: the IRS had audited every J-M return since 1913. Id. at 617.
"[E]xtending IRS contentions herein to their logical conclusion, it is
hard to determine what corporate records would not fall under a § 7602
summonses if the standard endorsed the production of any records which
might show tax fraud or tax liability. IRS does not, as it appears to assume
on this appeal, have carte blanche discovery."
Id. at 619.
10Id. (citing SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1038 (1972), and United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45
(10th Cir. 1974)).
11550 F.2d at 619-20 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)).
52 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).

0 550 F.2d at 620.

- 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
u 550 F.2d at 621. The court also noted the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States
v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (1973), that judicial protection against an irrelevant and over-
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After repeating once again that the tax pool analysis file "was not
prepared in connection with or used to facilitate the preparation
and filing of J-M's tax returns and that C&L has no responsibility
for any J-M tax matters,"" the court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the tax pool analysis file was not relevant and therefore not subject to production under the summons.57
In United States v. United Banks of Denver," the Tenth
Circuit considered whether the taxpayer's interest in a testamentary trust fund constituted "property" or "rights to property"
which would allow a federal tax lien to attach under section
6321.1' The Tenth Circuit found that local (Colorado) law would
be determinative of the nature of the property rights of the taxpayer." Only after such determination under local law should
resort be made to federal law to ascertain whether the property
rights so determined constitute "property" or "rights to property" within the meaning of the federal tax lien statute. The
Tenth Circuit certified the question of the nature of the taxpayer's interest to the Colorado Supreme Court"' and, upon the
decision of the Colorado court, reversed and remanded the case
to the federal district court for reconsideration in view of the
ruling by the Colorado Supreme Court.
2 the Tenth
In Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner,"
broad summons was particularly appropriate where a third party was involved. 550 F.2d
at 621.
"550 F.2d at 621.
7 Id. The court also upheld the district court's finding with respect to the audit
program noting that "Imere convenience does not make an item producible under an
IRS summons." Id.
542 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1976).
" I.R.C. § 6321 states:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue
in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person (emphasis added).
542 F.2d at 821-22.
In Re Question Submitted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, 553 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1976). The question certified to the supreme court was
whether taxpayer's interest in the trust created in his favor under his father's will was a
future interest subject to a condition precedent or a vested remainder subject to a complete defeasance on the happening of a condition subsequent.
-2 554 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1977).
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Circuit upheld the findings of the Tax Court13 as to the useful life
of certain structures for which a business depreciation deduction
had been claimed under section 167(a).14 The court held that the
determination of the useful life of a building and its component
parts is a factual one, 5 and, therefore could not be reversed on
appeal unless clearly erroneous-unless the "reviewing court
• . .is left with a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.' "67
In finding that such a mistake had not been made, the Tenth
Circuit first noted that the IRS' own policy of not altering a
taxpayer's estimate of the useful life of a structure 8 must be
considered in light of the "well established rule that the Commissioner's determination, once made, is presumptively correct and
that the burden is on the taxpayer to show error."69 The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that the number of witnesses
should be a factor in whether or not that burden is met. The
taxpayer had argued that its three witnesses should have been
more convincing than the Commissioner's one; but the court
noted that "[t]he weight of the evidence does not necessarily
depend on the number of witnesses called by a party, and the
70
credibility to be given a witness is a matter for the Tax Court.
Finally, the court rejected the taxpayer's allegation that the Tax
Court's determination had been made in a "rather hit-or-miss
fashion and by the flip of a coin. ' ' 7' The Tenth Circuit noted that
"it is not our function . . . to attempt to psychoanalyze the Tax
Court and go behind its written findings and speculate as to its
thinking processes. Our task is simply to determine whether the
Tax Court's several findings are supported by evidence and are
72
not clearly erroneous.
United States v. Smith7 3 involved an attempt by taxpayers
- 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 33.333 (1975).
" Section 167 permits as a depreciation deduction an allowance for wear and tear on
property used in a business.
" 554 F.2d at 415.
u Id.

hId.

0

Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418.
0 554 F.2d at 415.
70 Id. at 416.
71 Id.
72

Id.

"

Nos. 76-1854 and 76-1855 (10th Cir., May 12, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
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to invoke their Fifth Amendment" privilege against selfincrimination and thereby not state their earnings on their income tax returns. Recognizing the general rule that while the
Fifth Amendment allows a party to object to particular questions
on a return, it does not allow a party to refuse to make any return
at all, 5 the Tenth Circuit found that taxpayers' failure to set forth
their earnings was tantamount to not filing any return at all. On
this basis, the court of appeals rejected the claim of the taxpayers
that the good faith exercise of their privilege against selfincrimination was a valid defense against an action for willfully
failing to make a tax return."6
In Dowell v. United States 7 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's decision that a "sponsorship gift" of $22,500 by
the taxpayer to the Oral Roberts Evangelistic Association was
deductible as a charitable contribution under section 170 and was
not consideration for residential care received by the taxpayer
and her husband from a subsidiary of the "donee" corporation.
The court stressed that the key issue was the intent or motive of
the taxpayer. 8 In those cases where gifts had been disqualified as
charitable contributions "the donor-taxpayer was found to have
expected or anticipated the exchange benefit."7 Here, however,
the court held that there was "substantial evidence" 0 on which
the trial court could have based its finding that the gift had been
made "out of a detached and disinterested charitable and generous purpose," 8 1 and not in consideration for the lifetime housing,
care and other benefits received from the retirement village.
Cathleen Osborn Brandt
Constance C. Talmage
, U.S. CONST. amend.

V.

274 U.S. 259 (1927).
I.R.C. § 7203 provides penalties for willful failure to make a required tax return.
" 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
, Id. at 1238.
7 Id. at 1239.
' There was conflicting testimony as to whether the taxpayer was aware that the
sponsorship gift was "requested" as a condition of admission to the retirement village. The
trial court found, however, that such a gift was not "required" and that almost one fourth
of the residents did not give the suggested amount. Id. at 1237.
AId.
' United States v. Sullivan,

7
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